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TRY 1
"fk
AN ANALYSIS OF THE STRUCTURE OF THE INCOME TAXATION OF TRUSTS 
Synopsis
By reason of its nature as a legal concept, the trust is destined 
to fit awkwardly within any statutory system of taxation. It is 
intended in this dissertation to present an analysis of the present 
structure of the income taxation of trusts, noting certain aspects 
of the role of the trust in income tax planning.
For ease of presentation, the work is divided into three parts.
Part 1 is primarily concerned with the rudiments of the income 
taxation of the trust. In particular, there is presented an examination 
of the means by which the schedular system is adapted for the purposes
of trust taxation. The basis of the liability to tax of both the
trustee and beneficiary is discussed; considerable attention being 
focused on the nature of the beneficiary's interest under a trust as 
the factor determing the Schedule by virtue of which the beneficiary 
is chargeable to tax.
Also comprised in Part 1 is an examination of the machinery provided 
by sections 16 and 17, Finance Act 1973 for the taxation of 
discretionary and accumulation trusts.
The discussion in Part 1 relates exclusively to the taxation of the 
trustee and beneficiary. However, Part 2 is concerned with the 
taxation of the truster and comprises an analysis of the operation of 
the anti-avoidance provisions of Part XVI, Income and Corporation
Taxes Act 1970, as they apply to the trust concept.
In order to ascertain the scope of Part XVI consideration is given to 
the interpretation of the terms 'settlement' and 'settlor' as used 
therein. By virtue of the provisions of Part XVI the opportunity for 
the avoidance of income tax by means of the trust is severely limited. 
This limitation is achieved in general by the prescribing of 
circumstances in which the various flows of income (and to a certain
extent, capital) associated with the trust may be redirected to and 
treated as the income of the truster. The discussion is on a 
practical level, although the theoretical disharmony between certain 
sections of Part XVI is considered.
It is demonstrated in Part 2 that the only trusts which may be 
utilized effectively for the purpose of avoiding income tax are 
settlements of capital. For the sake of completeness, in Part 3 there 
is provided a general description of the capital gains and transfer 
tax treatment of the trust.
Because of the enormity of the subject of trust income taxation, it 
has been necessary to restrict the scope of this analysis as far as 
possible to a consideration of the taxation of trusts resident and 
domiciled in the United Kingdom.
The law stated is as at 1st June, 1981.
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PART 1
THE LIABILITY TO TAX OF THE TRUSTEE AND BENEFICIARY 
Introduction
The income tax legislation provides no code for adapting the 
schedular system for the purposes of trust taxation. The 
theoretical basis of the liability to tax of either trustee 
or beneficiary must, therefore, be found within the existing 
schedular framework.
1
Liability to tax can be created by Act of Parliament alone: while
it is open to the courts to interpret legislation, they are not, 
in theory, in the position to impose or absolve liability contrary 
to the intention of Parliament as expressed in the taxing statutes, 
According to Lord Cairns;
"If the person sought to be taxed comes within the letter 
of the law he must be taxed, however great the hardship may 
appear to the judicial mind to be. On the other hand, if 
the Crown, seeking to recover tax, cannot bring the subject 
within the letter of the law, the subject is free, however 
apparently within the spirit of the law the case might 
otherwise appear to be. In other words, if there be 
admissible, in any statute, what is called an equitable 
construction, certainly such a construction is not admissible 
in a taxing statute, where you can simply adhere to the words 
of the statute."
Thus, if the income of either trustee or beneficiary is not derived 
from any source designated in the Schedules it cannot be assessed 
to tax. Further, if the income is assessable it must be charged 
only under the Schedule appropriate to its source:
"Before you can assess a profit to tax you must be sure that 
you have properly identified its source or other description 
according to the correct Schedule; but once you have done 
that, it is obligatory that it should be charged, if at all, 
under that Schedule and strictly in accordance wit^ the Rules 
that are there laid down for assessment under it."
1. Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th. ed,, vol. 8 para. 9l3.
2. PartingtonV. Att-Gen., (1869) L.R. 4 H.L. lOO, at p. 122. Cf.
the judgements of Lord Wilberforce and Lord Fraser of Tullybelton 
in W. T. Ramsey v. I.R.C. and Eilbeck v. Rawlings, / 1981 /
S.T.C. 174.
3. Mitchell and Edon v. Ross, (1961) 40 T.C. 56, at p. 61 (per Lord
Radcliffe).
It is with these somewhat inflexible principles that the theory of 
trust taxation must accord.
It is suggested in the Report of the Meade Committee that there are 
only two possible methods of taxing trusts:
"(i) taxing the trust itself as a separate entity ... ; and 
(ii) taxing by reference to the circumstances of the beneficiary 
as if the trust did not exist ...
Trusts in which there is a fixed interest in possession are taxed by 
method (ii).^ Although the Committee grossly over-simplifies the 
matter, the basic theory is that the various taxing provisions are 
applied to the parties to the trust, and the trust itself is, by 
and large, ignored.
Trusts in which there is no fixed interest in possession (discretionary 
and accumulation trusts) are essentially taxed by method (i).^ The 
trust is recognised as an entity; there is provided a separate machinery 
for the taxation of payments from the trust although this does not 
affect the basis of the liability of the trustee and beneficiary under 
the Schedules.
In this part consideration is given first to trusts in which there 
is a fixed interest in possession. An outline of the trust concept 
is provided in Appendix 1.
1. "The Structure and Reform of Direct Taxation", at p. 401
2. Ibid., at p, 404.
3 . Ibid., at p. 404.
TRUSTS IN WHICH THERE IS A FIXED INTEREST IN POSSESSION
Since a trust in which there is a fixed interest in possession^ is 
not recognised as a taxable entity, the liability to tax of the 
trustee and that of the beneficiary must be considered separately,
TAXATION OF THE TRUSTEE
A) The status of the trustee
Trustees are 'persons' for the purposes of the Income Tax Acts;
however, they are distinct from the persons who may from time
to time be trustees. Thus a trustee's personal income is ignored
in computing his liability to tax as a trustee; likewise, the trust
income is left out of account in computing the trustee's personal 
2
liability to tax. The principle is tacitly recognised in s. 154(7),
I.C.T.A. which provides that a change in the trustees of any trust is 
not to be treated as a change in the persons engaged in any trade or 
profession carried on by those trustees as such.
Although trustees are persons for tax purposes they are not 'individuals 
Actual authority for this proposition is scant. Viscount Sumner in 
Baker v. Archer-Shee noted:
"Super teix is chargeable in respect of the income of an 
'individual' from all sources. Even in the easiest case 
of a trustee to accumulate income, no one would say that his 
trust was a 'source of income' to him as an 'individual', for 
in the case of several trustees they are not 'an individual' 
at all.'^
In consequence, trustees are not entitled to the personal reliefs 
which by virtue of s. 5, I.C.T.A. may be claimed only by individuals: 
neither are they assessable to tax at the higher rates applicable to 
individuals by virtue of s. 32(1)(b). Finance Act 1971. As to the 
addition rate of tax. Vaines noted:
1. The meaning of an interest 'in possession' is discussed in Part 
3 below at p. 199-205.
2. Tiley, at 17:10.
3. (1927) 11 T.C. 749, at p. 767 (dissenting). Cf. Farrand (1977 
Conv. 5) who observed that references to 'an individual' in a 
statute should cover cases where there is more than one trustee, 
for 'in every Act ... unless the contrary intention appear 
words in the singular shall include the plural’ - s. 1(1)(b), 
Interpretation Act 1889. However, further support for the 
proposition that trustees are not 'individuals' may be gleaned 
from the judgements of Lord Skerrington and Lord Johnston in 
Fry V. Sheils' Trustees, (1914) 6 T.C. 583.
"The enactment of section 16 of the Finance Act 1973 was 
apparently required specifically to empower the Revenue to 
assess trustees to the additional rate; the surcharge, being 
payable by individuals only, would otherwise not have applied 
to trustees."^
B) The basis of the trustee's liability to tax
Unless the trust instrument otherwise provides, trustees are not 
allowed to retain any of the trust income for their own benefit.
Their liability to tax is generally attributed to the fact that they 
are persons who receive or are entitled to income and it is of no 
consequence that their entitlement is not of a beneficial nature. 
Although it is convenient to describe the basis of the trustees's 
liability to tax on trust income in terms of 'receipt', 'receivability' 
or 'entitlement' it must be emphasised that liability can attach to a 
trustee only if it is shown that the income to which he is entitled 
falls within one of the Schedules mentioned in s. 1,I.C.T.A.
Trustees are the persons in control of trust income and it is they 
who are entitled to sue for any income due from the trust's source;^ 
their role cannot be dismissed as that of a mere conduit through 
which income flows from the source of the trust to the beneficiary; 
as the Lord President (Clyde) explained:
"Unless under very exceptional circumstances, the monies which 
arise or accrue in the form of income to the trustees, as 
administrators of the estate under their charge, are not simply 
passed on to the trust beneficiaries as their income. At the very 
least, there are administrative charges and expenses to be met 
which must be paid out of these monies; and in very many cases 
such monies never reach^the hands of any trust beneficiary in the 
form of income at all."
1. "Loans to Trustees: Section 286":/l98^B.T.R. 413, at p. 415
S. 16, Finance Act 1973 is discussed below at p. 36 et seq.
2. Tiley, at 17:05 and 17:07. Whiteman and Wheatcroft, 17-02
3. Tiley, at 17:05.
4. Reid's Trustees v. I.R.C., (1929) 14 T.C. 512, at p. 523
Their receipt of, or entitlement to, income as the basis of the 
trustees' liability to tax is in accordance with the notion that, 
for income tax purposes, the trust as an entity is disregarded.
However, there is some considerable authority to suggest that the 
entitlement of the trustees to income is not the only basis of their 
liability. In certain circumstances it would appear that they are 
treated as acting in a representative capacity and are taxed on behalf 
of their beneficiaries. This alternative basis of the trustees' 
liability was introduced in Williams v. Singer.1
The Respondents in Williams v. Singer were trustees resident in the 
United Kingdom; they were trustees of a British trust the beneficiaries 
of which were resident and domiciled outside of the United Kingdom.
The trust property comprised shares in a foreign company; the 
shares were registered in the names of the trustees. Dividends on the 
shares were paid direct to the non-resident beneficiaries in compliance 
with the trustees' order; no income was remitted to the United Kingdom, 
Nevertheless, the trustees were assessed to tax on the trust income 
under s. 5, Finance Act 1914 which provided;
"Income tax in respect of income arising from securities, stocks, 
shares or rents in any place out of the United Kingdom shall ... 
be computed on the full amount of the income, whether the income 
has been or will be received in the United Kingdom or not, ... "
The trustees appealed against the assessment. In the House of Lords 
Viscount Cave enunciated the following principle:
"The fact is that, if the Income Tax Acts are examined, it will 
be found that the person charged with tax is neither the trustee 
nor the beneficiary as such, but the person in actual receipt and 
control of the income which is sought to reach. The object of the 
Acts is to secure for the State a proportion of the profits 
chargeable, and this end is attained (speaking generally) by the 
simple and effective expedient of taxing profits where they are 
found. If the beneficiary receives them, he is liable to be 
assessed upon them. If the trustee receives and controls them, he 
is primarily so liable ... But in cases where a trustee or agent 
is made chargeable with tax, the statutes recognise the fact that 
he is a trustee or agent for others, and he is taxed on behalf of
1. (1920) 7T.C. 387
and as representing his beneficiaries or principals ... In 
short, the intention of the Acts appears to be that, where a 
beneficiary is in possession and control of the trust income 
and is sui juris, he is the person to be taxed, and that, while 
a trustee may in certain cases be charged with tax, he is in 
all such cases to be treated as charged on behalf or in respect 
of beneficiaries, who will accordingly be entitled to any exemption 
or abatement which the Acts allow.
The beneficiaries would not have been liable to tax under s, 5 and 
therefore the assessment on the trustees failed.
The decision in Williams v. Singer was considered by the Court of 
Appeal in Kelly v. Rogers.  ^ In the latter mentioned case, a United 
Kingdom resident trustee was entitled to the income arising from 
foreign stocks and shares, and to income from foreign possessions.
There was one beneficiary who was resident in the United Kingdom and 
who was beneficially entitled to a limited amount of income from the 
trust for her maintenance; however, there were no ascertainable 
beneficiaries entitled to the remainder of the income.
The trustee was assessed to tax under Schedule D Case IV, Income Tax 
Act 1918 on the income arising from the foreign stocks and shares 
(this was accumulated outside the United Kingdom), and under Schedule 
D Case V in respect of the income arising from the foreign possessions 
which was remitted to the United Kingdom.
The assessment was upheld. As there were no ascertainable beneficiaries 
on whose behalf the trustee could be said to act, she was liable to tax 
on the trust income, Roraer, L.J. explained:
"Where ... a beneficiary can come and say, "Although the trustee 
is legally entitled to the income, I am entitled in equity to 
receive that income or some definite part of it, and if I am 
entitled to that income or that part of it, as the case may be, 
at law I should not be liable to be taxed in respect of it," 
then, of course, the trustee is not chargeable because the 
beneficiary, on whose behalf and as representing whom the trustee 
is chargeable, is not himself chargeable. But where there is 
no such beneficiary, then the trustee remains chargeable; he is the 
only person who is in fact chargeable in such a case."^
1. (1920) 7 T.C. 387, at p. 411.
2. (1935) 19 T.C. 692.
3. (1935) 19 T.C. 692, at p. 713.
The suggestion is that where a non-taxpaying beneficiary is entitled 
to the income from a trust, the liability to tax of the trustee is 
absolved.
A more extreme view was presented in Baker v. Archer-Shee in which 
Lord Hanworth, M.R. commented:
" ... when you are considering sums which are placed in the 
hands of trustees for the purpose of paying income to beneficiaries, 
for the purpose of the Income Tax Acts you may eliminate the 
trustees. The income is the income of the beneficiaries; the 
income does not belong to the trustees.
The comment of the Master of the Rolls was endorsed by Lord Carson 
in the House of Lords.^ However, it must be appreciated that any 
remarks in the Archer-Shee case as to the liability of the trustee 
are strictly obiter; the case concerned the liability of a 
beneficiary and not a trustee.
The proposition in the Archer-Shee case was not accepted by the Court 
of Session in Reid's Trustees v. I . R . C where trustees were assessed 
to tax under Schedule D Case III of the Income Tax Act 1918 on interest 
received by them without deduction of tax. On the basis of dicta in 
the Archer-Shee case and in Williams v. Singer, the trustees argued 
that the Income Tax Acts did not warrant an assessment on trustees on 
the income arising under a trust. This contention was firmly dismissed 
by the Lord President (Clyde) who stated:
1. (1927) 11 T.C. 749, at p.759-760. The case is discussed in
detail below.
2. Ibid., at p. 782.
3. (1929) 14 T.C. 512.
"In both the two English cases ... referred to / i.e., Baker v. 
Archer-Shee and Williams v. Singer / there are undoubtedly dicta 
enunciated without apparent qualification, which point to the 
complete elimination of the trustees in the matter of 
assessability to Income Tax; but such a consequence was not,
I humbly think, really contemplated by the decisions pronounced 
nor in the judgements by which those decisions were supported."
"The conclusion on the whole matter seems to be that trustees, 
albeit only representatives of ulterior beneficial interests, 
are assessable generally in respect of the trust income under 
Rule 1 of the Miscellaneous Rules applicable to Schedule D 
/ of the Income Tax Act 1918_/; but that - just because they 
represent those beneficial interests - they may have a good 
answer to a particular assessment, as regards some share or part of 
the income assessed, on the ground that such share or part 
arises or accrues beneficially to a cestui que trust in whose 
hands it is not liable to income tax, e.g., a foreigner under 
Case V, Rules 1 and 3.^
The recognition that trustees act in a representative capacity is 
substantially at variance with the original proposition that their 
liability to tax is attributed to the fact that they are persons 
who receive or are entitled to income. What is perhaps extraordinary 
is that in no place do the Income Tax Acts either expressly or 
impliedly provide that, in certain circumstances, trustees shall be 
treated as acting in a representative capacity on behalf of their 
beneficiaries. The notion would appear to have been adopted by 
the courts purely as a rule of administrative convenience.
Exactly in what circumstances this rule of convenience will be 
applied is uncertain. It is significant that the case in which
1. (1929) 14 T.C. 512, at p. 524.
2. Ibid., at p. 525. Miscellaneous Rule 1 of Sch. D read: "Tax
under this Schedule shall be charged on and paid by persons or 
bodies of persons receiving or entitled to income in respect
of which tax under this Schedule is ... to be charged." See now
s. 114(1), I.C.T.A.
It should be noted that while it may be apt to describe trustees 
as 'representatives of ulterior beneficial interests', trustees 
do not act in the capacity of agent to the beneficiary - see 
Viscount Sumner in Baker v. Archer-Shee, (1927) 11 T.C. 749, at 
p. 766-767. For the avoidance of doubt the distinction is 
considered in more detail in Appendix 2.
trustees have been recognised as acting in a representative capacity 
involved beneficiaries who were not liable to tax. It would appear 
that the principle operates as a defence to an assessment and will 
not serve to create additional liability in the trustee. It is 
doubted, therefore, that trustees could be recognised as 
'representatives of ulterior beneficial interests’ for the purposes 
of assessing them to tax at the higher rates applicable to a 
beneficiary.1 Whiteman and Wheatcroft noted:
"(i) income of a trust which is paid directly to a beneficiary 
without passing through the hands of a trustee is not assessable 
on the trustee,^ and (ii) a trustee may have a good answer to 
a particular assessment as regards some share or part of the 
income assessed, on the ground that such share or part arises 
or accrues beneficially to a cestui que trust in whose hands 
it is not liable to income tax."^
It is also of significance that, so far, the rule had been applied in 
a trust case which involved a foreign element. It is improbable 
therefore that it could be applied to absolve the liability of 
trustees where both they and their beneficiaries are resident in 
United Kingdom and where those beneficiaries have unused personal 
allowances.
Thus, where there are trustees resident in the United Kingdom who 
receive income from foreign sources and where the beneficiaries to 
whom that income will eventually be paid are resident out of the 
United Kingdom, it is likely that the rule of convenience will be 
applied; the trust will be recognised and the trustees will be 
treated as representatives of the beneficiaries. The trustees will 
have a good answer to any assessment made upon them.
1. The fact that trustees are not 'individuals' would not inhibit
the charge: they would be taxed on behalf of an individual.
2. This is the alternative view which may be taken of the decision 
in Williams v. Singer.
3. 17-02.
Obviously, it cannot be said without qualification that trustees 
are liable to tax on the basis that they are persons who receive or 
are entitled to income. This is so despite the fact that the Income 
Tax Acts provide no alternative basis for their liability. The rule 
of convenience that trustees may be recognised as acting in a 
representative capacity, as it has been applied in the courts, might 
accord with notions of 'common sense' or 'fairness' but it demonstrates 
that the schedular system of income taxation is not rigorously 
applied to the trust concept in so far as the liability of the 
trustee is concerned.
Consideration must be given here to s. 76, Taxes Management Act 1970, 
which reads as follows:
"A trustee who has authorised the receipt of profits arising 
from trust property by, or by the agent of, the person entitled 
thereto shall not, if -
(a) that person or agent actually received the profits under 
that authority, and
(b) the trustee makes a return, as required by section 13 of 
this Act, of the name, address and profits of that person,
be required to do any other act for the purpose of the assessment 
of that person to income tax."
In Simon, s. 76 is used as the authority for the following proposition:
"Where ... income is received direct by a beneficiary by the
trustee's authority, so that the former is in immediate control
of it, it is the beneficiary who is assessed."
"S 76 protects the trustee in such a case, if he returns a list
under T.M.A. 1970, sl3."^
Pinson suggests s. 76 provides:
"Where income is received direct by the beneficiary under the 
authority of the trustees, the beneficiary may be assessed Instead 
of the trustees."^
1. E6.302
2. Pinson on Revenue Law I3th ed., 9:13.
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Both the interpretations of s. 76 quoted above are a little misleading, 
S. 76 does not absolve the trustees', liability to tax where they have 
authorised the receipt of the trust income directly by the beneficiary.
S. 76 has no real bearing on the liability of the trustee; it is silent
in that respect. It is purely an administrative provision which relates
to the assessment of beneficiaries and not of trustees.
TAXATION OF THE BENEFICIARY
Like the trustee, the beneficiary is liable to tax on the basis that 
he is a person who receives or is entitled to receive income.
However, it is in respect of the income of beneficiaries that the trust 
operates as an intermediary; it stands between the source of the trust's 
income and the ultimate recipients. This factor is reflected to a 
certain extent in the problems associated with the taxation of 
beneficiaries.
A beneficiary may be assessed to tax only under the Schedule appropriate 
to the source of his income. The source of a beneficiary's income 
depends upon the nature of his interest under the trust.
Assuming there exists a Schedule under which the beneficiary may be 
assessed, it is necessary to ascertain the amount of income on which 
tax may be charged. The amount of income to which a beneficiary is 
entitled usually depends upon the construction of the trust deed.^
Thus the process of taxation is in two stages: first, the appropriate 
Schedule must be identified and, secondly, the amount of income to 
which a beneficiary is entitled must be ascertained.
1) Identifying the appropriate Schedule
It was noted above that the Schedule under which a beneficiary may 
be assessed to tax is that appropriate to the source of his income.
1. Macfarlane v. I.R.C., (1929) 14 T.C. 532, at p. 540. See below 
at p. 34.
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and that the source of a beneficiary’s income is determined by 
reference to the law which governs the nature of the beneficiary's 
interest under the trust.
The theoretical problem which will be discussed here may be stated 
quite shortly: "Is the beneficiary entitled to the income of the 
trust, or is he entitled merely to income from the trust?"
If his entitlement is to the income of the trust then he must be 
assessed to tax under the Schedule appropriate to the source of the 
trust's income (usually theSchedule under which the trustee is charged) 
If his entitlement is to income from the trust then the source of 
the trust's income will not affect the Schedule under which the 
beneficiary is charged; in respect of trusts which are resident and 
domiciled in the United Kingdom the appropriate Schedule must be 
Schedule D Case III.
Annuitants
At the outset the distinction must be drawn between a beneficiary of 
a trust who is entitled to the income arising thereunder and an 
annuitant under a trust who is entitled to the payment by the trustees 
of a specified annual sum. The taxation of an annuitant is relatively 
straight forward. In Simon it is noted:
"An annuitant under a trust is in the same position as any other 
person entitled to an annuity. The annuity is a separate source 
of taxable income ..."^
An annuitant is chargeable to tax under Schedule D Case III on the
2income he receives - receivability being nothing without receipt.
1. E6.315.
2. I.R.C. V. Whitworth Park Coal Co. Ltd., (1961) 38 T.C. 531: 
Dewar v. I.R.C., (1935) 19 T.C. 561: Woodehouse v I.R.C. ,
(1936) 20 T.C. 673. Cf. Stamp. L.J. in Dunmore v. McGowan, / 1978 /
S.T.i 
with' 
far.
.C. 217, at p. 219 - " ... the doctrine that 'receivability 
thout receipt is nothing' is a doctrine which can be pressed too
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An annuitant under a trust is clearly a beneficiary; however, this 
discussion is concerned with beneficiaries who are entitled to the 
income arising under a trust and not merely to a specified annual sum.
Beneficiaries other than annuitants
It is the law of the particular state or country in which a trust 
is constituted and domiciled that determines the nature of the 
beneficiary's interest under the trust. It is, therefore, the laws 
of the United Kingdom which determine the rights of the beneficiary 
of a trust constituted and domiciled in the United Kingdom and which 
in turn determine the Schedule under which the beneficiary is to be 
charged to tax.^ The position may be illustrated by reference to 
the controversial decision of the House of Lords in Baker v. Archer-Shee, 
the implications of which will now be considered at length.
The Baker v . Archer-Shee controversy^
The facts in the case were as follows. The beneficiary was the sole 
life tenant under the will trust of an American citizen. The trust 
was constituted and domiciled in the State of New York but the 
beneficiary was resident in England, The trustee was a New York trust 
company, and the trust fund comprised, inter alia, foreign 
securities, stocks and shares. The trustees paid the income from 
the trust fund to a bank in New York: no income was remitted to 
the beneficiary in England.
The beneficiary^ was assessed to tax on the income arising from the 
trust fund, although the Crown, by concession, withdrew their claim 
to assess so much of the income that was consumed in meeting the trust 
administration expenses.
1. In Appendix 3 it is attempted to state concisely the nature of the 
beneficiary's interest according to the laws of Scotland and England: 
the decision in Baker v. Archer-Shee is, however, ignored. The 
purpose of omitting any discussion of the Archer-Shee case in Append! 
is to emphasise the impact of the decision on long settled legal theo
2. (1927) 11 T.C. 749.
3. In actual fact it was the beneficiary's husband who was assessed,but 
this is immaterial to the present discussion.
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The charging provisions involved in the case were Schedule D Cases 
IV and V, Income Tax Act 1918. Schedule D Case IV charged tax on 
income arising from foreign securities; Schedule D Case V Rule 1 
charged tax on income arising from foreign stocks and shares, and 
Schedule D Case V Rule 2 charged tax on income arising from foreign 
possessions but received in the United Kingdom. Lord Wrenbury explained 
the operation of these provisions:
"My Lords, Section 1 of the Income Tax Act 1918, enacts that 
Income Tax for any year 'shall be charged for that year in 
respect of all property, profits, or gains respectively 
described or comprised in the Schedules marked A, B, C, D, and E '.
I note here the words 'all property'.
"Schedule D enacts that tax under that Schedule shall be charged 
in respect of (a) the annual profits or gains arising or 
accruing - (i) to any person residing in the United Kingdom 
'from any kind of property whatever, whether situated in the 
United Kingdom or elsewhere'. It further enacts that tax under 
the Schedule shall be charged under certain Cases and after 
specifying five Cases it adds:-
Case VI. - 'Tax in respect of annual profits or gains not falling 
under any of the foregoing Cases, and not charged by virtue of any 
other Schedule'. No words could be more plain to include all 
annual profits of every kind.
"Case V, however, which relates to 'possessions out of the United 
Kingdom', consists of two parts. The former has to do with 'stocks, 
shares or rents in any place out of the United Kingdom' - the latter 
with 'possession out of the United Kingdom, other than stocks, 
shares or rents'. In the latter case the tax is to be computed 
only 'on the full amount of the actual sums annually received in 
the United Kingdom'.
"The result of the above may be shortly stated by saying that, in 
the case of a person residing in the United Kingdom all his 
property whatever, situated in the United Kingdom or elsewhere, 
is charged to tax, but if he shows that a particular part of his 
property is within Cases V, Rule 2, then the tax is computed 
only upon so much of the income as is actually received in the 
United Kingdom.
1. (1927) 11 T.C. 749, at p 777.
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The beneficiary resisted the assessment claiming that she was not
entitled to the income arising from foreign securities, stocks and
shares. Her only right was to have the trust administered; that right
was a foreign possession and the income arising therefrom was
assessable only in so far as it was received in the United Kingdom
1
under Schedule D Case V Rule 2.
As no evidence was submitted as to the nature of the beneficiary's 
interest according to the law of the State of New York, it was presumed 
that her interest was of the same nature as that of a beneficiary of a 
trust constituted and domiciled in England.
The majority of the judges who heard the case sympathized with the 
contention that the beneficiary's right was a right to have the trust 
administered only: it was a mere jus in personam. Rowlatt, J. explained;
"What this lady enjoys is not stocks, shares and rents or other 
property subject to the will, but what she does enjoy and has 
got is the right to call upon the trustees, and to force the 
trustees if necessary, to administer this property during her 
life so as to give her the income arising therefrom, according 
to the trust. Her interest is that of equity and is not an 
interest in the specific stocks and shares at all. There is no
doubt about the correctness of that."
The beneficiary's right as a jus in personam would have entitled her 
to receive whatever income might have been available after the 
administration of the trust. Clearly, this would not have been a 
right to income arising from specific items in the trust fund.
The majority in the House of Lords, however, took the opposite view.
Lord Wrenbury stated the case thus;
1. Para. 5 of the Case stated.
2. Ibid., at p. 7 54.
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"In this state of facts / the beneficiary’s_/interest under her 
father's will is beyond all question "property". The question 
for determination is what is the nature of that property, is it 
a"possession out of the United Kingdom other than stocks, shares 
or rents" within Case V, Rule 2? To escape^taxation the 
/ beneficiary / must establish that it is."
So far as the majority in the House of Lords was concerned, it was 
immaterial that the beneficiary could receive only the net balance 
sum of the trust income after the deduction of administration expenses 
They held that she was entitled to the entire income of the trust 
Lord Carson opined:
' ... upon the construction of the will__... once the_residue had 
become specifically ascertained, the / beneficiary^/ was the sole 
beneficial owner of the interest and dividends of all securities, 
stocks and shares forming part of the trust fund therein settled 
and was entitled to receive and did receive such interest and 
dividends. This, I think, follows from the decision of this house 
in Williams v. Singer ... and in my opinion the Master of the Rolls 
correctly stated the law when he said'that when you are considering 
sums which are placed in the hands of trustees for the purpose of 
paying income to beneficiaries, for the purpose of the Income Tax 
Acts you may eliminate the trustees. The income is the income of 
the beneficiaries; the income does not belong to the trustees'."^
Lord Wrenbury stated:
' ... the question is not what the trustees have thought proper to 
hand over and have handed over (which i^ a question of fact) but 
what under the / trust the benefieiary_/is entitled to (which 
is a question of law). The trustees, of course, have a first 
charge upon the trust funds for their costs, charges and expenses 
But this does not reduce the right of property of the beneficiary 
to a right only to a balance sum after deducting these.
Accordingly the beneficiary was assessed to tax on the income arising 
from the securities, stocks and shares: it was of no consequence that 
the income was not remitted to the United Kingdom.
1. (1927) 11 T.C. 749, at p. 778.
2. Ibid., at p. 782. Lord Hanworth, M.R. at p. 7 59-760. It will be
recalled that the statement of the Master of the Rolls was not 
accepted by The Lord President (Clyde) in Reid's Trustees v. I.R.C 
(1929) 14 T.C. 512, at p. 524; supra, at p. 8.
3. (1927) 11 T.C. 749, at p. 778-779. On this basis it would appear
to have been unnecessary for the Crown to have withdrawn their 
claim to assess the income which was consumed in meeting the trust 
administration expenses.
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Thus, as the nature of the property of the beneficiary was not a 
"possession out of the United Kingdom other than stocks, shares 
or rents", the beneficiary must have been attributed property rights 
in the stocks and shares which comprised the trust fund.
The decision is undoubtedly inconsistent with the theory that 
the nature of a beneficiary's interest is that of a jus in personam, 
to compel due administration of the trust and to receive whatever 
income may be available thereafter. It is demonstrated in Appendix 3 
that the right of a beneficiary under a trust is 'property'. It 
is, as Professor Langdell indicated, a right in rem in that it imposes 
a negative duty on the world at large not to interfere with the 
obligation of the trustee owed to the beneficiary.^ But surely in 
Baker v. Archer-Shee such property would have been a 'foreign 
possession', the income arising therefrom being assessable on a
remittance basis under Schedule D Case V, Rule 2.
On the basis of the Archer-Shee decision, it would appear that the 
Schedule under which a beneficiary is to be assessed on the income 
to which he is entitled by virtue of the trust is that appropriate 
to the source of the trust's income. He is entitled to the income 
of the trust and not merely to income from the trust.
Baker v. Archer-Shee was blindly followed in the Kings Bench Division 
in the case of Nelson v. A d a m s o n ,  ^ the facts of which were as follows.
By the terms of a will trust made in England trustees in Australia held 
various foreign securities in trust. They were obliged to make an 
annuity payment out of the trust income; any income remaining thereafter 
was payable to the Appellant who was resident in England. None of the
remaining income was remitted to the United Kingdom.
1. See Appendix 3, at p. xvii et seq.
2. Ibid.,_at p. xix.
3. / 1941/ 2 K.B. 12.
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The Appellant was assessed to tax under Schedule D Case IV, Income 
Tax Act 1918 on the income arising from the foreign securities. She 
contended that the assessment had been wrongly made, arguing that 
her only right was to compel due administration of the trust: she had 
no property right in the foreign securities.
The court held that the Appellant was assessable under Schedule D 
Case IV Rule 1, on income arising from specific securities out of 
the United Kingdom. The case was dismissed as being materially 
indistinguishable from Baker v, Archer-Shee .
Bearing in mind the remarks of Lord Wrenbury in the Archer-Shee case,
that * in the case of a person residing in the United Kingdom all his
property whatever, situated in the United Kingdom or elsewhere, is 
1
charged to tax', the proposition in Nelson v. Adamson is curious.
The implication is that, despite the prior right of the annuitant, 
the Appellant had a property right in the specific securities which 
the trust fund comprised. If the annuity payable from the trust 
fund was £100, and in 1938 the trust income was £200, presumably the 
Appellant would be said to have a property right in half the trust fund, 
However, if in 1939 the trust income was £150, it would follow that 
the Appellant would be attributed a property right in one third of the 
specific securities. It is a strange thing that fluctuations in the 
income of the trust can alter the property right of a beneficiary.
The decision of the House of Lords in the Archer-Shee case has been 
met with considerable criticism. Professor Hanbury remarked:
"A student beginning the study of equity cannot do better than 
to soak himself in the incomparable book written on the subject 
by Professor Maitland. That very learned author, even at the 
risk of monotony, pronounces and reiterates the root principle 
that equitable rights and interests are not jura in rem. They 
much resemble these, but the dividing line appears at once in 
the recollection of the bona fide purchaser for value of the
1. (1927) 11 T.C. 749, at p. 777, supra, at p . 14
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legal estate. Of course this distinction is only necessary for 
the lawyer; the layman finds it naturally convenient enough 
to regard a cestui que trust as an absolute owner and to stigmatize 
as pedantic and, if the word may be used in this connexion, 
slightly 'priggish’, the insistence of a lawyer, with Maitland, 
on the undoubted character of the cestui que trust's interest as 
a mere ius in personam. Now nobody relishes the imputation of 
'priggishness', so the lawyer is ready enough to adopt lay 
phraseology, and to talk loosely of 'equitable ownership'.
The utter chaos which would result if it were really true, 
that equity regarded A as owner, while law so regarded B, he 
well knows, but in nine cases out of ten this looseness of 
language produces no ill effects. But unfortunately there 
always arises the periodical tenth case, where looseness of 
language may lead to looseness of thinking, and looseness of 
thinking to a decision round w^ich criticisms subsequently 
rage and will not be checked."
' ... now looseness of language and forgetfulness of 'Maitland's 
axiom' have led to another decision which, unless explicable 
as pure 'income tax law' and therefore not to be widely construed, 
stands, it is submitted, as a contradiction of clear eguitable 
principle. This decision is Baker v. Archer-Shee ..."
It is instructive to compare the Archer-Shee case with that of Schalit 
3 .
V . Nadler. In Schalit v. Nadler certain premises were demised for 
a fixed term to N as lessee. These premises were sublet to the 
plaintiff, S.
N, by declaration of trust, constituted himself as trustee of the 
property demised by the lease. He declared that he would hold, 
and continue to hold the property in trust for the defendant 
company "absolutely to sell, let or otherwise (wholly or in part) 
as the company may direct or appoint and in the event of such sale
1. "A Periodical Menace to Equitable Principles": (1928) 44 L.Q.R.
468 at p. 468.
2. Ibid., at p. 469.
3. / 1933 / 2 K.B. 79.
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or letting to hold the net proceeds thereof upon trust for the
1
company to invest or otherwise as the company may direct."
S, the plaintiff sublessee, fell into arrears with the rent. The 
defendant company (the beneficiary of the trust declared) instructed 
a bailiff to enter the premises and to seize and distrain goods 
and chattels belonging to S in order to secure the rent due. S 
brought an action against the defendant company for illegal distress.
According to the provision of s. 141(2), Law of Property Act 1925, rent 
reserved by a lease 'shall be capable of being recovered, received, 
enforced, and taken advantage of, by the person from time to time 
entitled ... to the income of the land leased.'
It was argued by the plaintiff that the defendant company, being 
the mere beneficiary of a trust, was not entitled to the income 
of the land leased and that, therefore, the distress was wrongful. 
Goddard, J. upheld the plaintiff's contention.
"The right of the cestui que trust whose trustee has demised 
property subject to the trust is, not to the rent, but to 
an account from the trustee of the profits received from the 
demise ... The cestui que trust has no right to demand that 
the actual bank-notes received by the trustee shall be handed 
over to him or that a cheque for rent drawn to the trustee 
shall be indorsed over. What he can require is that the 
trustee shall account to him, after taking credit for any 
outgoings or other payments properly chargeable, for the 
profits received from the trust property."
1, Ibid., at p. 80.
2, Ibid., at p. 83.
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It is difficult if not impossible to reconcile this decision with 
that in Baker v, Archer-Shee. Sir David Hughes Parry noted:
"It seems well-nigh impossible to 'distinguish' the two cases, 
and for that reason i^ is submitted that the Schalit's case 
was wrongly decided."
Of course, it may be that the Archer-Shee case is explicable as 
pure 'income tax law', and that, therefore, the Schedule under 
which a beneficiary may be taxed has nothing to do with the law 
of trusts. This perhaps may be a preferable interpretation of 
the case. If the decision was based on a finding of trust law, 
its effect must be confined to trusts south of the border. The 
general principle is recited in Whiteman and Wheatcroft:
"Before applying taxation laws, the true legal effect of any 
transaction entered into by a taxpayer must first be ascertained 
and if, as a result of differences between the law of England and 
that of Scotland, the same transaction has a different effect in 
the two gountries, then different taxation consequences may well 
result."
As it will be demonstrated later, the nature of the beneficiary's
interest under a Scottish trust would appear to be nothing more
3
than a right to have the trust administered. Thus the beneficiary 
of a Scottish trust would be entitled to income from the trust 
whereas, in accordance with the Archer-Shee decision, the beneficiary 
of an English trust would be entitled to the income of the trust. 
Although their positions in substance might be identical, they may 
be assessed to tax under different Schedules.
Baker v. Archer-Shee: trust law or tax law?
In the light of the decision of the House of Lords in Aruher-Shee v . 
Garland^ it is difficult to conclude otherwise than that the decision in
1. (1934) 50 L.Q.R. 158, at p. 159.
2. 1-51. Judicial authority for this principle is found in Lord 
Advocate v. Gunning's Trustees, 1907 S.C. 800
3. Infra, p. 26-29. See also Appendix 3, p. xi - xvi.
4. (1931) 15 T.C. 693.
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Baker v Archer-Shee was based upon a finding of English trust law. 
However, before discussing the facts in the Garland case^ consideration 
will be given to the theories which tend to support the proposition that 
the decision in Baker v. Archer-Shee is explicable as pure income tax 
law.
Lord Sands in Reid's Trustees v. I.R.C. exposed himself as a proponent 
of the 'pure income tax law' theory. Having presented the material 
facts of the Archer-Shee case, he continued:
"The matter turned, under Rules 1 and 2 of Case V, Schedule D, 
upon the question whether the income enjoyed by Lady Archer-Shee 
/ the beneficiary^/ arose from "stocks, shares or rents", or 
from "other possessions". Here ... there was, as indeed the 
difference of judicial opinion in the Archer-Shee case shows, 
room for either of two views. The one was that regard must be 
had to the substance of the matter, and that when this was 
had there could be no doubt that the source - the thing from 
which the income arose - was dividends on stocks and shares.
The other view was that form must prevail and that technically 
the source of the income was not stocks and shares but a 
beneficial interest in a trust estate. By a majority of three 
to two the House of Lords decided in favour of the former view, 
overruling an unanimous judgement of the Court of Appeal. This 
was the sole subject matter of decision in the case. Notwith­
standing the narrowness of the majority, the decision is of 
course binding^upon us, as is any implication which necessarily 
underlies it."
Lord Sands suggested that the basis of the decision in the Archer-Shee 
case was that, according to the substance of the matter, the beneficiary's 
income comprised the dividends from "stocks, shares or rents", and 
that for the purposes of the Income Tax Acts it is the substance of 
the matter that determines what a beneficiary is entitled to. Thus, 
according to Lord Sands, the trust law which determines the nature of 
a beneficiary's interest is irrelevant. The theory is that substance 
prevails over form.
Two further theories on the Archer-Shee decision have been presented 
in the pages of the Canadian Bar Review.
1. (1929) 14 T.C. 512, at p. 528.
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Latham suggested 'that the decision may have been correct of principles 
1
of convenience.' He opined:
"Economically, Lady Archer-Shee was owner of the particular funds 
for her life-time, and tax should be imposed on economic grounds 
But I hope that the decisions will not be extended to other 
branches of law without careful consideration of the expediency 
of the particular extension. It may be that for many purposes 
the beneficiary should be treated as owner of the trust assets, 
but if he is so treated for all purposes, why set up the trust 
machinery in caseg where it is possible to create corresponding 
legal interests?"
Of the decision in Nelson v. Adamson, Latham concluded:
"But although the case may be difficult to reconcile with principle, 
it may be expedient to assess such a beneficiary on the ground 
that economically he is in much the same^position as the owner, 
when allowance is made for the annuity."
Latham excused the apparent inconsistency of the judgement of Goddard, J 
in Schalit v. Nadler with the decision in Baker v. Archer-Shee:
" ... why should a decision on the construction of the Income Tax 
Act be binding on the construction of the Law of Property Act: 
the former concerned the economic interest of the beneficiary, 
the latter the machinery for enforcing it? Is it surprising, 
then, that in the^latter the technical position should be of 
more importance?"
In conclusion Latham noted:
"Technically the cestui que trust has no interest in specific 
items of the trust fund, but merely a right to its due 
administration, enforceable against the trustees and situated 
where they may be sued - their residence. Where, however, 
problems of social and economic importance are involved, thg 
courts often attach the interest to specific trust assets."
1. "Specific Items of
2. Ibid., at p. 536.
3. Ibid., at p. 536.
4. Ibid. , at p. 537.
5. Ibid., at p. 544.
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A broadly similar argument was presented by Professor Waters. 
Professor Waters argued that the 'genius of the use and of the 
trust was that it contemplated a separation of the beneficial 
interest from the dispositive and managerial interests.' Baker 
V. Archer-Shee was not concerned with the separation of these 
interests and, therefore, the decision did no violence to equitable 
principles. The reasoning of Professor Waters is evident from 
his following statements; having briefly stated the facts of the 
case he continued:
"The question is as to the interest of the life tenant at a 
particular time in the dividends of those investments. The 
equitable estate concept is serving no function at this single 
point of time; it is juristic lumber. There is (1) no class or 
number of beneficiaries simultaneously possessing a similar right 
of enjoyment in the trust property; there is (2) no uncertainty 
as to what specific assets constitute trust assets; there is 
(3) no question as to the period of time during which there is 
to be a right of enjoyment, now or in the future. Why not 
ignore the equitable estate, and recognise the fact that this 
beneficiary^s right of enjoyment is actually in the specific 
dividends?"
"The issue did not concern a dispute between life tenant and 
remainderman, the duties of the trustee, or the rights and duties 
of the life tenant vis-a-vis third parties. It raised a type 
of question, perhaps the unusual question, where it was arguably 
mere pedantry to bar the Commissioner of Taxes with the equitable 
estate of the life tenant. One says arguably, because it is just 
possible to say that, though the equitable estate served no function 
in the circumstances, nevertheless the taxpayer was entitled to 
take advantage of its presence. The writer for his part, however, 
would suggest that that is an unattractive argument since it 
turns the creative genius o^ the trust into an instrument of 
unmeritorious frustration."
The suggestion is that the rights of a beneficiary should be determined 
according to the nature of the case before the court. Problems 
concerning the actual working of the trust should be decided in 
accordance with established equitable principle, but in other cases, 
notably those concerning the claims of the revenue authorities, the
1. "The Nature of the Trust Beneficiary's Interest": (1967) 
45 Can B.R. 219 at p. 228.
2. Ibid., at p. 229,
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equitable estate serves no purpose and should be ignored; the 
beneficiary should be recognised as enjoying the income from specific 
items in the trust fund.^
The theories outlined above must be read in conjunction with the
2
decision of the House of Lords in Archer-Shee v. Garland the facts 
of which were materially indistingushable from those of the earlier 
case of Baker v, Archer-Shee. However, in Garland's case the evidence 
was heard of a New York lawyer who testified that according to the laws oi
New York the right of the beneficiary was merely to compel due
administration of the trust. It was not, as the House of Lords had 
presumed in Baker v. Archer-Shee, a right to the income arising from 
the specific stocks and shares comprising the trust fund. The
beneficiary in Garland's case, therefore, could be assessed to tax
only under Schedule D Case V Rule 2 of the I.T.A. 1918 on income 
arising from a foreign possession and actually received in the United 
Kingdom,
It is clear in the light of Garland's case that the decision in 
Baker v. Archer-Shee cannot be interpreted as determining that, in 
substance, the beneficiaries income was derived from specific stocks 
and shares. The substance of the matter in both the Garland and 
Baker cases was identical. By comparing the two cases it becomes 
apparent that the courts were concerned with the technicalities of 
the beneficial interest under a trust. It was not as Lord Sands 
suggested, simply a case of substance prevailing over form.
It is also apparent that the decision in Baker v. Archer-Shee cannot 
be justified on the grounds that the beneficiary was 'economically' 
the owner of the specific items of the trust fund. In Garland's 
case the beneficiary was equally 'economically' the owner of the 
trust fund but she was not assessed to tax on the basis that her 
income arose from specific stocks and shares.
1. Ibid., at p. 280-281. Waters also noted that support for the 
decision in Baker v. Archer-Shee might be found in several 
Commonwealth cases, in particular Syme v. Commissioner of Taxes, 
/ 1914_/ A.C. 1031; ibid., at p. 243 et seq.
2. (1931) 15 T.C. 693.
3. Supra, at p. 22, Reid's Trustees v. I.R.C. was decided
before Garland's case.
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It is indisputable in view of the decision in Garland's case that 
it is the technical nature of the beneficiary's interest under a 
trust that determines under which Schedule he is to be assessed to 
tax. For this reason it becomes difficult to describe the decision 
in Baker v. Archer-Shee as being based on pure income tax law.^
Consistently with the decision in Baker v. Archer-Shee, the nature 
of the beneficiary's interest under an English trust is a right to 
the income arising from the specific items of the trust fund. It 
may be that, as both Latham and Waters suggested, the rule in Baker v. 
Archer-Shee applies only in cases of 'social and economic importance' 
and not to cases concerning 'a dispute between life tenant and 
remainderman' or 'the rights and duties of the life tenant vis-a-vis 
third parties.' A criticism of such a theory lies outside the scope 
of this work: however, the difficulties are obvious; it will suffice
here to pose the rhetorical question: "What constitutes a case of social 
and economic importance?"
Thus, it would appear that as a matter of English law, the beneficiary 
of an English trust must be assessed to tax on the basis that he is 
entitled to the income of the trust. However, the position of the 
beneficiary of a Scottish trust cannot be stated with such certainty.
Baker v. Archer-Shee in Scotland
It has been noted above that Lord Sands in Reid's Trustees v. I.R.C.
considered that the decision in Baker v. Archer-Shee was binding
2
upon the Court of Session. It has also been noted that, on the basis
of the decision in Archer-Shee v. Garland, Lord Sands misinterpreted
the Baker case as being founded on a rule of pure income tax law that
in substance a beneficiary is entitled to the income arising from the
3
specific items of the trust fund . The dicta of Lord Sands is, 
therefore, no authority for the proposition that Scottish courts are
1. This much was accepted by Latham who noted that the Garland case
'would appear to show that Baker v. Archer-Shee determines the
rights of beneficiaries apart from revenue law.' - 32 Can. B.R. 520, 
at p. 536, n. 84.
2. (1929) 14 T.C. 512, at p. 539: supra, at p. 22.
3. Supra, p. 25.
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bound by the decision in Baker v. Archer-Shee, a decision which, 
as it has been demonstrated, appears to have been based upon a 
finding of English trust law.
In order to assess the effects of Baker v . Archer-Shee on the 
taxation of the beneficiary of a Scottish trust consideration may 
be given only to the views expressed by Scottish courts after the 
decision in Garland's case. A relevant case is that of I.R.C. v. 
Clark’s Trs.^
I.R.C. V. Clark's Trs. was an estate duty case the facts of which 
were as follows. An American subject domiciled in the State of 
New York conveyed property, including shares in a United Kingdom 
company, to trustees to hold on trust to pay the income therefrom 
to himself during his life; thereafter the income was to be paid to 
beneficiaries in Scotland.
The settlor died and the question of estate duty arose. S'. 1 of 
the Finance Act 1894 enacted:
"In the case of every person dying ... there shall ... be 
levied and paid, upon the principal value ascertained as 
hereinafter provided of all property, real or personal, 
settled or not settled, which passes on the death of such 
a person a duty, called 'Estate Duty' ... "
Estate duty was charged on the death of the settlor. As a result of
2
the decisions in the Scottish cases of Cowley v. I.R.C. and
3
Dunderdale's Trustees v. I.R.C. the property which passed on the 
death of a liferenter was not the beneficial interest in the trust 
fund but the fund itself. The decisions were not based upon a finding
that the beneficiary of a Scottish trust has a proprietary interest
in the trust fund: it was found that Parliament had intended that
the trust property was to be treated as passing on the death of the 
liferenter.
1. 1939 S.C. 11.
2. / 1899_/ A.C. 198.
3. 1936 S.C. (H.L.) 20.
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Nevertheless, the defenders in I.R.C. v. Clark's Trs, attempted to 
distinguish their case from those of Cowley and Dunderdale. They 
argued that those cases were decided upon the grounds that the 
beneficiary of a Scottish trust has an interest in the trust res, 
whereas the beneficiary of a trust constituted and domiciled in 
the State of New York had a mere personal right of action against 
the trustee to compel due performance of the trust.
In rejecting the defender's contention, the court demonstrated that 
a beneficiary's right under a Scottish trust was the same as that 
of a beneficiary of a trust constituted and domiciled in the State 
of New York, The Lord President (Normand), having discussed the 
decision in Archer-Shee v. Garland, continued:
"There had been an earlier case / Baker v. Archer-Shee / between 
the same parties, in which a different result had been reached, 
because in that earlier case it was assumed that the beneficiary's 
right under American law was the same as his right would have 
been under the law of England, and apparently, as Lord Wrenbury 
said in the earlier case, under the law of England a beneficiary 
such as a liferenter is entitled in equity and specifically 
during his life to the dividend upon stocks held by the trustees, 
or to an equitable right in possession to receive during his life 
the proceeds of the shares and stocks of which he is tenant for life
"Now, no Scottish lawyer would describe the rights of a liferenter 
in these terms, which are entirely alien to our law. Lord
Sumner was in the minority in the first of the Archer-Shee
cases, and if his view had prevailed, the decision in the first 
Archer-Shee case would have been, not the decision which was 
actually given in it, but the decision which was given in the 
second of the Archer-Shee cases. He supported Sargant, L.J., 
who adopted the language of Rowlatt, J. who said: 'What this 
lady enjoys is not the stocks, shares and rents or other 
property constituting the trust fund under the will; what she 
has is the right to call upon the trustees, and if necessary,
to compel the trustees, to administer this property during her
life so as to give her the income arising therefrom according 
to the provision of the trust. Her interest is merely an 
equitable one, and it is not an interest in the specific stocks 
and shares constituting the trust fund'. In my opinion, that is 
a very accurate description of the rights of a beneficiary 
enjoying a liferent under a Scottish trust deed, and, as was 
pointed out by Lord Dunedin, it is a very good description of 
what was proved to be the law of the State of New York in the 
second Archer-Shee case."
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t"My conclusion is that there is no difference between the law 
of Scotland as regards the beneficiary's rights and the law 
which is admitted in the record to be the law of the State 
of New York."
Thus the nature of a beneficiary's interest under a Scottish trust
is, as it is noted in Appendix 3, a personal right of action against 
2
the trustee. It would appear that the decision in Baker v. Archer-Shee 
has little application in Scotland: the logical conclusion is that
the beneficiary of a Scottish trust must be assessed to tax on the 
basis that he is entitled to income from the trust. It necessarily 
follows that the source of the trust's income will not affect the 
Schedule under which he is charged to tax. This is not the position 
of the beneficiary of an English trust. Thus there is some 
theoretical disparity in the treatment for tax purposes of beneficiaries 
of Scottish and of English trusts.
The disparity: its practical significance and a possible reconciliation
At the outset it must be stated that the theoretical disparity 
which must arise by reason of the difference in the nature of the 
beneficial interest under a Scottish trust and that under an English 
trust is of little practical significance.
The beneficiary of an English trading trust will be assessed to tax
under Schedule D Case I, I.C.T.A., (the income which he receives will
usually have been taxed in the hands of the trustees and will therefore
be net of basic rate tax). In accordance with the decision in I.R.C.
3
V. Clark's Trs., the beneficiary of a Scottish trading trust is not 
entitled to the profits of the trade; he will be assessed to tax under 
Schedule D case III on the income that he receives from the trust.
Both beneficiaries are assessed to tax but under differing Cases; 
however, there would appear to be no harm in this.
1. 1939 S.C. 11, at p. 23-24.
2. This is reflected in the Capital Transfer Tax legislation in 
which a definition of an 'interest in possession in settled 
property' is provided for Scotland but not for England; para.
1(9) of Schedule 5 to the Finance Act 1975 (as amended). It 
has been suggested that the definition was necessary by reason 
of the fact that the beneficiary has no interest in settled 
property, but only a personal right of action against the trustee 
Foster, at Cl.04, at C114; Dymond at p. 571-572.
3. 1939 S.C. 11.
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The disparity may be of significance where the rules of one Schedule 
are more favourable than those of another. A possible example in 
which the disparity may be of some practical consequence would be 
in respect of trust income comprising rents under leases of 
land in the United Kingdom.
The beneficiary of an English trust would be the person receiving 
or entitled to the rents under the leases and would therefore be 
charged under Schedule A.
Not so the beneficiary of a Scottish trust. He would be assessed 
to tax under Schedule D Case III. His income would arise from 
’property*; the property being his personal right of action against 
the trustee.
This may be a curious anomaly even though it is apparently harmless; 
both beneficiaries are assessed to tax albeit under differing 
charging provisions. However, the matter cannot rest there.
Assume that both beneficiaries have 'private* incomes apart from the 
income which they receive under their trusts. These 'private' 
incomes are derived from rents under leases of land in the United 
Kingdom on which both are assessed to tax under Schedule A. Both 
beneficiaries undertake extensive repairs to their premises the 
allowable deductions in respect of which exhaust the rents received 
under the leases. Section 72(4), I.C.T.A, provides:
"In the case of a lease at full rent, not being a tenants 
repairing lease, there may also be deducted the amount of 
any payment made in respect of other premises by the person 
chargeable ... "
It would appear that the English beneficiary may set his loss 
against the income that he receives by virtue of the trust. The 
beneficiary of the Scottish trust whose income is charged to tax by
virtue of Schedule D Case III has no such right of deduction. This
is a necessary consequence of the strict rule that the Schedules are 
mutually exclusive.^
1. S. 68(1), I.C.T.A.
2. Mitchell and Edon v. Ross, (1961) 40 T.C. 56. Supra, at p. i.
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The disparity may also be of significance in respect of building 
society interest.
Trustees who receive building society interest cannot be assessed
to tax thereon.^ The beneficiary of an English trust who is
entitled to the interest will be treated as receiving an amount
of income equal to the interest received grossed up at the basic 
2
rate of tax. He may be assessed to tax at the higher rates on
3the grossed up amount of the interest.
However, the beneficiary of a Scottish trust is not entitled to the 
building society interest as such. He cannot be treated as 
receiving an amount of income equal to the amount of the interest 
grossed up at the basic rate under s. 343(3) (c), I.C.T.A., likewise, 
the amount to which he is entitled will not be treated as having 
suffered tax at the basic rate. The trustees, on handing over
the interest to the beneficiary will be entitled to deduct tax
under s, 52 or 53, I.C.T.A. ^ The beneficiary will therefore, in 
theory, receive less net income than the beneficiary of an English 
trust.
Clearly, it would be desirable if the disparity could in some way 
be reconciled. As it has been demonstrated, it is not enough 
simply to state that, no matter where a trust was constituted or 
is domiciled, the beneficiary shall be treated as being entitled to 
the income from the specific items of the trust fund. Had this been
so, Archer-Shee v. Garland would not have been decided as it was:
it is undoubtedly the technical nature of the beneficiary's interest 
under the trust that determines under which Schedule he is to be 
assessed to tax.
1. S. 343(3)(b), I.C.T.A.
2. S. 343(3)(c), I.C.T.A.
3. Proviso (i) to S. 343(3), I.C.T.A.
4. S. 343(3)(d), I.C.T.A.: the beneficiary will receive the amount
of interest (not its grossed up equivalent) less tax at the 
basic rate.
5. (1931) 15 T.C. 693.
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However, a restrictive interpretation of Baker v. Archer-Shee 
may be acceptable; the case may be interpreted as overriding 
United Kingdom trust law for the purposes of the Income Tax Acts.
Thus for the purpose of assessing the beneficiary of a trust 
constituted and domiciled anywhere in the United Kingdom, the 
technical nature of his interest is fixed as a matter of tax 
law. The nature of the beneficiary’s interest under such a trust, 
in effect, is deemed to be a right to the income arising to the 
trust.
This interpretation of the case would not affect the general 
nature of the beneficial interest under a trust; it would be 
of use purely in order to determine the nature of a beneficiary's 
interest under a trust constituted and domiciled in the United 
Kingdom for any purpose of the taxing Acts. The interpretation 
would be compatible with the decision in Archer-Shee v. Garland, 
it would do no violence to equitable principles and, as a rule of 
income tax law, would apply equally in Scotland and England. It 
is submitted that this is the only interpretation of the decision 
in Baker v. Archer-Shee which will not conflict with thè decision 
in Archer-Shee v. Garland and which will ensure that there is no 
disparity in the tax treatment of beneficiaries of Scottish and 
English trusts.^
It should be noted that income received by a beneficiary will invariably
be treated as investment income. Although a beneficiary may be
assessed to tax under Schedule D Case I in respect of the income of
a trading trust, the income is not earned within the meaning of s. 530,
I.C.T.A.
"Earned income", in relation to any individual means, inter alia,
income charged under Schedule A, Schedule B or Schedule D which is
immediately derived by the individual from the carrying on or
2
exercise by him of his trade or profession as an individual.
By reason of changes in the charging provisions the distinction 
drawn in the Archer-Shee cases between income from foreign 
'securities' and foreign 'possessions' is no longer of 
significance; under Schedule D Cases IV and V income from 
either source is now assessed on an arising basis -s. 109 I.C.T.A
S. 530(1) (c), I.C.T.A.
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The beneficiary is not the person carrying on the trade or 
profession; he is the mere recipient of the profits. Of the 
income of a trading trust, the Lord President in Fry v. Shiels'
Trustees stated:
"Unquestionably, the profits of this business^were ... earned 
profits, but they were earned by individuals to whom they 
did not belong and ^hey belonged t o .individuals who certainly 
did not earn them."
2) Ascertaining the amount of income to which a beneficiary is entitled
It has been noted that a beneficiary is assessed to tax on the 
income arising to the trust and not on income from the trust.
However, he is liable to tax only on so much of the trust's 
income to which he is entitled. His entitlement to the income 
will usually be fixed quite simply by the trust deed. He is not 
entitled to income which, under the terms of the trust is to be 
applied for the benefit of some other object or for some prior 
purpose. To illustrate this proposition it will be convenient 
here to consider the problem of trust administration expenses for 
the problem is inextricably associated with the difficulties in 
determining to what income of the trust a beneficiary is entitled.
Trust administration expenses
Consistently with the decision in Baker v. Archer-Shee, the income
consumed in meeting the trust administration expenses does not
affect the amount of income to which a beneficiary is entitled;
the amount of income which as a matter of fact he receives might
be affected, but it is his entitlement to income that is taken
3
into account for the purposes of assessing him to tax.
1. A Freudian slip. The other judges who heard the case did not 
consider the earning trustees as 'individuals'.
2. (1914) 6 T.C. 583, at p. 589.
3. It will be recalled that the Crown in Baker v. Archer-Shee 
withdrew the claim to tax the income used in paying the trustees 
expenses in New York: supra, at p. 13. It would appear that 
had the claim been continued it would most certainly have 
succeeded.
33
Lord Greene, M.R. in Corbett v. I.R.C. provided:
" ... where trustees are in receipt of income which it is their 
duty to pay over to beneficiaries, either with or without 
deduction of something for trustees' expenses on the way, 
that income is at its very inception the beneficiaries' 
income."
However, trustees are under no duty to pay over to a beneficiary 
income which he is not entitled to; for instance, income which is 
to be applied in satisfying some prior purpose of the trust.
2
On the basis of the decisions in Murray v. I.R.C. and Macfarlane v.
3 “
I.R.C. the payment of the trust administration expenses may be 
made a prior purpose of the trust. This would have the effect of 
reducing the total income to which a beneficiary is entitled.
In Macfarlane's case it was a prior purpose of the trust that income 
should be applied for the payment of administration expenses 
connected with the trust. Once these expenses had been discharged 
the remaining income was payable to the beneficiary. The beneficiary 
received the trust income net of tax and of the administrative 
charges. He was not chargeable to tax on his income and so reclaimed 
the tax paid by the trustees on the entire income of the trust.
It was held that the beneficiary could claim back the tax which 
was paid by the trustees on the amount of income to which he was 
entitled under the trust. He could not therefore claim back the
1. (1937) 21 T.C. 449, at p. 460. The Master of the Rolls
appeared to have accepted the rule in Baker v. Archer-Shee 
as affecting the general nature of a beneficiary's interest 
under a trust and not merely as a rule to be applied for the 
purposes of the Income Tax Acts. His statement was used to 
contrast the nature of the beneficial interest under a trust 
with that in an unadministered estate.
2. (1926) 11 T.C. 133.
3. (1929 14 T.C. 532.
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tax paid in respect of the income consumed in meeting the trust 
administration expenses.^
2
On the basis of the Murray and Macfarlane cases it is noted in 
Simon:
"The trustees' expenses and authorised management fees, 
therefore, are paid out of the taxed income of the trust, 
and no relief can be claimed by trustees or beneficiaries in 
respect thereof. In other words such expenses grossed-up at 
the basic rate are a charge upon the gross income of the trust."
3
Thus if in Macfarlane's case the trust income was £500 and the trust
expenses were £100, the charge on the gross income of the trust by
reason of the prior purpose would be lOO x 100 = £142.86. The
70
gross income of the beneficiary would therefore be 500 - 142.86 = £575.14
It is of no consequence who actually pays the trust administration 
expenses; the vital factor is from whose income the expenses are 
met, and, so far as the beneficiary is concerned, this turns upon 
his entitlement under the trust deed; as Lord Blackburn stated;
"Trustees are always entitled to charge the expenses of 
administration against the trust estate. The question whether 
these expenses are to be paid out of income to which the 
beneficiary under the trust is entitled or out of income to 
which he has no right may come in almost every case to be^a 
question depending on the construction of the trust deed.
In consequence there are certain tax planning measures which may be 
considered in drafting a trust instrument.
1. It is a long established rule that in computing a trustee's
total income for the purpose of calculating his liability to
tax, no deduction may be made in respect of the expenses
incurred by him in the administration of the trust - Aikin v. 
Macdonald's Trustees, (1894) 3 T.C. 306.
2. The facts in Murray's case were indistinguishable from those 
in Macfarlane v. I.R.C. In the first mentioned case it was 
held that the beneficiary was entitled to the income of the 
trust net of tax paid by the trustees and of the administrative 
expenses. In the light of Baker v. Archer-Shee it is clear that 
Murray's case no longer represents good law; see Tiley, Revenue 
Law, 2nd ed., at 17:22.
3. 3rd ed., E6.311(b).
4. (1929) 14 T.C. 532, at p. 540.
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In respect of a beneficiary who pays no tax it would be advantageous 
if he were entitled to the entire income of the trust; the trustees 
being reimbursed for their expenses by the beneficiary personally.
The beneficiary would be entitled to reclaim the tax paid by the 
trustees on the entire trust income.^
However, in respect of higher rate tax paying beneficiaries it
would be desirable to insert in the trust deed a prior purpose
for the payment of the administration expenses. By doing so the
income consumed in meeting the expenses would be taxed in the
hands of the trustees at the basic rate. Otherwise that income would
be treated as the income of the beneficiary and accordingly would
2
suffer tax at his higher rates.
DISCRETIONARY AND ACCUMULATION TRUSTS.^'
The taxation of discretionary and accumulation trusts involves to 
a great extent the recognition of the trust as an entity. The 
machinery for taxing these trusts is provided by statute, 
namely, ss. 16 and 17, Finance Act 1973.
Ss. 16 and 17 represent an attack on the practice of exploiting 
the trust as a tax shelter under which income is accumulated in 
the hands of trustees at a low rate of tax, the accumulated income 
being distributed among the beneficiaries at a later date in the 
form of capital payments. This process of capitalizing income 
(commonly referred to as ’alchemy') has been made less advantageous;
1. "Taxation of settlements": (1977-78) 100 Taxation 72, at p. 72
(Whitehouse).
2. Tolleys Tax Planning 1980, at p. 388-389.
3. Unless otherwise stated, references in this discussion are to 
the Finance Act 1973.
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the Finance Act 1973 imposes the additional rate of tax of 15% 
on the income as it is accumulated in the hands of the trustees.^
In effect, the income of the trustees is charged to tax at the rate 
of 45%. An income tax advantage will now be gained only where the 
prospective beneficiaries have personal rates of tax in excess of 
45%.
The discretionary or accumulation trust is recognised as a true 
fiscal intermediary and is taxed as such: s. 16 operates in
respect of the income of the trust, whereas s. 17 is concerned 
with payments from the trust.
1) Taxation of the income of the trust
Trustees of discretionary or accumulation trusts are assessed to 
tax under the Schedule appropriate to the source of their income.
It must be appreciated that s. 16 does nothing more than to alter 
the rate at which trustees may be charged to tax in respect of 
certain income; it does not affect the actual basis of their 
liability. S. 16(1) provides:
"So far as income arising to trustees is income to which this 
section applies it shall, in addition to being chargeable to 
incoqg tax at the basic rate, be chargeable at the additional 
rate.
Trustees, not being 'individuals', would not otherwise have been 
liable to tax at the additional rate: s. 32, Finance Act 1971 
operates only in respect of individuals; supra, at p. 3-4. It 
was estimated that the imposition of the additional rate of 
tax on the income of trustees of discretionary and accumulation 
trusts would yield an extra £5 million in the year in which the 
provisions were introduced: (1973) 91 Taxation, at p. 378.
It is not a condition precedent to the charging of the trustees 
to tax at the additional rate that the income must also be 
charged at the basic rate: as Slade, J. indicated: " ... the 
phrase 'in addition to being chargeable to income tax at the 
basic rate' has no further function than to make it clear that 
the charge to income tax at the additional rate is not to super­
cede the charge if any, to tax_at the basic rate.' - I.R.C. v. 
Regent Trust Co. Ltd., / 1980 / S.T.C. 140, at p. 148-149.
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The income on which the additional rate is to be charged under 
s. 16(1) is described in s. 16(2). 16(2) provides*.
"This section applies to income arising to trustees in any 
year of assessment so far as it -
(a) is income which is to be accumulated or which is payable 
at the discretion of the trustees or any other person 
(whether or not the trustees have power to accumulate it); 
and
(b) is neither (before being distributed) the income of any 
person other than the trustees nor treated for any of the 
purposes of the Income Tax Acts as the income of a settlor;
Excluded from the operation of the section is income which arises 
under a trust for charitable purposes, and income which is applied 
in defraying the expenses of the trustees in a particular year of 
assessment.^
Thus income of a discretionary or accumulation trust is charged to 
tax at the additional rate if, before being distributed, it is not 
the income of any person other than the trustees for the purposes 
of the Income Tax Acts. It is suggested in Whiteman and Wheatcroft 
that words 'before being distributed' as used in s. 16(2) can be
3
read as 'while still in the hands of the trustees.'
Apart from the provisions of the Income Tax Acts which might operate 
to treat as the settlor's income arising under a trust, there are 
several situations in which income, while in the hands of trustees, 
may form part of the total income of another. In particular, in 
the case of a beneficiary who is sui juris and who could if he so 
desired terminate the trust, any income arising from the trust fund 
is treated as the income of the beneficiary although it remains in the 
hands of the trustees: this is the proposition in Hamilton-Russell's 
Executors v. I.R.C. a case which deserves some attention.
1. S. 16(2)(c).
2. S. 16(2)(d).
3. Income Tax, at 17:02.
4. (1943) 25 T.C. 200.
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In 1918, the settlor settled funds on trustees upon trust to 
accumulate. On the death of the settlor the trustees were to 
hold the funds and the accumulation of income therefrom for such 
son or daughter 'as being in tail male by purchase of the freehold 
hereditaments settled by the Indenture of Resettlement dated 3rd 
day of October 1906 of the Brancepath and Baysdale Estates shall 
first attain the age of 21 years.'
G. L. Hamilton-Hussell became tenant in tail male by purchase of 
the relevant estates; he attained his majority in 1928 at which 
time the settlor was still alive. In 1928 he was in a position 
to terminate the trust. Although the settlement was not due to end 
until the death of the settlor, G. L. Hamilton-Russell, being sui 
juris and the sole beneficiary had power under the rule in Saunders 
V. Vautier to demand that the trustees should hand over the trust 
fund and accumulations of income to him. The rule in Saunders v. 
Vautier was succinctly stated by Vice Chancellor Page-Wood in 
Gosling V. Gosling ;
"The principle of this Court has always been to recognise the 
right of all persons who attain the age of twenty-one to 
enter upon the absolute use and enjoyment of the property 
given to them by will, notwithstanding any directions by 
the testator to the effect that they are not to enjoy it 
until a later age - unless, during the interval, the property 
is given for the benefit of another. If the property is 
once theirs, it is useless for the testator to attempt to 
impose any fetters upon their enjoyment of it in full so 
soon as they attain twenty-one,"
In fact G. L. Hamilton-Russell postponed the exercise of this right 
to terminate the trust. The trustees continued to accumulate until 
the tax year 1938-1939, and only then did the beneficiary call for 
payment of the funds and accumulated income. The accumulated income 
amounted to £14,530. The question arose as to sur-tax on that 
accumulated income.
1. (1841) 49 Eng. Rep. 282.
2. (1859) 70 Eng. Rep. 423, at p. 426. The rule applies equally in
the case of an intervivos settlement, A similar rule exists in
Scotland - Miller's Trustees v. Miller, (1890) 18 R.301.
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Sur-tax could be charged only on the amount of the income which
was accumulated as the income of the beneficiary and not of the
trustees alone. It was necessary to determine to whom the income
1
belonged from 1928 until the settlement was terminated in 1938. 
According to Luxmore, L.J.:
' ... in the present case, neither G. L. Hamilton-Russell nor 
the trustees of the settlement could, after G . L. Hamilton- 
Russell attained his majority, have insisted on the con­
tinuation of the trusts. The trustees could at any time 
after the happening of that event, even though G. L. 
Hamilton-Russell had requested them to continue the 
accumulation, have refused to do so, and, if he had refused 
to accept a transfer of the trust funds, could have paid 
them into Court; just in the same way as G . L. Hamilton- 
Russell could, contrary to the wishes of the trustees, have 
insisted on a transfer to himself of the whole of the trust 
funds. The reason why the trusts then became unenforceable 
and ineffective is because the funds were at home and 
belonged solely to the beneficiary for his own absolute use 
and benefit. The capital and income were his and no one else 
was interested in them: if the income was left in the hands 
of the trustees, and they invested it, they only di^ so by 
sufferance of the beneficiary whose income it was."
Thus, consistently with the dicta of Luxmore, L. J., once a 
beneficiary becomes sui juris and can put an end to the settlement, 
the income (while In the hands of the trustees) is that of 
another person, namely, the beneficiary, and so the additional 
rate of tax cannot be charged on the income of the trustees under 
s. 16(1) despite the fact that the trustees continue to accumulate 
in compliance with the trust instrument. On the basis of 
Hamilton-Russell's Executors v. I.R.C. it is stated in Simon:
1. The Crown, however, conceded that an additional assessment 
could be made only on the income accumulated in the period 
from 6th April, 1938, to 18th Janaury, 1939.
2. (1943) 25 T.C. 200, at p. 208.
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"If a beneficiary is absolutely and beneficially entitled to 
the income of a trust, it forms part of his total income. If 
the settlement directs that such income is to be accumulated, 
the trust for accumulation is ineffective, if the beneficiary 
has attained the age of eighteen, and the income will be his, 
even if he allows it to remain in the hands of the tpi^stees 
in accordance with the directions in the settlement.
In general, the additional rate cannot be charged in respect of 
income arising under the trust which remains in the hands of the 
trustees but in which a beneficiary has a vested interest. This
is so even though by reason of his infancy the beneficiary is
2
unable to give a good receipt for his income. However, in resj 
of income in which a beneficiary has a mere contingent interest 
the trustees may be assessed to ta 
income is theirs and no-one elses.
x at the additional rate; the
3
It would appear that the distinguishing feature of a vested interest 
is that the income in which the interest subsists immediately forms 
part of the beneficiary’s estate. On the death of the beneficiary the 
accumulated income passes to his legal personal representatives.
The distinction was demonstrated by Lord Greene, M. R. who compared 
the position of an infant with a vested interest but who cannot 
give a good receipt for his income with that of an infant who is 
entitled to income contingently upon attaining his majority.
"Apart from any special provision in the instrument under 
which an infant derives his interest and apart from 
statutory provision, an infant who has a vested interest 
in possession is the person entitled to the income. It 
is his income although he_cannot give a good receipt for 
it. On his death under / eighteen income which has 
accumulated during his minority goes to his legal personal 
representatives. In such a case there can be no doubt that 
the income accruing during minority is the income of the 
infant. He is accordingly chargeable with / income tax _/ 
in respect of it ... If, on the other hand, the infant is
only entitled contingently on his attaining / eighteen _/, 
he has no title to any income until that event takes place.
If the event does take place, he becomes entitled to future
1. E6.31.
2. The income is nevertheless that of the beneficiary - I.R.C. 
V. Blackwell, (1924) 10 T.C. 235..
3. See generally Simon, E6,312-314.
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income and (in appropriate circumstances) to accumulations 
of past income. But that past income was not his in the 
years in which it accrued, and no one suggests that he  ^
could be assessed to / income tax / in respect of it."
Stanley v. I.R.C. (the case before Lord Greene, M. R.) serves 
to illustrate the distinction. A testator appointed land upon 
trust. On the death of the testator, his son became the equitable 
tenant for life in possession. The testator died while his son 
was an infant. The son attained his majority some five years after 
the death of his father. In the absence of contrary intention in 
the testators will, s. 31 of the Trustee Act 1925 applied to the 
income during the son's minority.
S. 31 of the Trustee Act 1925 directs that where trust property 
is held by trustees for a beneficiary with a vested or contingent 
interest, during the infancy of that beneficiary the trustees may 
pay the income from trust property for the maintenance, education 
or benefit of him. Any surplus income is to be accumulated by 
the trustees and the accumulations are to be held for the 
beneficiary absolutely on attaining his majority.
Surplus income from the settled property was accumulated and 
accordingly paid to the beneficiary on his attaining the age of 
twenty-one years. The beneficiary was assessed to sur-tax in respect 
of the surplus income accumulated by the trustees. The assessment 
failed; the interest of the beneficiary in the income during the 
years of accumulation was contingent. S. 31 of the Trustees Act 
1925 has the effect of transforming the beneficiary's vested 
interest into a contingent interest; had the beneficiary died 
before attaining his majority the accumulation of surplus income 
would not have passed to his personal representatives. The income 
accumulated prior to the beneficiary attaining his majority was not 
his income in the years in which it accrued.
1. Stanley v. I.R.C., (1944) 26 T.C. 12, at p. 17-18
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Income accumulated according to the terms of s. 31 of the Trustee 
Act 1925 becomes comprised in the capital of the settlement. If 
therefore, the interest of the infant beneficiary in the income of 
the trust would have been vested but for s. 31, and his interest in 
the capital of the trust is vested, then it follows that the income 
as it accumulates forms part of the total income of the beneficiary. 
This is because the income would fall into the beneficiary's estate 
by reason of his vested interest in the trust capital. Wylie noted:
"Where an infant beneficiary has a vested interest in income 
and an absolute entitlement to capital even if he dies under 
eighteen, the trust income being accumulate^ during his minority 
should remain his income for tax purposes."
Income will be treated as that of the beneficiary only if his
entitlement to that income after it has arisen is indefeasible.
However, the possibility that a beneficiary may not be entitled
to future income arising under the trust does not affect his interest
2
in the intermediate income as being vested and indefeasible.
It would appear that s, 16(2)(b) was provided in order to prevent 
a charge to tax at the additional rate on trust income where that 
same income is taxed in the hands of the beneficiary at his personal 
rate. Obviously, in these circumstances there could be no 
exploitation of the trust as a tax shelter; the mischief at Which 
the provisions are aimed would not be present.
2) Taxation of payments from the trust
S. 17(1) provides an elaborate scheme for the taxation of payments 
from discretionary trusts which are treated as income in the hands 
of the recipient beneficiary. In effect, the section provides the 
machinery by which the additional rate of tax paid by the trustees 
under s. 16(1) may be recovered.
1. "Capital Transfer Tax - Interests in Possession": (1980) 106
Taxation 307, at p. 310._ Also Sigmon, E6. 312.
2. Brotherton v. I.R.C., / 1978 / S.T.C. 201, Cf. Cornwell v.
Barry, (1955) 36 T.C. 268.
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a) Payments to which s. 17 applies
S. 17(1) provides:
"Where, in any year of assessment, trustees make a payment 
to any person in the exercise of a discretion exercisable by 
them or any person other than the trustees, then, if the sum 
paid is for all the purposes of the Income Tax Acts income of 
the person to whom it is paid (but would not be his income 
apart from the payment), the following provisions of this 
section shall apply with respect to the payment in lieu of 
section 52 or 53 of the Taxes Act."
Thus, a payment to which s. 17 applies (a) must have been made 
in exercise of a discretion; (b) must form income in the hands
of the recipient beneficiary; and (c) must not have been the
beneficiary's income apart from the payment.
It will be noted that there is no requirement to the effect that
the payment must have been made out of the income of the trust.
The section applies equally to payments out of capital which
form income in the hands of the beneficiary.^
The effect of s. 17 is to oust the operation of ss.52 and 53,I.C.T.A.; 
hence it is axiomatic that the beneficiary falls to be taxed on the 
payment under Schedule D Case III (ss.52 and 53 provide the machinery 
for the deduction of tax at source in respect of annuities and other 
annual payments on which the recipient will be charged to tax under 
Schedule D Case III),
The conditions precedent to changeability under Schedule D Case III
must therefore be satisfied in respect of the payment if it is to
be treated favourably under s. 17; the payment must have been made
2 3
under an obligation and must be capable of recurrence. Both these
conditions of changeability present difficulties in relation to
payments from discretionary trusts.
1. See Brodie's Will Trustees v. I.R.C., (1933) 17 T.C. 432
2. Smith V. Smith, / 1923 _/ P. 191.
3. Moss' Empires, Ltd. v. I.R.C., (1937) 21 T.C. 264.
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where trustees have an absolute discretion to pay sums to the objects
of a discretionary trust, unless the trustees exercise their discretion
1
in favour of a particular beneficiary, he is entitled to nothing.
By the very nature of an absolute discretion it is difficult to 
appreciate how payments to a discretionary object are either made 
under an obligation or are capable of recurrence.
However, it is generally accepted by the courts that the exercise of 
an absolute discretion is not a voluntary act but is in a sense 
obligatory. Trustees are usually obliged by the terms of their 
trust to consider whether or not to make a payment, and it is this 
obligation to consider that removes the voluntariness of the operation.
Finlay, J. in Hindus and Hortin v. I.R.C. refused to distinguish 
a payment made by trustees in exercise of a discretion from a payment 
made pursuant to a direction contained in the trust instrument:
2
"I think that where you get the relationship of trustee and 
cestui que trust, where you get payments which constitute 
income of the recipient, then it matters not whether the 
payments were made, because the trustees were directed by 
their will to make them, or whether they were made pursuant to 
the discretion they exercised; once made and made to the 
cestui que trust, they become,^in the circumstances, income 
of the cestui que trust; ... "
In Cunard's Trustees v. I.R.C.^  a testatrix by her will settled 
her residuary estate upon trust to pay the income therefrom to 
her sister. Clause 10(b) of the will provided:
"If in any year the income of my residuary estate shall not 
be sufficient to enable my sister to live at The Grove in 
the same degree of comfort as she now lives there with me
then I empower my Trustees to apply such portion of the
capital of my residuary estate by way of addition to the 
income as they in their absolute and uncontrolled discretion 
may think fit moreover any capital so applied shall not be
replaced out of the income of a subsequent year but shall be
treated as an additional bequest to my sister."
1. Snell's Principles of Equity, 27th ed., at p. 134
2. Cunard's Trustees v. I.R.C., (1945) 27 T.C. 122.
3. (1933) 17 T.C. 442, at p. 448.
4. (1945) 27 T.C. 122.
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Payments were made in exercise of the discretion granted by 
clause 10(b) of the will. The payments were assessed to tax 
under Schedule D Case III. It was argued that the payments 
of capital by the trustees were not paid under any obligation, 
and that they were not capable of recurrence so as to be 
chargeable under Schedule D Case III.
As to the voluntariness of the payments. Lord Greene, M. R. stated:
'They were not voluntary in any relevant sense, but were made 
in the exercise of a discretion conferred by the will out of 
a fund provided for the purpose by the testatrix. It is true, 
of course, that the trustees had an absolute discretion whether 
to make a payment or not. But the question whether they should 
do so is one which they were bound to take into their con­
sideration. They could not refuse to consider whether the _ 
income of the estate was sufficient to give / the beneficiary/ 
the required degree of comfort, and the fact that, after 
examining that matter, they might come to the conclusion that 
it was sufficient, and so decline to make a payment out of 
capital, does not, in my opinion, give to a payment, if and 
when ma^e, the character of a voluntary payment in any relevant 
sense."
Lord Greene, M. R. further found that the payments were capable of 
recurrence for the purpose of an assessment under Schedule D Case III
"It is sufficient, to use the language of Lord Maugham, if it 
has "the quality of being recurrent or being capable of being 
recurrent" - Moss' Empires, Ltd. v. I.R.C., 21 T.C. 264, at 
page 299. It is quite clear that a payment under clause 
10(b) of the will is one that is capable of recurrence, 
because in its very nature it may be paid in any year when 
the income of^the estate is insufficient for the purpose 
contemplated.
A liberal approach to the problem of recurrence was criticised by 
Lord Radcliffe in his dissenting judgement in I.R.C. v . Whitworth 
Park Coal Co., Ltd.:
Ibid., at p. 133-134. See also Earl Loreburn in Drummond v, 
Collins, (1915) 6 T.C. 525, at p. 539. Lord Wrenbury in 
Drummond's case suggested that payments in exercise of a 
discretion are not voluntary in the sense that once the 
discretion is exercised the trustees are bound to make the 
payment thereafter; at p. 540-541.
(1945) 27 T.C. 122, at p. 133.
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"The word "annual" has not been found to admit of any 
significant interpretation. To the Courts it means no 
more than "recurrent": see for example, Moss' Empires, Ltd. 
V. I.R.C. ... or even "capable of recurrence". That may 
be so, but I think that it would be both bad logic and bad 
law to deduce that merely because a payment is in fact 
recurrent or capable of recurrence it is therefore to be 
treated as an annual payment."
Lord Radcliffe suggested that occasional payments which may in 
fact be capable of recurrence are more properly assessed under 
Schedule D Case VI. However, if occasional payments from trustees 
were assessed to tax in the hands of a beneficiary under Schedule 
D Case VI, then s. 17 would be of little effect. It could not 
apply in lieu of ss.52 and 53, I.C.T.A. for those sections operate 
only in respect of income assessed to tax under Schedule D Case III.
Exactly in what circumstances an occasional payment to a discretionary
object will constitute a non-taxable capital sum in the hands of
the recipient is uncertain. A payment in exercise of an absolute
discretion will invariably be capable of recurrence according to
2
the dicta in Cunard's Trustees v. I.R.C. However, a discussion on 
the already much debated distinction between capital and income 
lies outwith the scope of this work.
Assuming the sums paid by the trustees in exercise of their discretion 
are for all the purposes of the Income Tax Acts income of the 
recipient beneficiary and are assessable under Schedule D Case III, 
then s. 17(2) and (3) replace the machinery for the deduction of 
tax at source which would otherwise have been provided by s3.52 and 
53, I.C.T.A.
1. (1959) 38 T.C. 531, at p. 575.
2. In s. 438(2)(b) it is presupposed that a payment from an 
accumulation trust can constitute a capital payment; the 
payment may be deemed to be income; infra, at p. 125.
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b) The Machinery of taxation
S. 17(2) provides:
"The payment shall be treated as a net amount corresponding 
to a gross amount from which tax has been deducted at a 
rate equal to the sum of the basic rate and the additional 
rate in force for the year in which the payment is made; 
and the sum treated as so deducted shall be treated -
(a) as income tax paid by the person to whom the payment 
is made; and
(b) so far as not set off under the following provisions 
of this section, as income tax assessable on the 
trustees."
To prevent a double taxation of the trustees, s. 17(3) provides:
"The following amounts, so far as not previously allowed, 
shall be set against the amount assessable (apart from this 
subsection) on the trustees in pursuance of subsection (2)(b) 
above :
(a) the amount of any tax on income arising to the trustees 
and charged at the additional as well as at the b^sic 
rate in pursuance of section 16 of this Act;... "
There are further rights of set off contained in subsection (3) 
though these are of less general application.
The entire scheme seeks to tax income at the additional and basic 
rate whilst it is being accumulated. If the accumulated income 
is distributed in the form of a capital sum then the additional 
rate of tax paid by the trustees is irrecoverable. Where however, 
the accumulated income is paid to a discretionary object and forms 
part of the income of the recipient for income tax purposes, then 
the additional rate of tax paid may be recovered . A simple example 
will serve to illustrate the operation of s. 17.
Tax which has been paid at the additional rate alone in 
pursuance of s. 16 may be used as a set off. According to 
Slade, J, 'the phrase "as well as at the basic rate" 
appearing in section 17(3)(a) merely echoes the phrase "in 
addition to being chargeable to income tax at the basic rate" 
/ as used in section 16(1) /': I.R.C. v. Regent Trust Co.
/ 1980 / S.T.C. 140, at p. 148.
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Gross Net Tax
Trustees income 1979/80 500 275 225
1980/81 300 165 135
Total 800 440 360
In January, 1981, the trustees exercise their discretion and pay 
the entire accumulated trust income available for distribution to X.
X receives £440 from the trustees. This sum is treated under s. 17(2)(a) 
as a net amount corresponding to a gross amount from which tax has 
been deducted at a rate equal to the sum of the additional and basic 
rate: 440 x 1 0 0 =  £800
55
Under s. 17(2)(a), X is treated as having paid tax on the £800 at 
a rate of 45%: 800 x = £360. If the personal rate of tax of
100
X is 30%, he should only have paid 800 x 30 = £240 of tax. X is
1ÔÔ
therefore entitled to a tax rebate of 360 - 240 = £120. The net 
income of X is the sum of the distribution payment and his tax 
rebate which is 440 + 120 = £560 (i.e. £800 net of tax at 30%),
The trustees are liable under s. 17(2)(b) to account for the tax 
notionally deducted from the gross payment of £800 (i.e. £360).
Against their libility under s. 17(2)(b) the trustees may set off 
the amount of tax paid at the additional as well as the basic rate 
in pursuance of s. 16. The tax which the trustees paid in pursuance 
of s. 16 amounted to £360, therefore their liability under s. 17(2)(b) 
is completely discharged.
49
PART 2; TRUSTS AND PART XVI, I.C.T.A.^
Introduction
Part XVI I.C.T.A. comprises a consolidation of anti-avoidance 
measures which have been introduced over the years since 1922, many 
of which are directed at the multifarious tax avoidance schemes 
which embody the trust as an essential element.
It was noted in Part 1 that a tax advantage may be gained by
exploiting the trust as a tax shelter under which income may
accumulate in the hands of trustees thereby suffering tax at the
2
basic and additional rate. This accumulation process would
give rise to a considerable saving of income tax where, but for 
the trust, the income would accrue to the truster to be charged to 
tax at his personal rate of, say, 55%. What the truster does on 
constituting an accumulation trust is to effectively alienate his 
income; the theoby is that he cannot be assessed to tax on income 
which is not his but accrues to the trustees of the settlement.
Prior to the introduction of the anti-avoidance provisions now 
consolidated in Part XVI, the advantages associated with the 
alienation of income were great. By reason of its flexible nature 
the trust represented a satisfactory means of effecting such 
alienation. Trusts may be made revocable or on a short term basis; 
the truster may retain an interest under the trust if he so desires. 
He may make his wife or children the objects of the trust or he may 
retain the power to direct how the trustees are to invest the trust 
fund. Within certain limits, the truster may deal with his property 
as he chooses and he is free to settle that property on such trusts 
and subject to such conditions as he thinks fit.
1. Unless otherwise stated, references in this Part are to 
the I.C.T.A.
2. S. 16, Finance Act 1973: supra, at p. 37 et seq.
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The general effect of Part XVI is not to render offending settlements 
void, but merely to treat the income arising therefrom as the income 
of the settlor, the income being charged at the settlor's personal 
rate of tax. Although it is possible to express in general terras 
the effect of its operation. Part XVI does not represent an organised 
structure of taxation; what identifiable structure there is would 
appear to have evolved by accident rather than by design. As 
Walton, J. indicated;
"The difficulty ... in discerning any consistent pattern in 
the various chapters of Part XVI of the 1970 Act is that 
they all spring from totally different origins, and thus do 
not in any sense represent what would obviously be^highly 
desirable, namely a 'code', in any shape of form."
Part XVI is divided into four chapters. It will be convenient 
here to briefly summarise the nature of each of the chapters.
Chapter I is directed towards short terra dispositions. Where 
income is paid by virtue or in consequence of a disposition to 
a person other than the disponer, then if the income cannot be 
so paid for a period of more than six years, that income will 
be treated for tax purposes as the income of the disponer.
The object of the chapter would appear to be to discourage those 
with high personal rates of tax from effecting dispositions of 
their income to those with low personal rates purely for the purpose 
of saving tax. If such dispositions are to be tax effective then 
they must be capable of exceeding six years. The obligation 
associated with the tax advantage is substantial. Obviously the 
obligation presents no problem to those with high and steady levels 
of income; but those with lower or fluctuating levels of income 
must carefully balance the tax advantages associated with a 
disposition with the possibility that in four or five years time 
they may not be in a financial position to meet their obligations.
1. Ang V. Parrish, / 1980_/ S.T.C. 341, at p. 345.
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chapter II is concerned with settlements made in favour of 
infant, unmarried children of the settlor. Where as a result 
of a settlement income is paid to an unmarried infant child of 
the settlor, the income is treated for tax purposes as that of 
the settlor. But for chapter II, a parent could, by means of a 
settlement, effectively utilize any unused personal allowances 
of his child. The rate of tax on the income of the parent would 
be reduced and the child could maintain itself out of its own 
income.
Chapter III renders ineffective for tax avoidance purposes 
settlements which are revocable or in which there is some 
interest retained for the settlor or his spouse. The purpose 
of this chapter is essentially the same as that of chaper I.
However, included in chapter III is s. 451 which basically provides 
that capital sums paid to the settlor by the trustees of a 
settlement shall be treated as the income of the settlor. "Capital 
sum" includes any sum paid by way of loan or repayment of a loan.
Chapter IV provides that income arising from a settlement which is 
paid to any person other than the settlor shall be treated as the 
income of the settlor for the purposes of computing his excess 
liability to tax. The purpose of the chapter would appear to be to 
minimize the tax advantages to be gained by the creation of settle­
ments, and to increase the tax yield.
A thorough understanding of the terms "settlement" and "settlor" 
is essential if the operation of Part XVI is to be fully appreciated. 
These terras will now be considered in detail for it is the 
interpretation of the words "settl ement" and "settlor" that determines 
the scope of Part XVI.
A) THE MEANING OF "SETTLEMENT" IN PART XVI
It must be appreciated at the outset that the term "settlement" 
as used in Part XVI includes in its meaning a wide range of 
transactions as well as the legal conpept of trust as described in 
Appendix 1. Each chapter contains its own interpretation of
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"settlement", or, in the case of chapter I, "disposition". 
For the purposes of chapter III and IV, s. 454(3) provides:
"'settlement' includes any disposition, trust, covenant, 
agreement or arrangement, ... "
In chapter II the interpretation is provided by s. 444(2) and is 
the same as that provided by s. 454(3) but in addition includes 
any 'transfer of assets.'
Chapter I relates to disposition; "disposition" being described 
in s. 434(2) as including 'any trust, covenant, agreement or 
arrangement.' Dispositions and settlements are obviously closely 
related.^
If the various interpretations of the term were read literally 
virtually every transaction would be a settlement for the purposes 
of Part XVI. The opening of a current account with a bank would 
be a settlement. No doubt the settlement would be considered as 
revocable, the creditor having the option to close his account.
The creditor would therefore be the settlor of a revocable settle­
ment, and, by virtue of s. 446 of chapter III, any income arising 
to the banker by reason of his investing the sum credited would 
be treated as the income of the creditor for tax purposes.
Because of the curious consequences which would undoubtedly follow 
on a strict literal interpretation of the term "settlement", it has 
been attempted to narrow the scope of the transactions which fall 
to be treated as settlements according to the literal meaning of the 
word as used in Part XVI. Restricting the effect of a particular 
term in a statute is recognised as legitimate judicial practice.
1. According to Walton, J., 'The wording of the respective
definitions in ss.434(2) and 454(3) are quite indistinguishable.' 
I.R.C. V. Plummer, / 1977 / S.T.C. 440, at p. 458.
53
"General words must receive a general construction, unless 
there is in the statute itself some ground for restricting 
their meaning. The fact that general words are used in a 
statute is not in itself, however, a conclusive reason why 
every case falling literally within them should be governed 
by that statute."
To date, two approaches to the problem of restricting the operation 
of the term "settlement" have been presented before the courts.
It has been urged that the general words which follow the word 
"settlement" in s. 444(2) and 454(3) should be construed ejusdem 
generis with the dominant word. A second argument has been advanced 
to the effect that bona fide commercial transactions which involve 
no element of bounty are not settlements for the purposes of Part XVI
"Settlement" and the ejusdem generis construction
To construe the general words which follow the term "settlement" 
in s. 444(2) and 454(3) ejusdem generis with the dominant word 
would be to accept that dispositions, trusts, covenants, agreements, 
arrangements and transfers of assets are "settlements" for the 
purposes of Part XVI only in so far as they share the common 
characteristics of those transactions which may be described as 
settlements according to the natural meaning of the word.
The natural meaning of the word*settlement" is somewhat imprecise;
Lord Moncrieff suggested that the word, according to its familiar
use at Common Law, meant 'a charging of the property of the settlor
2
with rights constituted in favour of others! Thus, a transfer of 
assets if construed ejusdem generis would be a settlement only if 
the assets of the transferor were charged with rights constituted 
in favour of others.
This argument was first employed by the Appellant in Hood Barrs v.
3 ^
I.R.C., the facts of which were as follows. The Appellant
transferred 120,000 shares to his two infant daughters in equal 
moieties. Subsequent to the transfer dividends amounting to £4,200 
arose from the shares and were paid to the daughters of the Appellant. 
The Crown alleged that the transfer of shares was a transfer of
1. Halsbury's Laws of England, 3rd ed., Vol. 36, at para. 596.
2. Morton v. I.R.C. (1941). 24T.C. 249, at p. 269.
3. (1946) 27 T.C. 385.
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assets and therefore a settlement according to s. 444(2). The
Appellant was the settlor and the dividend income was paid to
his children 'by virtue or in consequence of the settlement.' S. 437(1)
of chapter II provides that in such circumstances the income must
be treated for all the purposes of the Income Tax Acts as the
income of the settlor. Hence, the Appellant was assessed to
surtax in respect of the dividend income of his children.
The Appellant contended that the transfer of the shares did not
amount to a settlement; reliance was placed on the words of Lord
Moncrieff in his dissenting judgement in Morton v. I.R.C.^ as
2
supported by Lord Macmillan in Chamberlain v. I.R.C. According 
to Lord Moncrieff:
"Settlement" is ... nowhere defined in the Act, although in 
/ s. 454(3)_/ it is extended to include various specified 
deeds and arrangements which at Common Law might or might 
not have been regarded as forming part of a settlement.
These deeds and arrangements would, however, appear to be 
included only in so far as they themselves effectively 
operate the settlement (seeing that this remains the 
dominant word) ... "
"As used in the statutory Sections which require construction, 
I interpret "settlement" in accordance with a familiar use 
of the term at Common Law, as meaning a charging of the 
property of^the settlor with rights constituted in favour 
of others."
Lord Macmillan in Chamberlain v. I.R.C. concurred:
"I agree with Lord Moncrieff that the settlement or arrangement 
must be one whereby the settlor gharges certain property of his 
with rights in favour of others'!
1. (1941) 24 T.C. 259.
2. (1943) 25 T.C. 317.
3. (1941) 24 T.C. 259, at p. 268.
4. Ibid., at p. 269.
5. (1943) 25 T.C. 317, at p. 331. It should be noted that both
the Morton and Chamberlain cases were not concerned with the 
meaning of "settlement" but with determining what property 
is comprised in a settlement.
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The Appellant argued on the basis of these remarks that if a 
transfer of assets is to be a settlement for the purposes of 
chapter II, the actual transfer must create something in the 
nature of a settlement in the ordinary meaning of the word.
He urged that the transfer of shares to his daughters was 
an outright transfer which in no way resembled a settlement 
and that, therefore, the assessment must fail.
The Court of Appeal rejected the Appellant's contention. Lord 
Greene, M. R. was of the opinion that the word "settlement" did 
not create a genus to which the words 'disposition, trust, 
covenant, agreement, arrangement or transfer of assets'must 
belong. The Master of the Rolls noted that a covenant need not 
bear any resemblance to a settlement; that it was possible to 
create a valid covenant without the intervention of a trustee.^
As to the reliance which the Appellant placed on the judgement 
of Lord Macmillan in Chamberlain's case, Lord Greene, M. R. had 
little sympathy;
"If I may say so with the utmost respect, I cannot bring 
myself to believe that Lord Macmillan intended to make 
a suggestion as to the meaning and operation of such an 
interpretation clause so gubversive as that which ^ the 
Appellant _/ argues for."
3
In Thomas v. Marshall the whole issue of the ejusdem generis 
construction was raised once more. The Appellant opened Post 
Office savings accounts for his two unmarried infant children. 
He paid various sums into these accounts; the payments were 
absolute and unconditional gifts. Interest from the accounts
1. (1946) 25 T.C. 385, at p. 400-401: see also Wrottesley, J.
at p. 394.
2. Ibid,, at p. 402.
3. (1953) 34 T.C. 178.
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accrued to the children. The interest so accruing was income 
paid to them by virtue or in consequence of a settlement of 
which the Appellant was the settlor. It was, therefore, treated 
for all the purposes of the Income Tax Acts as the income of the 
Appellant under s. 437(1) of chapter II.
It was argued by the Appellant before the Court of Appeal that 
the Hood Barrs case no longer represented good law.^ It was 
suggested that Hood Barrs v. I.R.C. had been impliedly over­
ruled by the subsequent decision of the House of Lords in
2
Lord Vestey's Executors v. I.R.C. Lord Vestey's Executors 
V. I.R.C., like the Chamberlain and Morton Cases, was concerned
3
with determining what property was comprised in a settlement.
The House of Lords overruled the decision in Morton's case and 
in doing so approved of the dissenting judgement of Lord Moncrieff; 
furthermore, the House approved of the judgement of Lord Macmillan 
in the Chamberlain case. Although the Hood Barrs decision was not 
considered in Lord Vestey's Executors v. I.R.C., the Appellant in 
Thomas v. Marshall urged that, in the light of the Vestey case, a 
transfer of assets was a settlement only where there was 'a charging 
of the property with rights constituted in favour of others,’ 
and that the decision in Hood Barrs v. I.R.C. should not be followed,
The Court of Appeal dismissed the Appellant's contention and applied 
the decision in the Hood Barrs case. Sir Raymond Evershed, M. R. 
distinguished the Vestey and analogous cases:
" ... the real question which fell to be determined in all 
these cases, Morton's case, Chamberlain's case and Vestey's 
case, was not so much: Was there a settlement within the
1. Ibid., para. 8(c) of the Case state.
2. (1949) 31 T.C. 1.
3. All three of these cases are examined in detail below at p.92-96
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particular provisions of the Act in question?, but: 
What was the property comprised in the settlement? 
and that is a somewhat different question ... I 
think, therefore, it would be wrong for this court to 
say that, as it were, by a side wind, the validity 
of the Hood Barrs decision has been destroyed or 
impeached by the observations of the noble Lords in 
the Vestey case."
Lord Morton of Henryton surmised:
"The object of the Sub-section / i.e. s. 444(2) _/ is, 
surely, to make it plain that in Section / 437 _/ 
the word "settlement" is to be enlarged to include 
other transactions which would not be regarded as 
"settlements" within the meaning which that word 
ordinarily bears."
In conclusion it must be stated that it is not possible to 
restrict the operation of the words 'disposition, trust, 
covenant, agreement, arrangement or transfer of assets' to 
circumstances where a person has charged his property with 
an interest in favour of another; the words are not construed 
ejusdem generis with the term "settlement".
Of all the transactions or operations which fall to be treated 
as settlements for the purposes of Part XVI, the most abstruse 
is the "arrangement". An arrangement is a settlement but 
nowhere is "arrangement" defined in the Act. However, the 
frequently cited passage of Lord Greene, M. R. in I.R.C. v. 
Payne serves to illustrate in a general way the meaning of 
the word:
1. (1953) 34 T.C. 178, at p. 196.,
2. Ibid., at p. 202.
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"The word "arrangement" is not a word of art. It is used, 
in my opinion, in this context in what may be described 
as a business sense, and the question is: can we find here 
an 'arrangement' as so construed? ... It appears to me^ 
that the whole of what was done must be looked at ... "
The Lords President (Normand) in I.R.C. v. Morton suggested
that in 'order that something can be described as an arrange-
2
ment it must have a certain unity in its composition.'
Clearly, "arrangement" is an all-encompassing term which must 
catch most transactions. It has long been thought desirable 
that business transactions should not be subjected to the 
provisions of Part XVI; hence, the courts have striven to provide 
some form of protection for what are essentially commercial 
arrangements. The protection so provided operates as a limitation 
on the scope of Part XVI and is considered below.
"Settlements" and bona fide commercial transactions involving
no element of bounty
Given that the term "settlement" as used throughout Part XVI is 
not restricted to its natural meaning at Common Law, and that it 
includes such a nebulous concept as an "arrangement", it is clear 
that the scope of the anti-avoidance provisions is vast. A
limitation on the effect of Part XVI has been developed in the
I
4
3
line of cases beginning with Copeman v. Coleman in 1939 and
ending with the House of Lords decision in I.R.C. v. Plummer 
in 1979. The development of this limitation was somewhat chaotic 
and it will be demonstrated later that it now applies only to 
those transactions which involve no element of bounty. A review 
of these cases is necessary as it is essential to understand the 
nature of the transactions which are favoured by the limitation;
1. (1940) 23 T.C. 610, at p. 626.
2. (1941) 24 T.C. 259, at p. 271. See generally (1961
67 Taxation 135 and 147.
3. (1939) 22_T.C. 594.
4. / 1979 / S.T.C. 793.
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it is also of interest to note how the original proposition in 
Copeman v. Coleman has not so much been refined but overruled 
by subsequent cases.
The facts in Copeman v, Coleman were relatively simple. In 
1933 a company was formed to take over the Respondent's business. 
The capital of the company was £1,000 and its shares were held 
by the Respondent and his wife. Following an Extraordinary 
General Meeting in 1937 the capital of the company was increased 
to £6,000; this was effected by creating 25 preference shares 
each valued at £200. The newly created shares were
distributed amongst the close relatives of the Respondent; two 
such shares were allotted to his unmarried infant children for 
a consideration of £10 each.
Dividends were paid of the preference shares and the Respondent 
was assessed to tax under s. 437 of chapter II in respect of the 
dividend income paid to his children. The case was disposed of 
on the basis that there was an arrangement and therefore a settle­
ment; the Respondent was the settlor and the dividend income was 
paid to his children by virtue or in consequence of the settlement.
As a decision on a set of facts the case is unexceptional; however, 
during the argument of counsel, Lawrence, J. intervened and 
suggested of the interpretation of the term "settlement" contained 
in s . 444(2);
"Is not the limitation to be read into thos^ words - 'not 
being a bona fide commercial transaction?"
Nothing was expressed in the judgement of Lawrence, J. to that 
effect, though it is safe to assume that had there in fact been a 
bona fide commercial transaction the assessment would have failed
1. / 1939 / 2 K.B. 484, at p. 490,
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Naturally, the Respondent argued that there was a bona fide 
commercial purpose to the transaction in that it was commercially 
expedient to increase the capital of the company. The Crown, 
however, successfully demonstrated that this argument of the 
Respondent was fallacious. In reality the company received a 
mere £250 and it immediately distributed £1,000. Further, the 
unpaid capital of £190 on each of the children's shares was 
irrecoverable.^ There was clearly no commercially sound 
purpose to the transaction and so the assessment succeeded: 
it can only be assumed that had the Respondent been in a position 
to prove that the transaction was bona fide and commercial the 
court would have decided in his favour.
Following the perfunctory judgement of Lawrence, J. in Copeman's
case. Plowman,J. was faced with the rather more complicated facts in 
2
I.R.C. V. Leiner. The Respondent's mother had loaned a sum of 
£34,000, interest free, to T Ltd., a firm in which the Respondent 
was interested. For reasons immaterial to this discussion, the 
loan was charged to T Ltd. as security in favour of I.C.F.C., a 
finance company. The Respondent's mother wished to recover the 
£34,000 and settle this sum on the children of the Respondent (who 
happened to be unmarried infants). In order to release the 
charge on the loan the following scheme was devised: (1) I.C.F.C.
released their charge on the loan; (2) T Ltd. paid the £34,000 
to the Respondent's mother; (3) she paid the sum to the trustees 
of the children's settlement; (4) the trustees loaned £34,000 to 
the Respondent, interest being charged at the rate of 6% per annum 
(£2,040 p.a.) and (5) the Respondent loaned £34,000 free of interest 
to T Ltd.
The Respondent conceded that the scheme was an "arrangement" and, 
therefore, a settlement of which he was a settlor. The income 
of the trustees (the interest received by them on their loan to 
the Respondent) was paid to the unmarried infant children of the 
Respondent settlor who was accordingly assessed to tax thereon
1. (1939) 22 T.C. 594, at p . 600
2. (1964) 41 T.C. 589.
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under s. 437 of chapter II. The Respondent resisted the assessment 
arguing that the whole arrangement was a bona fide commercial 
transaction to which Part XVI could not apply and that, therefore, 
the trustees' income was not provided by him as a settlor under 
s. 442. Plowman, J. observed:
' ... it is common ground that it is implicit in the 
fasciculus of Sections of which Section / 442 _/ forms
a part that some element of bounty is necessary to make 
the Sections apply and that a bona fide commercial 
transaction would be excluded from their operation: see 
Copeman v. Coleman ..."
It should be noted that Plowman, J. accepted that not only should 
a bona fide commercial transaction be excluded from the operation 
of Part XVI but also excluded should be transactions which involve 
no element of bounty. The "element of bounty test" was introduced 
in I.R.C. V. Leiner for nowhere was it recognised in Copeman v. 
Coleman.
In Leiner's case the learned Judge determined that there was no 
bona fide commercial purpose to the transaction and that there was 
an element of bounty involved. This conclusion was reached simply 
by comparing the position of the Respondent before and after the 
arrangement was executed: before, he was liable to make no payments 
to anyone, but after, he was paying £2,040 per annum in return for 
which he personally derived no benefit. The position of T Ltd. 
was unchaged; both before and after the arrangement was executed 
it was the recipient of an interest free loan.
2
Next in the line of cases was Bulmer v. I.R.C. which involved a 
transaction which was unquestionably bona fide and of a commercial 
nature. The Appellants in the case held shares in Bulmer S Lumb 
(Holdings) Ltd., a public company which was threatened with take-over. 
In order to frustrate the take-over bid the following scheme was 
devised. S Ltd (another public company) agreed to incorporate a 
subsidiary company, Y Ltd, S Ltd. made a loan (the servicing loan)
1. Ibid at p. 596.
2. (1966) 44 T.C. 1.
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to Y Ltd. at a commercial rate of interest. Using this loan, Y 
Ltd. bought shares in Bulmer Ltd on the open market. The 
Appellants sold their shares in Bulmer Ltd. to Y Ltd.; the 
purchase price was left outstanding as an interest free loan.
With the dividends that Y Ltd. received on its shares in Bulmer 
Ltd., the servicing loan could be repaid. On repayment of the 
servicing loan the Appellants had the option to purchase all 
the shares of Bulmer Ltd. which would be held by Y Ltd.; the 
consideration for this purchase would be, in effect, the discharge 
of the outstanding loan between Y Ltd. and the Appellants.
The problem was that the servicing loan need not have been 
discharged by Y Ltd. . alone; any person, including the Appellants 
could have repaid the outstanding amount to S Ltd. The Appellants, 
therefore, had it in their power to terminate the arrangement at 
any time and recover the shares which they originally sold to Y 
Ltd. together with the shares which Y Ltd. purchased on the open 
market by means of the servicing loan.
The Crown argued, inter alia, that the whole scheme was an 
"arrangement" and so a settlement within the meaning of s. 454(3). 
The Appellants were the settlors and they had it in their power to 
determine the whole arrangement by repaying the servicing loan.
On the termination of the settlement the Appellant would become 
beneficially entitled to the property comprised in the settlement, 
that is the shares in Bulmer Ltd. S. 446 of chapter III provides 
that in circumstances such as these, the income arising from the 
property comprised in the settlement must be treated as the 
income of the settlor. In this case, that income comprised 
the dividends paid on the shares of Bulmer Ltd. to Y Ltd.; the 
income which was applied to discharge the servicing loan made 
by S Ltd.
Against this the Appellants argued that the scheme was a bona fide 
commercial transaction involving no element of bounty. It was not 
therefore, a settlement within the meaning of s. 454(3) ■,
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The law applicable to the case, according to Pennycuick,J. was to 
be found in the Coleman and Leiner cases:
"I think that in all the circumstances my proper course 
is to follow what was said in the Coleman and Leiner 
cases without expressing any independent conclusion of 
my own. ' '
On the facts of the case Pennycuick, J. decided that there was a 
bona fide commercial transaction which involved no element of 
bounty.
"It seems to me abundantly clear that the transaction between 
the Appellants and / S Ltd._/ was indeed a bona fide 
commercial transaction. Again, in case that imports in any 
respect a different test, it is clear that there was no _ 
element of bounty as between the Appellants and / S Ltd._/.. 
It may be that the transaction has been framed ... in such 
a way as to procure tax advantages to the Appellants, but 
that circumstance does not of itself prevent it from being 
a bona fide commercial transaction or import any element 
of bounty."
Before considering the case of I.R.C. v . Plummer, it will be useful 
to summarize the state of the law at this stage of its development.
There was nothing expressed in the judgement of Lawrence, J. in 
Copeman v. Coleman to the effect that a bona fide commercial 
transaction is excluded from the operation of Part XVI, However, 
such a proposition may be implied, although it does not form part 
of the ratio of the case for, on the facts, there was no bona fide 
commercial transaction. The "implied obiter dicta" of Lawrence, J. 
was accepted by Plowman, J. in I.R.C. v. Leiner. In Leiner's case 
the "element of bounty test" was introduced to determine whether 
or not a transaction is a "settlement". On the facts of the case 
before him Plowman, J. decided that there was no bona fide commercial 
transaction and that there was an element of bounty involved: 
his remarks, therefore, must be relegated to the ranks of obiter dicta.
1. (1966) 44 T.C. 1, at p. 29.
2. Ibid., at p. 29-30.
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Only in Bulraer's case was there found to be a bona fide commercial 
transaction which did not involve an element of bounty. In that 
case, Pennycuick, J. thought that he should "follow what was said 
in the Coleman and Leiner cases". It has been demonstrated above 
that what was said in the Leiner case and what was not said but 
could be implied in the Coleman case was strictly obiter. There 
was no reason why Pennycuick, J. should have felt constrained to 
follow the previous two cases. Nevertheless, it must be said that 
incorporated in the ratio of the Bulmer case is one of the two 
following propositions: (i) a bona fide commercial transaction is 
not a settlement for the purposes of Part XVI; or (ii) a 
transaction which involves no element of bounty is not a 
settlement for the purposes of Part XVI.
Such was the state of the law in 1977 when Walton, J. was presented 
with the facts in I.R.C. v. Plummer. The material facts and mechanics 
of the scheme devised by the taxpayer were succinctly summarized 
by Walton, J .:
"The Slater Walker Group had evolved a taxation-saving 
scheme which it was one of the taxpayer's duties to 
supervise. It was aimed at high surtax_payers, and_in 
essence was simplicity itself. HOVAS a charity / 
was prepared to purchase annuities from such individuals 
at rates which were attractive to them. This was because, 
as a charity, HOVAS was thought to be able to recover the 
tax deducted when the surtax payer paid the annuity to it, 
while the surtax payer was able to deduct, or was thought 
to be able to deduct, the amount of the annuity from his 
total income for the purposes of surtax. So he would 
receive by way of a capital sum roughly the amount which 
he would have to pay, over the period of the annuity, to 
the charity; and, as he would be able to deduct this from 
his total income, he would save the surtax which he ^ould 
otherwise have to pay on the amount of the annuity."
The scheme was attacked on four fronts; however, in the present 
discussion only one is significant. It was argued that the 
scheme was an "agreement" and therefore a settlement within the 
meaning of s, 454(3), S. 457(1) of chapter IV provides:
1. See Walton, J. In I.R.C. v. Plummer, below at p. 66.
2. / 1977 7 S.T.C. 440, at p. 447-448.
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'Where, during the life of the settlor, income arising 
under a settlement made on or after 7th April 1965 is, 
under the settlement and in the events that occur, 
payable or applicable for the benefit of any person 
other than the settlor, then, ... the income shall, 
for the purposes of excess liability, be treated as 
the income of the settlor and not as the income of 
any other person.
"In this subsection "excess liability" means the excess 
of liability to income tax over what it would be if 
all income tax were charged at the basic rate to the 
exclusion of any higher or additional rate."
Obviously, if this section applied the scheme of the taxpayer 
would be frustrated: the theory depended upon the ability of 
the taxpayer to deduct the amount of the annuity for the purposes 
of computing his liability to surtax (i.e. tax at higher rates).
The taxpayer urged on the basis of the decision in Bulmer v. 
I.R.C. that, as there was no element of bounty involved, the 
agreement was not a settlement for the purposes of s. 454(3) 
and that, therefore, s. 457(1) was inapplicable. Against this 
the Crown argued that the agreement was a settlement. There 
was no bona fide commercial purpose to the transaction; the 
purpose was purely to avoid the payment of tax.
Faced with these contentions, Walton J. was required to interpret 
the judgement of Pennycuick, J. in the Bulmer case; he noted the 
possible rationes of the case:
"It is fair to say, I think, that he comes to no final 
conclusion as to whether the true test of a scheme 
which falls outside the definition of 'settlement' is 
one which (a) is a bona fide commercial transaction or
(b) is one in which there is no element of bounty.
In Bulmer itself both tests were satisfied."
1. Ibid., at p. 457.
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Walton, J. had little hesitation in adopting the "element of 
bounty test";
' ... however wide the statutory language in which the 
term 'settlement' is defined, the overriding idea is that 
of bounty of some description. If there is no bounty, 
then there is nothing which can eyen remotely be classed 
as a settlement with a settlor."^
In the Court of Appeal, Buckley, L. J, concurred with the opinion 
expressed by Walton, J.:
"In my opinion it is clear from the judgements of Pennycuick 
J. in Bulmer v. Inland Revenue Comrs and of Plowman J. in 
Inland Revenue Comrs v. Leiner that those judges were there 
using the term 'commercial transaction' to indicate any 
transaction in which there was no element of bounty. It 
follows that a transaction effected for full consideration 
in money or money's ^orth is not a 'settlement' for the 
purposes of s. 457."
The view of the majority in the House of Lords was clearly expressed 
by Lord Fraser of Tullybelton:
"In my opinion the true rule is that the definition / in 
s. 454(3) _/ applies only where there is an element of 
bounty. One reason is that the commercial transaction 
test seems to go too far; many transactions which would 
be generally regarded as perfectly legitimate forms of 
investment, are entered into solely or at least 
predominantly, for tax reasons, and I think it would 
be wrong to suggest that they might be taxable for that 
reason alone. But the main reason in favour of the bounty 
test is that the word 'settlement', even allowing for 
its extended definition in s. 454(3), seems to me to be 
used throughout Part^XVI of the Act with a flavour of 
donation or bounty."
Needless to say the taxpayer's contention was upheld.
1. Ibid., at p. 457.
2. l_  1978__/ S.T.C. 517, at p. 527.
3. / 1979 / S.T.C. 793, at p. 813.
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Thus there is now an abundance of authority for the proposition 
that a transaction is a settlement for the purposes of Part XVI 
only if it involves an element of bounty. The proposition is 
substantially at variance to that impliedly propounded by Lawrence,
J. in Copeman v. Coleman for it is matterless that there is no 
bona fide commercial purpose to the tranaction.
There was some considerable discusssion in the judgements of
the House of Lords in Plummer's case as to the intention of Parliament
in drafting the settlement provisions. The various sections which
govern the definition of "settlement" are drafted in wide terms.
Lord Wilberforce thought that it would be judicial legislation to
read into the definitions an exception in favour of bona fide
commerical transactions;^ however, he had no hesitation in limiting
2
the scope of the term to transactions involving an element bounty.
As Lord Diplock pointed out in his dissenting judgement, there
seems to be little distinction between what Lord Wilberforce would
describe as judicial legislation and what he obviously considered
3
judicial interpretation.
The dissenting judgements of Lord Diplock and Viscount Dilhorne 
are of particular interest. Both query the basis for limiting 
the scope of the settlement provisions. If it could be implied 
that Parliament had intended such limitations, why did it expressly 
include in s. 434 an exception in favour of dispositions made for 
valuable and sufficient consideration? Likewise, why were exceptions 
provided to the operation of s. 457, exceptions which are essentially 
in favour of business transactions?^
Viscount Dilhorne strenuously objected to the imposition of any 
limitation by the courts on the scope of the settlement provisions:
1. Ibid., at p. 800.
2. Ibid. , at p. 801.
3. Ibid., at p. 810
4. See Lord Diplock at p. 809-810. The exceptions to s. 434 
and 457 are discussed below at p. 97-98 and at p. 119-20 
respectively.
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' ... if Parliament had intended that the definition in s. 454 (3 
should only apply to a settlement, disposition, trust, covenant 
agreement or arrangement in which there was an element of 
bounty, that could easily have been stated. Similarly if 
Parliament intended that despite the width of the definition, 
bona fide commercial transactions should be excluded that also 
could have easily been stated. For my part I decline to 
construe the definition as if it contained these words. It 
may well be that in a great many cases there will be an 
element of bounty but to hold, when Parliament has not so 
enacted, that s. 457 only applies when there is an element 
of bounty may be to restrict its operation far beyond 
Parliament’s intention, and the width of the definition is  ^
a clear indication that its scope was intended to be wide."
Lord Roskill in Chinn v. Collins (a capital gains tax case) advised 
against the acceptance of the word "bounty" as a term of art:
' ... I would venture to point o^t that the word 'bounty' 
appears nowhere in the statute. It is not a word of 
definition. It is a judicial gloss on the statute 
descriptive of those cases which are caught by the section 
in contrast to those which are not. The courts must, I 
think, be extremely careful not to interpret this descriptive 
word too rigidly."
Chinn v. Collins involved what were essentially commercial dealings 
with a contingent interest under a trust. The trust was constituted 
in 1960 and the dealings in question took place in 1969. The whole 
transaction was an "arrangement" which involved the appointment 
of the trust fund to the taxpaying beneficiary (contingent upon 
him surviving three days from the date of appointment). It was 
argued by the taxpayer that the arrangement was not a settlement 
in that it involved no element of bounty, the dealings with the 
interest under the trust being of a commercial nature.
1. Ibid., at p. 806.
2. The statute was what is now the Capital Gains Tax Act
1979 in which for certain purposes "settlement" has the 
meaning given by s. 454(3) I.C.T.A. - s. 17(7) Capital 
Gains Tax Act 1979.
3. / 1981 / S.T.C. 1, at p. 12.
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However, it was held in the House of Lords that the appointment 
of the fund to the beneficiary supplied the requisite element 
of bounty. The bounty of the settlor in constituting the trust 
in 1960 was incomplete. It was completed in 1969 when the 
absolute interest was appointed to the beneficiary, hence the 
arrangement was a settlement:
"7 The beneficiary^/ was among the objects of the 1960 
settlement but before the power of appointment was 
exercised there was no absolute certainty, however 
strong the probability, that / he_/ would receive 
any of the shares held by the trustees. In my judge­
ment there was a very real 'bounty' conferred when 
the trustees with the settlor's consent exercised the _ 
power of appointment in question in / the beneficiary's_/ 
favour. As counsel for the Crown put it, when the power 
of appointment was exercised a blank was filled in the 
original settlement which left blank how the final 
distribution of the trust's assets was to be rpade. That 
in my judgement was a clear act of 'bounty'."
By reason of the decision of the House of Lords in Plummer's 
case. Parliament thought it necessary to prevent further exploitation 
of schemes such as the one devised by Mr. Plummer. S. 48 of the 
Finance Act 1977 basically prevents the deduction of income tax 
from payments specified in the section; such payments cannot 
be deducted in computing the total income of the payer, and no 
longer represent a charge on income for the purposes of 
corporation tax.
Subject to the exceptions in subsection (3), s. 48 applies to 
any payment which -
"(a) is an annuity or other annual payment charged with 
tax under Case III of Schedule D, not being interest; and
(b) is made under a liability incurred for consideration 
in money or money's worth all or any of which is not 
required to be brought into account in computing for the 
purposes of income tax or corporation tax the income of 
the person making the payment."
1. Ibid., at p. 12 {per Lord Roskill).
2. S. 48(2), Finance Act 1977.
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By this provision Parliament has effected a limited exception
to the operation of the term "settlement" as construed by the
courts in relation to s. 457. Because the exception is of 
such limited application it can only be assumed that Parliament 
is generally satisfied with the way in which the courts have 
interpreted the term. It may be implied that the decision in 
Bulmer's case has the approval of Parliament, for were it 
otherwise the legislature would have drafted s. 48 of the 
Finance Act 1977 in wider terms.
B) THE MEANING OF "SETTLOR" IN PART XVI
Because in Part XVI the word "settlement" is given an unnatural
and wide meaning it would have been incongruous not to have 
provided an equally extensive interpretation of the term "settlor" 
It is intended here to provide an analysis of the term "settlor" 
and to illustrate its operation by reference to decided cases.
For the purposes of chapter II, s. 444(2) provides:
"settlor", in relation to a settlement, includes any 
person by whom the settlement was made or entered into 
directly or indirectly, and in particular (but without 
prejudice to the generality of the preceding words of 
this definition) includes any person who has provided 
or undertaken to provide funds directly or indirectly 
for the purpose of the settlement, or has made with any 
other person a reciprocal arrangement for that other 
person to make or enter into the settlement."
S. 454(3) provides the definition of "settlor" for the purposes 
of chapters III and IV. The section states that "settlor", 
in relation to a settlement, means any person by whom the 
settlement was made;' and continues;
' ... a person shall be deemed for the purposes of this 
Chapter to have made a settlement if he has made or 
entered into the settlement directly or indirectly, and 
in particular (but without prejudice to the generality 
of the preceding words) if he has provided or undertaken 
to provide funds directly or indirectly for the purpose 
of the settlement, or has made with any other person a 
reciprocal arrangement for that other person to make or 
enter into the settlement."
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The wording of s. 444(2) differs slightly from that of s. 454(3), 
although the effect of the two sections in respect of the term
"settlor" is the same.
Thus there are three categories of persons who are considered 
to be settlors for the purposes of Part XVI. There are (1) 
those who have made or entered into a settlement directly or 
indirectly; (2) those who have provided funds directly or 
indirectly for the purposes of a settlement; and (3) those 
who have, made with any other person a reciprocal arrangement 
for that other person to make or enter into a settlement.^
Each of these categories will now be considered in turn.
(1). "Settlor" as a person who has made or entered into a 
settlement directly or indirectly
This aspect of the term "settlor" may be illustrated adequately
2
by reference to the case of I.R.C. v. Buchanan. The case
involved the will of Edward Cecil Guinness, the first Earl of
Iveagh, The terms of the will were explained in the Case 
stated as follows:
"Edward Cecil Guinness, the first Earl of Iveagh / the 
testator _/ ... died in 1927. By his will ... his 
residuary estate was settled upon such of his children 
as were living at his death and their issue. The 
children took a life interest with remainder as to 
each child's share to their issue, but any of such 
issue living at the testator's death took onl^ a 
life interest with remainder to their issue."
The will further provided:
"Any such life tenant may at any time surrender such 
life interest or any part thereof to or in favour of 
the person or any one or more of the persons who 
would be entitled thereto or to some share thereof 
or of the trust premises in which it subsists."
1. See Simon, E6.223.
2. (1957) 37 T.C. 365.
3. Ibid., para. 2(a).
4. Ibid., quoted by Lord Goddard, C. J. at p. 373.
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Until 1948, A- G. (one of the testator’s three children) was 
enjoying his life interest in possession in one third of the 
residuary estate. He had three daughters including L. D. L. D. 
herself had children.
In 1948 L, D. surrendered her contingent interest under the 
will, that is the interest which would have vested upon the 
termination of her father's interest. The day following 
L. D.'s surrender. A, G. surrendered his interest in the 
residuary estate; thereupon the interest which would have 
vested in L. D. had she not executed the deed of surrender 
actually vested in L. D.'s unmarried infant children. These 
children would not acquire a vested interest in possession 
until they attained the age of 21 years; however, the will 
provided that the trustees might advance to such infants sums 
of up to £2,000 per annum.
The object of the exercise was to save tax. The theory was 
that income from the residuary estate would suffer tax at a 
lower rate in the hands of the children than it would if 
paid as income to either A. G . or L . D.
The Crown sought to counter-attack the scheme. It was 
successfully argued before the Court of Appeal that L. D. had, 
by surrendering her contingent interest, effected a disposition 
and had, therefore, made a settlement. As the maker of a 
settlement she was a settlor within the meaning of s. 444(2). 
The sums paid by the trustees to the infant children of L. D. 
were paid by virtue or in consequence of a settlement of which 
L. D. was the settlor. The sums paid were, therefore, treated 
as the income of L. D. under s. 437(1) of chapter II.
It was of no consequence that the income of the infant children 
was in fact received from the trustees of the residuary estate 
and that L, D. herself paid nothing. It was also matterless 
that the disposition effected by L. D. on its own would’ not 
have led to any payments to her children.
The case is of importance in that it demonstrates that a person
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may be a settlor without actually having provided anything which 
forms the property comprised in the settlement or which forms the 
income of another person. This is of particular significance in 
respect of s. 437 where the source of income which is paid to the 
infant unmarried child of the settlor is immaterial provided it 
is paid by virtue or in consequence of the settlement.
(2) "Settlor" as a person who has provided or undertaken to 
provide funds directly or indirectly for the purposes of a settlement
Curious and rather unexpected applications of the settlement 
provisions result from this aspect of the term "settlor"; this 
is particularly so in respect of persons who provide funds for 
the purposes of a settlement by indirect means: Crossland v.
Hawkins  ^ is an example.
Crossland v. Hawkins involved a scheme commonly adopted by those 
engaged in the film industry and similar highly paid professions.
In order to avoid a high incidence of income tax, a highly paid 
professional actor would form a company. He would enter into a 
contract of employment with the company and accept a modest salary. 
The company would be paid vast sums on the hiring of their 
employee's services. These sums would eventually reach the pocket 
of the employee at a later stage, perhaps upon the liquidation 
of the company. The employee would suffer a charge to tax on 
his salary though at a relatively low rate. Had he hired his 
services directly without the intervention of the company, 
obviously his income would be much greater and would, therefore, 
attract a higher incidence of tax.
The Respondent, H, entered into such an arrangement. On lOth 
December, 1954, a company was formed, R Ltd., of which H. was a 
director. H entered into a contract of employment with the 
company. Of the first two shares of R Ltd., one was held by 
H's accountant solely, and the other by H's wife and his accountant 
jointly. A trust was created on 3rd March, 1955, the settlor of
1. (1961) 39 T.C. 493.
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which was H's father-in-law; the trustees were H's wife and 
his accountant, and the beneficiaries were, after the trustees 
had exercised their power of appointment, H's children who 
would take the trust property absolutely in equal shares should 
they attain the age of 25.
The trust property comprised £lOO, £98 of which the trustees 
used to purchase 98 unissued shares in R Ltd. These shares were 
issued on 3lst March, 1955,
The company received income from the hiring of H's services and 
in October, 1956, a dividend of £500 was declared. Most of the 
income which the trustees received on their shares in R Ltd was 
applied to the benefit of H's unmarried infant children. The 
children, having unused personal allowances, claimed back the 
tax paid on the income which they received.
The whole scheme (that is, the formation of the company, the 
contract of employment and the trust deed) comprised an arrange­
ment and was therefore a settlement.^
1. The Respondent unsuccessfully argued that to constitute 
an arrangement the whole of it must be contemplated from 
the outset, and that when he formed R Ltd. he did not 
foresee that the trustees would eventaully hold the shares. 
It was held, however, that there was sufficient unity to 
constitute an arrangement. Donovan, L. J. did not "think 
that the language of / s. 437 requires that the 
whole of the eventual arrangement must be in contemplation 
from the very outset"; (at p. 505). On the facts of the 
case, Donovan, L. J. was in no doubt that there was an 
arrangement: "Bearing in mind the ultimate object of
securing money free from the burden, or the full burden, 
of Surtax, can it matter for present purposes that the 
precise way of securing this result was not decided upon 
at the very outset? I think not"; (p. 505).
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The Respondent was the settlor; he had provided funds for the 
purposes of the settlement. The contract of employment allowed 
R Ltd. to hire out the services of the Respondent in return 
for a hiring fee. By entering into the contract of employment, 
the Respondent was indirectly providing R Ltd. with funds. The 
company was part of the arrangement and so the Respondent was 
indirectly providing funds for the purposes of the settlement; 
he was, therefore, a settlor.
The sums advanced to the unmarried infant children of the Respondent 
by the trustees were paid by virtue or in consequence of a 
settlement of which the Respondent was the settlor. Accordingly 
those sums were treated as the income of the Respondent under s. 437.
The words "provided ... funds ... indirectly for the purpose of 
the settlement" as interpreted and applied in Crossland v. Hawkins 
are of far reaching effect. It would appear that a person 
indirectly provides funds for the purposes of the settlement if 
he does any act which causes a flow of funds into the settlement.
This implies a 'causation test' to determine whether or not a 
person is a settlor. Difficulties may be envisaged where the act 
of a person is the causa sine qua non of the flow of the funds 
into the settlement as opposed to the causa causans; a solution 
to this problem is suggested below.^
An alternative interpretation of the case is that H was actually 
responsible for the entire arrangement and was therefore the 
maker of the settlement. The scheme was essentially devised 
and executed by H's solicitors and accountants; H was not specifically 
consulted on the matter. This did not, however, prevent H from 
being deemed the maker of the settlement. Pearce, L. J. noted:
1. At p. 79.
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"Thè mere fact that [_ H _7 did not concern himself with 
some of the steps in the legal machinery involved does 
not make it any the less his arrangement withln_the Section. 
A man does not avoid the incidence of Section !_ 437 _/
by merely being absent from, and leaving to his solicitors 
and accountants, certain parts of the legal machinery, 
if he is aware of the proposals for an "arrangement" or 
a settlement and actively forwards them by personally 
carrying out and assisting in the vital parts in which 
his performance and co-operation are necessary. Nor 
can he avoid liability by merely giving his solicitors 
carte blanche to effect some scheme for the benefit of 
his family and^refusing to concern himself with its 
precise form."
Crossland v. Hawkins was followed by the House of Lords in the
2
similar case of Mills v. I.R.C. In Mills' case the Appellant
was a child actress whose father wished to secure legal protection for
her potentially vast earnings in the film making business.
A company was incorporated, S. P. Ltd., with which the child 
entered into a contract of employment. The scheme was as in 
Crossland v. Hawkins, the difference being that the shares of 
the company were held in trust for the child absolutely on her 
attaining the age of 25 years, with gift overs should she fail 
to attain a vested interest. The child herself was virtually 
ignorant of the scheme which her father had implemented. She 
signed the relevant documents without having read them.
S. P. Ltd. hired the services of its employee to Walt Disney 
Productions in return for which it received considerable sums 
of money. Substantial dividends were paid to the trustees in 
respect of the shares they held in S. P. Ltd.
It was contended by the Crown that the entire arrangement 
constituted a settlement; the Appellant was the settlor, and, 
as at the age of 25 she would become absolutely entitled to 
the shares in S, P. Ltd. and to the income accumulated in the 
hands of the trustees, she retained an interest under the
1. (1961) 39 T.C. 493, at p. 508.
2. (1974) 49 T.C. 367.
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settlement. S. 447 of chapter III provides that where the settlor 
has an interest in the income arising under or the property 
comprised in a settlement, then (subject to certain limitations) 
any income so arising shall be treated as the income of the 
settlor! On the basis of s. 447 the Appellant was assessed to 
surtax in respect of the dividends which were paid to the trustees.
Against this the Appellant argued that she was not the settlor; 
that the only funds provided for the purpose of the settlement 
were provided by S. P. Ltd.
The House of Lords had little sympathy with this argument; according 
to Viscount Dilhorne:
" ... in this case it is, to my mind, taking too narrow 
a view of the arrangement to conclude that the funds 
which went to the trustees by way of dividends were just 
provided by S. P. Ltd. _/. To do so means shutting 
ones eyes to the fact that the source of the dividends
was money paid for / the Appellant's _/ work and money
which but for the arrangement would have been received by
her. In my opinion, she must be held to hgve provided
funds for the purpose of the "settlement".
The House of Lords overruled the decision of the Court of Appeal 
in which Lord Denning, M. R. suggested that the child actress 
could not have provided funds for the 'purpose' of the settle­
ment. Lord Denning, M. R. suggested:
"The word "purpose" connotes a mental element. The Shorter 
Oxford English Dictionary gives it as "intending or meaning 
to do something" or "the object for which anything is done". 
In Newton v. Commissioners of Taxation / 1958_/ A. C . 450,
at page 465, it was said to mean "the end in view"^ 
According to this, in order that / the Appellant^/ herself 
should provide funds "for the purpose of the settlement", 
she must have had the object - the end in view - of 
promoting the purposes of the settlement. For that to be 
her purpose, she must have had some understanding gf the 
"arrangement" and have intended to facilitate it".
1. S. 447 is considered below at p. 104 et seq.
2. (1974) 49 T.C. 367, at p. 407-408.
3. Ibid., at p. 385.
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Buckley, L. J. thought along similar lines to those of Lord 
Denning, M. R. ; however. Viscount Dilhorne disapproved:
"I do not agree with Lord Denning M. R. that the word 
"purpose" in this section connotes a mental element or 
with Buckley L. J. that there must be a motivating 
intention ... I do not consider it incumbent, in 
order to establish that a person is a settlor as 
having provided funds for the purpose of a settlement, 
to show that there was any element of mens rea. Where 
it is shown that funds have been provided for a settle­
ment a very strong inference is to be drawn that they 
were provided for that purpose, an inference which will 
be rebutted if it is established that they were provided 
for another purpose. In this case there is not a shred 
of evidence that the funds were provided for any other 
purpose."
From the Hawkins and Mills cases it is apparent that the line 
which divides those who have indirectly provided funds for the 
purposes of a settlement from those who have done some remote 
aet which causes a flow of funds into the settlement may be 
somewhat narrow and indistinct. However, a workable scheme 
may be extracted from the two cases, in particular from the 
judgement of Viscount Dilhorne in Mills v. I.R.C. Thus, a 
person who causes a flow of funds into a settlement is 
presumed to be a settlor. The presumption is rebuttable by 
evidence that the person did not act to benefit the settlement, 
but acted for some other purpose. Henee, if the act of a
person is the mere causa sine qua non of the flow of funds into
a settlement he is presumed to be a settlor, but he may be
protected from the rigours of Part XVI by adducing evidence of
the true purpose of his act, thereby rebutting the presumption. 
This may involve placing a heavy burden of proof on to the 
presumed settlor as to the purpose of his acts although this 
seems wholly to accord with the opinion expressed by Viscount 
Dilhorne.
1. Ibid., at p. 408.
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(3). "Settlor" as a person who has made with any other person 
a reciprocal arrangement for that other person to make or enter 
into a settlement.
This aspect of the term "settlor" is of interest in that it appears 
to add nothing to the operation of either s. 444(2) or s. 454(3). 
This submission is demonstrable by reference to the case of I.R.C. 
V. Clarkson-Webb. The case involved a reciprocal agreement between 
two brothers. Finlay, J. detailed the relevant faets as follows:
"The arrangement was carried out by two deeds and the 
substance of eaeh deed is this: A, the first brother,
appoints B, the other brother, a trustee, and covenants 
to pay B, for the benefit of B's infant son, a sum of 
£350 a year ... B, by the other deed, enters into 
precisely the same arrangement turned round; he makes A 
the trustee and covenants to pay A, for ^he benefit of 
A's infant son, the sum of £350 a year".
The deeds in question were to take effect for a maximum period 
of 7 years.
One of the brothers was the Respondent in the case. He admitted
that there was a mutual agreement. The Crown argued that the
income paid to the children must be treated as the income of 
their respective fathers. S. 20(c), Finance Act 1922 provided 
that any income which, in consequence of a disposition made by 
any person, was payable to an infant child of that person, then 
if it was so payable for a period less than the life of the child, 
the income was to be treated as that of the disponer. "Disposition" 
for the purposes of s. 20 included any trust, covenant, agreement 
or arrangement.
The Respondent argued that as a result of the disposition made by
him no income was paid to his child.
1. (1932) 17 T.C. 451, at p. 455.
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Finlay, J. considered that if regard was had to one of the deeds 
only, then neither of the covenantors would have made a disposition 
for the benefit of his own child. . However, he concluded that the 
effect of the arrangement could not be found by considering each 
individual deed:
"You constantly must look at several deeds to get the true 
effect of an arrangement. I think one ought to look at 
these deeds together and, if one does, it seems to me to 
be reasonably plain that this was, in substance, the 
procuring of an arrangement by the Respondent ...
"The substance of my view ts this: these were dispositions; 
they were made by mutual arrangement; and, really, I think 
that they were part of an arrangement which must be looked 
at as a whole, with the result that t^ey really, for this 
purpose, constituted one disposition."
The learned Judge considered that the reciprocal arrangement amounted 
to an "arrangement" and therefore a disposition for the purpose of 
s. 20(c), Finance Act 1922. Surely such an arrangement would 
amount to a settlement for the purposes of Part XVI, I.C.T.A.?
It is suggested that a person who makes a reciprocal arrangement 
with another person for that other to make or enter into a settle­
ment is himself making an "arrangement"; he is, therefore, a settlor 
by reason of his making a settlement. It can only be assumed that the 
"reciprocal arrangement" provisions were added to s. 444(2) and 454(3) 
for the avoidance of doubt.
Settlements involving more than one settlor
In the case of a settlement involving more than one settlor, the
provisions of chapters II, III and IV apply to each settlor as
3
if he was the only one.
1. (1932) 17 T.C. 451, at p. 456-457.
2. Ibid., at p. 457.
3. Sections 442(1), 452(1) and 459(2). A similar provision
applies to chapter I in the case of dispositions involving 
more than one disponer.
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In general terms, the income which may be attributed to a joint 
settlor is limited to the amount of income originating from that 
settlor, or, to the amount of income arising from property comprised 
in the settlement to the extent that that property originated from the 
settlor.^
Income originating from a settlor includes income provided directly
or indirectly by the settlor and includes income from property
2
originating from the settlor.
Property originating from a settlor includes property which the 
settlor has provided directly or indirectly for the purposes of
3
the settlement.
The machinery for the treatment of joint settlors may prove cumbersome
in cases such as I.R.C. v. Buchanan.^ Tiley noted that on the
facts of I.R.C. V. Buchanan there was an arrangement involving
A, G. and L. D. in addition to there being a disposition by L. D.
5
alone. Had the court considered that there was an arrangement, 
it would have concluded that there were two settlors. However, 
in d'Abreu v. I.R.C., the facts of which were materially 
indistinguishable from those in Buchanan’s case, Oliver, J. refused 
to consider the transaction as comprising two dispositions with 
two settlors:
"As it seems to me, the only enquiry which the court 
needs to make is whether there has been a disposition 
and whether it is in consequence of that disposition 
that the income is paid to the children of the settlor. 
Plainly that is the case; s. 437, it seems to me, applies; 
and one does not need to look at all at the provisions 
of s. 442,"
1. S. 442(2) and s. 452(2).
2. S. 442(4) and s. 452(6).
3. S. 442(3) and s. 452(5).
4. (1957) 37 T.C. 365., supra, at p. 72-74.
5. 19:^.
6. /Ï97J/S.T.C. 538, at p. 548.
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Thus, it is not open to a taxpayer to argue that a disposition 
made by him was a mere part of an arrangement involving others 
who were equally "settlors". There is, therefore, no requirement 
to apportion the income arising under the settlement between the 
various settlors; the entire income may be treated as originating 
from the disponer.
PART XVI AS IT APPLIES TO THE TRUST CONCEPT
\
Part XVI operates in respect of "settlements" and "dispositions".
From the foregoing discussion it will be appreciated that both 
these terms encompass an extensive range of transactions including 
the legal concept of "trust". A trust is necessarily a settlement, 
but a settlement need not necessarily embody a trust.
Although it was undoubtedly the exploitation of the trust as a 
device for the avoidance of tax that prompted the legislature to 
introduce many of the provisions which Part XVI now comprises, 
the provisions are not specifically designed to counteract only the 
use of the trust as a means of tax avoidance: Part XVI catches
covenants and agreements, etc. which may have none of the 
characteristics of "trust". Thus, nowhere is "trust" defined 
in Part XVI ; reference is made in several of the provisions to 
"trustees", although there is no express recognition of the 
concept of the beneficiary.
No useful purpose would be served by considering Part XVI chapter 
by chapter; the chapters themselves do not integrate to form any 
structure or scheme of taxation. It is realism and not defeatism to 
accept that there is no structure in Part XVI which is capable of 
analysis.
1. Ang V. Parrish, / 1980 _/ S.T.C. 341, at p. 345 (per
Walton, J .). ■
83
In general, Part XVI prescribes the circumstances in which certain 
income and, to à limited extent, capital is to be treated as the 
income of the settlor. It provides a response to circumstances 
rather than a positive structure of taxation of certain transactions
In the following discussion it is intended to present an analysis 
of the provisions of Part XVI as they apply to the trust concept.
The concept of the trust is characterised by three flows of income. 
Income may flow (1) from the truster to the trustees; (2) from 
the trust property to the trustees; and (3) from the trustees to 
the beneficiary. This may be represented diagramatically thus:
Truster Flow 1)_____ ^ Trustees ^ Flow 2)________ Trust property
Flow 3)
Beneficiary
Consideration will be given to the circumstances in which these 
various flows of income are redirected to and are treated as the 
income of the truster. The provisions,of Part XVI can be classified 
to a limited extent by reference to the flows of income in respect 
of which they operate. Thus:-
a) s. 445 operates in respect of flow 1) in isolation,
-I
b) s. 446 and s. 448 apply to income flow 2) in isolation.
c) Several of the provisions operate in respect of flows 1)
and 2) without distinguishing the two. In general these .
provisions apply to income arising under the trust without 
reference to any specific source. Included here is s. 447, 
s. 448, s. 457 and s. 434.
d) s. 437 operates in respect of flow 3) in isolation.
1. s. 448 also operates in respect of flows 1) and 2) without 
distinguishing the two.
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Two provisions of Part XVI which must be considered here but 
which cannot be classified as above in terms in income flow 
are s. 450 and s. 451.
If the circumstances are such that s. 450 operates, the truster 
may be prevented from deducting certain income payments for the 
purpose of computing his total income. The income is not re­
directed to the truster; in effect, it is treated as never having left 
him.^
S. 451 prescribes the circumstances in which payments of capital 
to the truster or his spouse may be treated as the income of the 
truster.
A) INCOME FLOWING FROM THE TRUSTER TO THE TRUSTEES - FLOW 1)
S 445 of chapter III operates in respect of income flowing from 
the truster to the trustees: if the section applies, the income 
is redirected to, and is treated as forming part of the total 
income of, the truster. S. 445(1) provides:
"If and so long as the terms of any settlement (wherever made) 
are such that -
(a) any person has or may have power, whether immediately 
or in the future, and whether with or without the consent 
of any other person, to revoke or otherwise determine the 
settlement or any provision thereof and, in the event of the 
exercise of the power, the settlor or the wife or husband 
of the settlor will or may cease to be liable to make any 
annual payments payable by virtue or in consequence of
any provisions of the settlement; or
(b) the settlor or the wife or husband of the settlor may, 
whether immediately or in the future, cease, on the payment 
of a penalty, to be liable to make any annual payments 
payable by virtue or in consequence of any provision of the 
settlement,
any sums payable by the settlor or the wife or
1, Infra, p. 150-151.
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husband of the settlor by virtue or in consequence of that 
provision of the settlement in any year of assessment 
shall be treated for all the purposes of the Income Tax 
Acts as the income of the settlor for t^at year and not 
as the income of any other person: ..."
For the purposes of s. 445(1), references to a power to revoke or
determine any provision of the settlement include references to a
power to diminish the amount of payments payable by virtue of any
provision of the settlement; and references to the cessation of liability
of the settlor or his spouse to make such payments are deemed to
include references to any diminution in the amount which the settlor
or his spouse is liable to pay. However, where there is a power
to diminish the amount payable under the settlement, s. 445 treats
as the income of the settlor only the amount by which the payments
2
may be diminished.
Where the power to revoke or determine any provision of the settle­
ment cannot be exercised for a period of six years from the time
when the first annual payment becomes payable, s. 445(1)(a) does
3not apply so long as the power is not exercisable. It should be 
noted that any deed executed subsequently which purports to extend 
the period over which the power cannot be exercised does not 
operate retrospectively. For example, assume that on 1st January,
1979 T constituted a revocable trust under which he is obliged to 
pay to the trustees an annual payment for a period of 15 years.
The trust contains a power to revoke which is exercisable after
1st January, 1984 (i.e., 5 years after the payment of the first
annual payment). On 1st January, 1981 T executed a deed, the
terms of which provide that the power to revoke the trust cannot
be exercised until 1st January, 1987. The deed does not, however,
prevent the income payments made between 1st January, 1979 and
1st January, 1981 from being treated as the income of T under s. 445.^
1. Income treated as that of the settlor under s. 445(1) is
charged under Schedule D Case VI - s. 449(1).
2. S. 445(2).
3. Proviso to s. 445(1). In relation to covenanted payments
to charity the period is three years - s. 445(lA). What 
is meant by a covenanted payment to charity is considered 
below at p. 102.
4. See Taylor v. I.R.C., (1946) 27 T.C. 93; and I.R.C. v.
Nicolson, (1953) 34 T.C. 354.
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If s. 445(1) is to apply, the power to revoke or determine any. 
provision of a trust must be found by construing the terms of 
the trust. If the trust is a mere integrant of an arrangement 
or "settlement", the power must be found within the framework 
of the settlement. This rule was expounded in Wolfson v. I.R.C.^
The Respondent in the case had by deed covenanted to pay X the 
dividends received by him on the ordinary shares that he held in 
L. G. E. Ltd., a company essentially under the Respondent's 
control.
The Crown argued that, as the Respondent was in control of the 
company, he had the power to determine the settlement either 
by preventing the payment of dividends on the ordinary shares 
or by simply winding up the company; therefore, the covenanted 
payments should be treated as the income of the Respondent under 
s. 445(1)
The Crown's contention was dismissed. It was held by the House 
of Lords that as s. 445(1) begins, "If and so long as the terms of 
any settlement ... are such that - ... ", then the power must be 
identifiable by construing the terms of the settlement. The 
settlement in the case comprised only the deed of covenant, and 
the power of the settlor either to prevent payment of the dividends 
or to wind up the company could not be discovered by construing 
the terras of that deed.
Lord Simonds in the House of Lords recognised that the decision
2
provided a loop hole for tax avoidance. The ingenious taxpayer 
might avoid the provisions of s. 445(1) by arranging his affairs 
such that the power to determine the settlement is derived from 
some source extraneous to the settlement itself.
1. (1949) 31 T.C. 141.
2. Ibid at p. 169.
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However, this is not quite the simple expedient that it may 
superficially appear to be. For instance, the incorporation of 
a company by A followed by the execution of a deed of covenant 
to pay the dividends therefrom to B, would not slip through 
the loop hole created by the Wolfson decision. The incorporation 
of the company and the execution of the deed of covenant would 
undoubtedly constitute an "arrangement" and, therefore, a settle­
ment, The terms of the settlement would not be ascertainable by 
construing the deed of covenant alone: clearly, s. 445(1) would 
apply.^
S 445(1) is concerned with the power of any person to revoke or 
determine the settlement or any provision thereof; the exercise 
of the power must, however, extinguish any obligation to make the 
payments under the terms of the settlement if the section is to 
apply. Thus, the section has no application where the obligation 
to make the payments would remain unaffected by the exercise of 
the power even though as a matter of fact no payments would be
made. The proposition is demonstrable by contrasting the cases
2 . 3
of I.R.C. V. Payne and I.R.C. v. Rainsford-Hannay.
I.R.C. V. Payne involved the following arrangement. P incorporated 
a company, D Ltd. of which he had full control. Approximately one 
year later he entered into a deed of covenant under which he agreed 
to pay £72 per week to D Ltd, The covenant was expressed to run 
during the life of the covenantor or until, in effect,' such time 
as D Ltd. was wound up, which ever was the shorter period. The 
incorporation of the company and the execution of the deed of covenant 
comprised an arrangement which constituted a settlement of which 
P was the settlor. P had the power to wind up D Ltd. by virtue of 
his control of the company; hence, he had the power to extinguish 
his obligation under the covenant. S. 445(1) therefore applied 
and the income paid under the covenant was treated as the income 
of the settlor, P.
1. See Whiteman and Wheatcroft at 17:45; also I.R.C. v .Payne
2. (1940) 23 T.C. 610.
3. (1941) 24 T.C. 237.
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The facts in I.R.C. v. Rainsford-Hannay were similar to those in 
Payne’s case. A company was incorporated over which the settlor 
and her spouse had control. The settlor covenanted to'pay the 
company an annuity. The covenant was expressed to run during the 
life of the settlor; unlike that in Payne's case, it would not 
have terminated on the liquidation of the company. The settlor's 
power over the company was not, therefore, sufficient to enable 
her to extinguish her obligation to make the annuity payments.
It was held that s. 445(1) does not apply unless on the exercise 
of the power the annual payments cease to be payable. The 
section is not concerned with whether or not as a matter of fact the 
annual payments will be made. Lord Flemming stated the rule thus:
"To bring the case under _s. 445(1) 1 the result of
the exercise of power _/ must be that the settlor or 
the wife or husband of the settlor will or may cease to 
make any annual payments payable by virtue or in 
consequence of any provision."
Thus, income flowing from the truster to the trustees will be 
redirected to the truster if any person has a power to extinguish 
the obligation of the truster to make the payments. However, if 
the power is not exercisable within six years of the date of the 
first annual payment, s. 445(1) does not operate until the power 
becomes exercisable: further, the section does not apply unless 
the power is identifiable by construing the terms of the settlement.
B) INCOME FLOWING FROM TRUST PROPERTY TO THE TRUSTEES - FLOW 2)
S. 446 and 448 operate in respect of the income arising to the
trustees specifically from trust property. S. 448 also applies to
the income arising to trustees generally, however, this aspect of
2
the provision will be considered under the appropriate heading.
Both sections prescribe the circumstances in which the income arising
3
from trust property is to be treated as the income of the truster.
1. (1941) 24 T.C. 273, at p. 277.
2. Infra, p. 96.
3. The income is assessable to tax in the hands of the truster
under Schedule D Case VI - s, 449(1).
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(i) S. 448 - the effect of a power to apply trust property for the • 
benefit of the truster or his spouse
S. 448(1) is set out below^ where it is considered in relation 
to income arising to trustees generally, without reference to 
any specific source of income.
The section provides, inter alia, that where trust property may 
be paid to or applied for the benefit of the truster or his 
spouse, then the income arising from that property is to be 
treated as the income of the truster. If part only of the trust 
property is the subject of the power then it is the income arising 
from that part which may be treated as the income of the truster. 
This is subject to the exemptions and proviso to s. 448(1) which, 
to avoid repetition, are discussed fully later.
(11) S. 446 - the effect of a power to revoke or determine the trust 
or any provision thereof
Income arising from the property of a trust is treated as the income 
of the truster if any person has the power to revoke or determine 
the trust or any provision thereof, on the exercise of which the 
truster or his spouse will become beneficially entitled to that 
property. S. 446(1) provides:
"If and so long a| the terms of any settlement (wherever made) 
are such that -
(a) any person has or may have power, whether immediately 
or in the future, and whether with or without the consent 
of any other person, to revoke or otherwise determine the 
settlement or any provision thereof; and
(b) in the event of the exercise of the power, the settlor 
or the wife or husband of the settlor will or may become 
beneficially entitled to the whole or any part of the 
property then comprised in the settlement or of the income 
arising from the whole or any part of the property so comprised.
1. At p. 103.
2. See Wolfson v. I.R.C., (1949) 31 T.C. 141; supra, at p. 87.
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any income arising under the settlement from the property 
comprised in the settlement in any year of assessment or 
from a corresponding part of that property, or corresponding 
part of any such income, as the case may be, shall be treated
for all the purposes of the Income Tax Acts as the income of
the settlor for that year and not as the income of any other
person: ,. , "
References to a power to revoke or otherwise determine a settle-; 
ment or any provision thereof include references to a power to 
diminish the property comprised in the settlement, and to a power 
to diminish the amount of payments payable under the settlement 
to any person other than the settlor or his spouse.^
If the power cannot be exercised for six years from the date that 
the particular property first became comprised in the settlement,
2
8. 446(1) does not apply so long as the power cannot be exercised,
A settlement may be determined by the advancement of the entire
3
settled property. In I.R.C. v. Countess of Kenmare trustees had 
the power to advance trust property to the settlor. The maximum 
value of trust property that the trustees could advance in any 
three years was set at £60,000. If the property actually advanced 
fell short of £60,000, the amount by which it fell short could 
be carried forward to the next triennial period. There was no 
doubt in the minds of the Law Lords that the trustees might 
have had in the future the power to advance the entire trust 
property to the settlor, and that such a power was a power to 
determine the settlement. The income arising from the trust 
property was therefore treated as the income of the settlor under 
s. 446(1).
The root problem connected with both s. 446 and s, 448 lies in 
determining what property is comprised in a settlement. Trusts 
themselves present no real difficulty. The problems arise where 
the trust is a mere part of an arrangement which comprises a
"settlement", in which case it is essential to distinguish the
settlement itself from the steps taken in its composition.
1. S. 446(2). This provision was introduced as a result of the
decision in I.R.C. v. Saunders, (1957)37 T.C. 416, in which a
power to diminish the property comprised in a settlement was
held not to be a power to determine the settlement. See Monroe:
"The Settlement Provisions of the Finance Act 1958",/ 1958/B.T.R 266
2. Proviso to s. 446(1).
3. (1957)37 T.C. 383.
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The meaning of "property comprised in a settlement"
The formula for determining what property is comprised in a
settlement was expounded by the House of Lords in Chamberlain v.
1
I.R.C. Chamberlain's case involved an extremely complicated 
arrangement the first stage of which was completed on 20th 
December, 1935, with the incorporation by the Appellant of S Co., 
an unlimited company. The company had a share capital of £100,000 
comprising 50,000 preference shares of lOs. each, and 7,500 
ordinary shares of £lO each. On 23rd December, 1935, the Appellant 
sold his shares in C. S. Ltd. to S Co.; the purchase price was 
satisfied partly by the transfer by S Co. of 35,000 of its 
preference shares to the Appellant.
On loth March, 1936, the Appellant executed a deed of settlement 
under which he paid to the trustees £3,500. The trustees invested 
this sura in the purchase of 350 ordinary shares in S Co. Under the 
terms of this settlement there was the possibility that the 
Appellant's wife might have become beneficially entitled to the 
trust property such that the income arising therefrom would be 
treated as that of the settlor under s. 446(1).
At an Extraordinary General Meeting of S Co. held on 3rd December, 
1936, the following rearrangement was sanctioned:
" ... 7,500 ordinary shares of / S Co._/ were divided 
into 350 "A" ordinary shares of £10 each (these being the 
350 ordinary shares held by the trustees of the settlement 
dated lOth March, 1936); 1,750 "B" ordinary shares of £lO
each ; 1,750 "C" ordinary shares of £lO each; 1,750 "D" 
ordinary shares of £10 each, and 1,900 "E" ordinary shares 
of £10 each. Voting rights were not altered. Each class 
of shares was entitled only to such dividend (if ^ y ) as 
the company should in general meeting determine."
On 7th December, 1936, four more deeds of settlement were executed 
by the Appellant. Under each deed he paid to the trustees £100 
and directed that those sums were to be invested respectively in
1. (1943) 25 T.C. 317.
2  (1943) 25 T.C. 317, para. 5 of the Case stated.
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the purchase of lO "B", "C", "D", and "E" £lO ordinary shares 
1
of S Co. The settlements were irrevocable and were in favour 
of the children of the Appellant. The income arising under 
each of the settlements was t< 
attained the age of 21 years.
o be accumulated until the children
2
Dividends were paid on the preference shares held by the Appellant 
and on the "B", "C", "D" and "E" ordinary shares, but not on
the "A" ordinary shares. It will be recalled that under the 
terms of the March settlement (dated lOth March, 1936) any 
income arising from the property thereof would be treated as 
the income of the Appellant, It was assumed by the Appellant that 
the property comprised in the March settlement consisted of the 
350 "A" ordinary shares in S Co.; hence no dividends were paid 
on those shares.
The Appellant was assessed to tax under s. 446(1) on the entire 
income arising to S Co. (apart from that actually paid to the 
Appellant in the form of dividends on his own preference shares).
The Crown contended that the incorporation of S Co. on 20 December, 
1935, the sale of shares to S Co. by the Appellant on 23rd December, 
1935, the settlement of lOth March, 1936, and the settlements dated 
7th December, 1936, constituted an arrangement and therefore a 
settlement within the meaning of s. 454(3). The "B", "C", "D", 
and "E" ordinary shares were redeemable on the payment of a 
capital sum; on the redemption of those shares the only share­
holders in the company would have been the Appellant and the
trustees of the March settlement. The Appellant had the power
to wind up the company and on doing so the assets of the company
would have passed part to the Appellant himself and part to the
trustees of the March settlement. The Appellant' s wife was a potential 
recipient of the property of the March settlement.
Hence, as the Appellant had the power to redeem the "B", "C", "D", 
and "E" ordinary shares and the power to wind up S Co., he had the 
power to determine a provision of the settlement. On the exercise
1. Ibid., para. 6 of the Case stated.
2. The income arising from these settlements would not be 
caught by s. 437.
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of this power the Appellant's wife might have become beneficially 
entitled to part of the assets of the company. It was assumed 
by the Crown that the assets of the company (that is, the shares 
in C. S. Ltd.) formed the property comprised in the settlement; 
therefore, a substantial portion of the income of the company 
was treated as the income of the Appellant under s. 446(1)
The Crown's contention was dismissed. The assets of the company 
did not form the property comprised in the settlement. The only 
property comprised in the settlement to which the Appellant's wife 
might have become beneficially entitled was the "A" ordinary shares 
comprised in the March settlement. No dividends were paid on 
those shares hence no assessment could be made on the Appellant 
under s. 446(1). Lord Macmillan explained:
"I find myself unable to agree with the Crown's contention.
I accept the view that the statutory expansion of the term 
"settlement", which includes an "arrangement^, justifies 
and indeed requires a broad application of / s. 446_/ 
but a settlement or arrangement to come within the statute 
must still be of the type which the language of the Section 
contemplates. I agree with Lord Moncrieff that the settle­
ment or arrangement must be one whereby the settlor charges 
certain property of his with rights in favour of others 
(Commissioners of Inland Revenue v. Morton .. It must 
comprise certain property which is the subject of the settle­
ment; it must confer the income of the comprised property on 
others, for it is the income so given to others that is to 
be treated as nevertheless the income of the settlor. There 
can be no question that the deeds of lOth March, 1936, and 
7th December, 1936, were settlements. Each of tnem settled 
a sum of money provided by the settlor for the application 
of the income for the benefit of third parties ... But 
none of these settlements comprised any property of / S Co. _7 
The trust funds were invested in the shares of that company, 
which is a different matter. In point of fact, the whole 
assets of the company have never been settled at all so as^ ■ 
to dedicate the whole of its income to any trust purpose."
Thus, the formation of the company was an essential element of the 
arrangement, but the assets of the company never became property 
comprised in the settlement. It is vital to distinguish the steps
1. I.R.C. V. Morton, (1941) 24 T.C. 259, is considered below at p. 96
2. (1943) 25 T.C. 317, at p. 331.
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taken towards effecting the settlement from the settlement itself.
The distinction may be appreciated by considering the simple illustration 
provided by Lord Romer:
"If a man enters into a contract to buy 1,000 shares in 
a company with a view to settling 500 of them on his 
daughter and does so settle the 500 shares by deed, it 
may well be that consistently with Section / 454(3)_/
the settlement can be described as consisting of the contract 
and the deed together. But the property comprised in the 
settlement is the 500 shares settled by deed and not the 
whole of the 1,000 shares. The mere fact that the contract 
to buy 1,000 shares was a part of the arrangement for the 
settling of 500 of them, is no conceivable justification for 
saying that the property comprised in the settlement 
included the other 500, even though the settlement be 
regarded as consisting of the whole arrangement.
The principle enunciated in Chamberlain's case was applied in
2
Lord Vestey's Executors v. I.R.C., the facts of which briefly 
stated were as follows. The settlors leased certain properties, 
the rent from which was payable to trustees in Paris. The rent 
so paid was to be held by the trustees for the purposes set out 
in the trust deed. Under the terms of the lease the settlors had 
the power to withdraw any of the properties demised by giving six 
months notice in writing to the lessees. It was argued by the 
Crown that the lease was part of the arrangement and the properties 
demised thereunder formed the property comprised in the settle­
ment. As the settlors had the power under the lease to recover 
the property, the Crown urged that the income arising therefrom 
should be treated as the income of the settlors under s. 446(1).
The argument was rejected by the House of Lords. The only property
comprised in a settlement is property in respect of which some
beneficial interest is created. In the present case that property
was composed of the rent payable to the trustees and the invest-
3
raents and accumulated income. If the settlors had exercised
1. Ibid., p. 334.
2. (1949) 31 T.C. 1. The facts in the case are stated fully
below at p. 112-113.
3. Ibid., pp. 82, 89, 107-108 and 120-121.
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their power under the lease they would not, therefore, have 
become entitled to any of the property comprised in the settle­
ment; hence, s. 446(1) did not apply.
Chamberlain's case effectively overruled the decision in Morton 
V. I.R.C.^  in which the formation of a company, the transfer of 
assets thereto, an allotment of shares, and the execution of 
various trust deeds were held to constitute an arrangement.
Although beneficial interests were created in the shares alone, 
it was nevertheless held by the First Division of the Court of 
Session, that the property comprised in the settlement included 
the assets of the company.
Morton v. I.R.C. was not a decision based on Scottish law. It 
involved the interpretation of a technical phrase in a taxing 
Act, namely, "property comprised in the settlement"; Scottish 
courts are, therefore, clearly bound to follow the decision in 
Chamberlain v. I.R.C. and not that in Morton's case.
Thus, in cases where s. 446 applies, the income arising specifically 
from trust property is treated as the income of the truster. This 
is true of s. 448, although that section: may also operate in 
respect of the income arising under the trust in general.
C) INCOME ARISING UNDER THE TRUST FROM NO SPECIFIC SOURCE - 
FLOWS 1) AND 2) COMBINED
The provisions which fall to be considered here are i) s. 434, 
which relates to income payable to or applicable for the benefit 
of another by virtue or in consequence of the trust; ii) s. 448; 
iii) s. 447 and iv) s. 457. The latter three mentioned provisions 
relate to the income arising under a settlement.
i) Income which, by virtue or in consequence of a trust, is 
payable to or applicable for the benefit of another and which 
is treated as the income of the truster
1. (1941) 24 T.C. 259.
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s. 434(1) of chapter I provides:
" ... any income which, by virtue or in consequence of 
any disposition made, directly or indirectly, by any 
person (other than a disposition made for valuable and 
sufficient consideration), is payable to or applicable 
for the benefit of any çther person for a period which 
cannot exceed six years shall be deemed for all the purposes
of the Income Tax Acts to be the income of the person, if
living, by whom the disposition was made, and not to be 
the income of any other person".
2
A trust is a disposition for the purpose of chapter I. The 
person to whom income will be directly payable as a result of 
the constitution of the trust will be the trustees. The section
is concerned merely with 'any income' which, by virtue or in
consequence of the disposition is payable to the trustees; it 
draws no distinction between income arising from trust property 
and income flowing from the truster.
S. 434 applies to all dispositions other than those made for
valuable and sufficient consideration. What is meant by valuable
and sufficient consideration was discussed in Ball v. National
3
S Grindlays Bank Ltd.
The case involved the interpretation of the words "incurred for 
valuable and sufficient consideration" as used in s. 52(1), 
Finance Act 1965. It was expressly accepted by Ungoed-Thomas, J. 
that those words must bear the same meaning as the words "made 
for valuable and sufficient consideration" as in s. 434(1 )i The 
opinion of Ungoed-Thomas, J. was expressed as follows:
1. In the case of covenanted payments to charity the period 
is three years; see below at p. 102.
2. S. 434(2)
3. (1971) 47 T.C. 287.
4. (1971) 47 T.C. 287, at p. 296.
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' ... it seems to me that "valuable and sufficient" must 
be given a meaning in this tax Statute independent of any 
common law reluctance to consider adequacy in consideration.
It was submitted - rightly, in my view - that "valuable" 
consideration is, as it so familiarly is in a legal 
context, in contrast with "good" consideration ... ; and 
"sufficient" goes to quantum in the sense of "adequate", 
or, what doubtless comes to the same thing, "fair equivalent".
This opinion was supported by Russell, L. J. in the Court of Appeal.
It also may be gleaned from the judgement of Russell, L , J. that
the adequacy of the consideration must be justifiable at the time
2
of the disposition.
3
In I.R.C. v. Plummer, the facts of which are set out above, it 
was held that the payment of £2,480 to the taxpayer was good 
consideration for five annual payments of £500. This was so despite 
the fact that the gross annuity payments amounted to some £4,255 over 
the five years. Both parties to the agreement anticipated that 
the payments would be made net of tax and that the annuitant would 
be entitled to claim back the tax deducted. Also taken into 
account was the fact that the taxpayer would be entitled to 
deduct the annuity payments in computing his total income.
Construed as a whole, there was no doubt that the taxpayer 
obtained a "fair equivalent" for his obligation to make the annuity 
payments.^
Thus, unless the trust was executed by the truster for valuable and 
sufficient consideration, if the income paid to the trustees by 
virtue or in consequence of the trust is not to be treated as the 
income of the truster, it must be payable for a period which is 
capable of exceeding six years. If according to the terms of the
Ibid., at p. 296.
Ibid., at p. 299.
/_1979_/ S.T.C. 793, supra, at p. 65. 
There was no dissent on this point.
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trust the truster is liable to pay to the trustees a specified 
sura annually for a period not exceeding four years, those payments 
will be treated as the income of the truster. However, should 
the trustees invest the annual payments, the income arising there­
from may be receivable by them for a period capable of exceeding 
six years; the interest would not in such case be treated as the 
income of the truster under s.434.
Whether or not the income will be payable for a period capable
of exceeding six years will in most instances be determined
by the deed effecting the disposition or trust. Thus in I.R.C.
1
V. The Trustees of the Hostel of St. Luke, Registered, the 
subscriber to a charity executed a deed of covenant on 3rd February, 
1927, under which he covenanted to pay to the trustees of the 
charity a certain sum less tax. The terms of the deed were in 
the following form:
"The subscriber hereby covenants with the / charity_/ 
that he will during the term of seven years from the 
6th April, 1926 or during his life (whichever is the 
shorter period) pay to the Funds of the / charity_/ 
annually from his taxed income the sum of ten pounds 
less Income Tax ... the first annual payment to be 
made on the 3lst day of December, 1926 and subsequent 
annual payments to be made on the 31st day of December 
each year."
The trustees claimed a repayment of tax in respect of these 
annual payments. Their claim failed. S. 434 deemed the income 
to be that of the subscriber for all the purposes of the Income 
Tax Acts. The income was payable to the trustees for a period 
which could not exceed six years.
In this case the liability to pay arose when the deed was excuted 
on the 3rd February, 1927. The final payment was to be made on 
3lst December, 1932 (that is, the 3lst December preceding 6th 
April, 1933). The period over which the liability was to be 
discharged was from 3rd February, 1927 (the date of the disposition) 
to 3lst December, 1932, which is a period of five years eleven 
months less three days. The income was payable for a period which 
could not exceed six years.
1. (1930) 15 T.C. 682.
2. Ibid., at p. 684-685.
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The case not only illustrates the importance of the wording 
of the deed, but also demonstrates that where the deed imposes a 
liability on the truster to make payments to trustees, s. 434 
is concerned only with the period over which the obligation 
imposed by the terms of the trust may be discharged. The 
obligation of the truster cannot be back-dated by the words 
in the deed; the liability arises only when the deed is delivered.
It would appear that the period over which the liability of the 
truster is capable of being discharged need not be set by 
reference to dates. In I.R.C. v. Black the Respondents covenanted 
to pay L Ltd. annually a sum which was variable though calculated 
by means of a set formula. The covenants were to run for a 
period in excess of seven years, however, once one covenantor had 
paid an amount of £100,000, his liability would be considered 
discharged. Within two years of the execution of the covenants 
the Respondents had each paid £l00,000 thereunder.
The Crown argued that, as the Respondents' liability was discharged 
within two years of the date of the covenants, the income paid 
was not payable for a period which was capable of exceeding six 
years. The argument was rejected at first instance and by the 
Court of Appeal. Lawrence, J. at first instance explained:
"The Section does not say a period which in the events 
that happen does not exceed six years, but which by^ 
virtue of the disposition cannot exceed six years."
Although the covenant was expressed to run for a period in excess
of seven years, it is submitted that the payments would have been
payable for a period capable of exceeding six years without such
an express term. It may be that where the sums payable are
variable according to, for example, the truster's income, then
a limit may be set on the maximum amount payable by the truster;
this would not prevent the liability of the truster from being
3discharged over a period capable of exceeding six years.
1. (1940) 23 T.C. 715.
2. Ibid., at p. 719.
3. A scheme based on this principle might be vunerable in that
the Revenue would doubtless argue that the payments represent
a payment of capital by instalments rather than a series of 
income payments.
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It will be appreciated from Black's case that income payable by 
virtue or in consequence of a disposition need not be a fixed 
sura; provided it is payable for a period capable of exceeding 
six years, the annual payment of a variable sum cannot be treated 
under s. 434(1) as the income of the disponer. This is subject 
to the rule that there must be some element of constancy 
associated with the variable sums. Wrottesly, J. in D'Amrumenil 
V. I.R.C. stated the rule thus;
' ... the income must be payable for a period of over six 
years, and I think there must be some constant element in 
such yearly payments of income. It may be that the 
constant element introduced by the promise of the same 
fraction of a man's income ^or the requisite number of 
years would be sufficient."
D 'Ambrumenil v . I.R.C.concerned a covenant for the payment of 
£20, thereafter there was to be paid annually an amount 
that was equal to three-quarters of the covenantor's total income 
The £20,000 was deemed to be the income of the disponer under s. 
434(1); it had nothing in common with the subsequent payments.
"In this case the £20,000 has nothing in common with the 
subsequent payments all of which are to be a constant 
fraction of the giver's yearly income; it is a sum payable 
for a period which cannot exceed six year, namely, one 
year; ...
It was stressed earlier that s. 434 operates in respect of 'any 
income' payable to the trustees by virtue or in consequence of 
the trust. The cases so far discussed are relevant in relation 
to the flow of income from the truster to the trustees. However, 
income flowing from the trust property to the trustees is equally 
income payable 'by virtue or in consequence of ' a disposition
1. (1940) 23 T.C. 440, at p. 447.
2, Per Wrottesly, J. at p. 447. Wrottesly, J. followed the
first instance decision in I.R.C. v. Mallaby-Deeley; (1938)
23 T.C. 153. In Mallaby-Deeley the covenantor had agreed 
to pay specified sums each year. In year 1 the sum of 
£5,600 was payable ; the amount to be paid each year decreased 
until in year 7 only £700 was payable. Lawrence, J. held 
that the only income which was payable for a period capable of 
exceeding was £700, (at p. 161-162). The decision was 
reversed by the Court of Appeal though on the grounds that 
the payments constituted a payment of capital by instalments.
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and must be payable for a period capable of exceeding six
years it is not to be treated as the income of the truster.
The principle may be illustrated by reference to the case of I.R.C 
1
V. Prince-Smith.
The Respondent wished to provide a capital sum for his children.
He was the majority shareholder in P.S. Ltd., the other shares 
in which were held by the Respondent's wife and his father. The 
Respondent's father executed a trust deed; he settled £2,500 on 
the children. The trustees were authorised to invest the trust 
fund in P. S. Ltd.; they did so acquiring 50,000 ordinary shares. 
On 18th March, 1938, the Respondent by means of his control of 
P. S. Ltd. converted the 50,000 ordinary shares into preference 
shares with a fixed rate non-cumulative preferential dividend at 
a rate of 50% until 3lst March, 1943; thereafter, at the rate 
of 5%.
It was held that an arrangement and therefore a disposition was 
made on I8th March, 1938. The Respondent was the disponer. 
According to the terms of the arrangement only a 5% dividend was 
payable on the trust shares for a period capable of exceeding 
six years. Dividends payable at the rate of 50% were payable only 
for the period beginning I8th March, 1938, and ending on 3lst 
March, 1943: a period of five years and thirteen days. Any 
amount paid in excess of a 5% dividend was treated as the 
income of the Respondent.
Covenanted payments to charity
A special dispensation is made from the operation of s. 434 in 
respect of covenanted payments to charities. A covenanted pay­
ment to charity is a payment made under a covenant which was 
made otherwise that for consideration in money or money's worth. 
The payment must be made to a trust established for charitable 
purposes and must be one in a series of annual payments which
1. (1943) 25 T.C. 84.
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are payable for a period capable of exceeding three years. The 
payments under the covenant must not be determinable within three years 
without the consent of the persons entitled thereto.^ Under s. 434(1) 
income payable as a covenanted payment to charity is treated as the 
income of the covenantor o: 
cannot exceed three years.
nly if it is payable for a peridd which
2
ii) Income arising under a trust which is treated as the income 
of the truster
S. 448(1) reads:
"If and so long as the terms of any settlement (wherever 
made) are such that any person has or may have power, 
whether immediately or in the future, and whether with 
or without the consent of any person -
a) to pay or apply to or for the benefit of the settlor or the 
wife or husband of the settlor the whole or any part of
the income or property which may at any time arise under 
or be comprised in the settlement; or
b) to secure the payment or application to or for the benefit 
of the settlor or the wife or husband of the settlor of the 
whole or any part of that income or property,
being a power exercisable at^his discretion, any income 
arising under the settlement in any year of assessment or, 
as the case may be, any income so arising from the property 
comprised in the settlement or from a corresponding part of 
that property, or corresponding part of such income, shall 
(so far as it is not so treated apart from this section) 
be treated for all the purposes of the Income Tax Acts as 
the income of the settlog for that year and not as the income 
of any other person ..."
1. S. 434(2)
2. S.434 (lA)
3. "Income arising under a settlement" for the purposes of
chapter III and IV includes income chargeable to tax by 
deduction or otherwise, or would have been so chargeable 
had it been received in the United Kingdom by a person 
domiciled and resident or orinarily resident in the United 
Kingdom": s. 454(1)(a) and s. 459(1).
4. Where there is a power to apply the trust property for the 
benefit of the truster or his spouse then only such income 
that flows from that property is treated as income of the 
truster under s. 448; supra, p. 90.
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where any person has a power to apply the income arising under 
a trust for the benfit of the truster or his spouse that income will 
be treated as the income of the truster irrespective or whether 
the source of the trustees income is the truster himself or the 
trust property.
If the power cannot be exercised within six years from the time 
that the income first arises under the trust, then s. 448(1) 
does not apply so long as the power is not exercisable.^
Where the power is exercisable only on the happening of one of
the events mentioned in the proviso to s. 447(2)^ s. 448(1) does 
2
not apply. The proviso to s. 447(2) is discussed below at p. 118.
iii) Undistributed income of a trust which is treated as the income 
of the truster
S. 447 reads:
"(1) If and so long as the settlbr has an interest in 
any income arising under or property comprised in a 
settlement (wherever made), any income so arising during 
the life of the settlor in any year of assessment shall, 
to the extent to which it is not distributed, be treated 
for all the purposes of the Income Tax Acts as the income 
of the settlor for that year and not as the income of any 
other person:
Provided that -
(a) if and so long as that interest is an interest neither 
in the whole of the income arising under the settlement nor 
in the whole of the property comprised in the settlement, 
the amount of income to be treated as the income of the 
settlor by virtue of this subsection shall be such part of 
the income which, but for this proviso, would be so treated 
as is proportionate to the extent of that interest; and
1. S. 448(2). See Taylor v. I.R.C., (1946) 27 T.C. 93, and
I.R.C. V. Nicolson, (1953) 34 T.C, 141, supra, p. 86.
In respect of income arising from trust property, the 
period is six years from the time the property first became 
comprised in the trust.
2. S. 448(3).
3. The means of ascertaining the amount of income which has not
been distributed is described below at p.146,
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(b) where it is shown that any amount of the income which 
is not distributed in any year of assessment consists of 
income which falls to be treated as the income of the 
settlor for that year by virtue of section 445 or 446 
above, that amount shall be deducted from the amount of 
income which, but for this proviso, would be treated 
as his for that year by virtue or this subsection.
(2) For the purpose of subsection (1) of this section, 
the settlor shall be deemed to have an interest in 
income arising under or property comprised in a settle­
ment if any income or property which may at any time arise 
under or be comprised in that settlement is, or will or 
may become, payable to or applicable for the benefit of 
the settlor or the wife or husband of the settlor in any 
circumstances whatsoever: ... "
Subject to the provisos in s, 447(1), the undistributed income of 
a trust will be treated as the income of the truster if he retains 
any interest in either the income or property of the trust. The 
truster will be deemed to have an interest in the income or 
property of the trust where that income or property is, will or 
may become payable to or applicable for the benefit of himself 
or his spouse.
The interest may arise by virtue of an express term of the trust; 
however, the section applies equally to a latent interest which 
exists by reason of the operation of the doctrine of resulting 
trusts. The truster must effectively dispose of the entire bene­
ficial interest in the trust property and income if he is to 
escape the effects of s. 447(1)
In I.R.C. V. Tennant, (1942) 24 T.C. 215, it was provided 
that the wife or husband of the settlor includes a potential 
wife or husband. However, the Inland Revenue have stated 
that this rule will be applied only where the settlor is 
unmarried or where "whether or not the settlor is married, 
the terras of the settlement ... are such as to indicate a 
specific intention that a future wife or husband of the 
settlor might be entitled to benefit". See Mustoe, "Settlor's 
wife or Husband": (1959) 109 The Law Journal 681. Wife or 
husband does not include widow or widower - Lord Vestey's 
Executors v. I.R.C., (1949) 31 .T.C. 1, infra., at p. H 3 ,
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No question arises as to the application of the section should
the trust fail entirely ab initio. In such circumstances the
beneficial interest which has not been disposed of is simply
carried back to the truster on resulting trust. From the
outset the 'trust income' remains the income of the truster,
it is never the income of anyone else. However, where there
is a partial failure to dispose of the trust property or income,
the undistributed income will be treated as the income of the
truster under s. 447(1). For example, assume that the terms of
the trust provide that the income is to be paid to such of X
and Y as the trustees in their absolute discretion think fit,
subject to an overriding power of accumulation. If there is
no stipulation as to the treatment of the trust income or
property after the death of X and Y, that income and property
will be held on resulting trust for the truster. The trust
income and property will be paid to the truster should he survive
X and Y; he is, therefore, deemed to have an interest in the
income arising under and the property comprised in the trust,
and any income arising under the trust during the life of X
and Y which was not distributed will be treated as the income 
2
of the truster.
S. 447(2) is drafted in particularly wide terms; where there is 
the possibility that either the property or the income of the 
trust may become payable to the truster or his spouse in any 
circumstances whatsoever, he is deemed to have an interest therein 
The words "in any circumstances whatsoever" add considerably to 
the scope of the section. This may be appreciated by considering 
the cases of Barr's Trustees v. I.R.C.^ and Muir v. I.R.C. ^
1. Re Vandervell's Trusts (No. 2) 1974__/ 1 All E.R. 47.
See also Wilson and Duncan, at p. 74.
2. For an example of the operation of the doctrine of resulting
trusts and s, 447 see Hannay's Executors v. I.R.C., (1956)
37 T.C. 217
3. (1943) 25 T.C, 72.
4. (1966) 43 T.C. 368.
106
In Barr's Trustees v. I.R.C. the truster had settled shares in 
B, Ltd. on his grandchildren, Robert Barr and Archibald John 
Barr. The respective interests of the beneficiaries were to 
vest on their attaining the age of 30 years. Clause 4 of the 
deed provided:
"In the event of both the said Robert Barr and Archibald 
John Barr dying before reaching the said time of vesting 
and payment without lawful issue, the Trustees shall 
divide the Trust Estate among^the heirs and representatives 
in moveables of my said son."
It was held by the First Division of the Court of Session that
the truster himself could be included in the group of "heirs
and representatives in moveables" of his son. He had, therefore,
an interest in the income arising from the property comprised
in the trust for the purposes of s. 447, and was accordingly assessed
to tax on the undistributed income of the trust.
Muir V. I.R.C. involved a trust the terms of which provided for 
the capitalization of the trust income. Clause 8  of the trust 
instrument provided that the capitalization could be effected:
' ... by applying the income_/ in or towards payment of 
the premiums on any policy or policies of assurance in 
which any beneficiary shall (whether under this Settle­
ment or under any other Settlement or otherwise) have 
any beneficial interest whether vested or contingent and 
whether indefeasible or defeasible."
This clause was sufficient to create in the settlor an interest 
in the income of the trust for the purposes of s. 447. Pennycuick,J 
explained:
1. (1943) 25 T.C. 72, para. 3 of Case stated.
2. (1966) 43 T.C. 468, at p. 377.
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' ... the trustees, in performance of their duties under 
the settlement might apply income towards the payment 
of premiums under a policy comprised in another settle­
ment under the terms of which the trust funds, including 
the policy, are held in trust for one of the settlor's 
grandchildren contingently upon attaining the age of 2 1 , 
with a default trust for the settlor. It is impossible 
to say that such an application would represent a breach 
of trust. The application of income towards the payment 
of these premiums would in the first place benefit the 
grandchildren, but it would clearly also benefit the 
settlor."
The decision of Pennycuick, J. was reversed by the Court of Appeal
though on different grounds. Harman, L. J. acknowledged that
the exercise of the trustees' power to pay the premiums on an
assurance policy in which the settlor might be interested was
not too remote to prevent the settlor from being treated as
2
having an interest in the income of the trust.
The decisions in Barr's Trustees v. I.R.C. and in Muir's case 
at first instance are a little harsh. The truster must'ensure 
that according to the terms of the trust there is no possibility 
that either the trust property or income can be applied for his 
or his spouse's benefit. Further, if the possibility was unforseen 
by the draftsman of the deed, it cannot be argued that, as the 
truster intended the trust to be tax effective, there is an 
implied term to the effect that the trustees should not at any 
time apply the income or property of the trust for the benefit 
of the truster or his spouse. To imply such a term would be to 
presume that the draftsman of the deed was familiar with fiscal . 
law; a presumption which is not tenable in the courts, as Stamp, L. J 
declared:
1. Ibid., at p. 384.
2. Ibid., at p. 391.
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"I do not think that there is any presumption that advisers 
of a settlor do know the fiscal law and if there are some 
provisions of the fiscal law which are so notorious that 
almost everybody knows about them, there are other provisions 
which are obscure and difficult and (as one may see from 
the decided cases) unknown to many draftsmen. If there 
was such a presumption where could one draw the line? The 
suggestion that a draftsman ought to be taken to be aware 
of the fiscal consequences of what he is doing and that 
ambiguity should be resolved on that basis is^ in my 
judgement, a heresy and cannot be supported."
In practice, s. 447(2) is not given a strict literal interpretation.
It would appear that the section will not necessarily operate where
there is a mere possibility that the income or property of a trust
may be voluntarily applied for the benefit of the truster or his
spouse; if the terms of the trust do not provide for such
application, then the truster has no deemed interest under s. 447(2).
2
In Glyn v. I.R.C. the Appellant and his son executed a deed of 
resettlement in 1928. Prior to the resettlement property was held 
in trust for the Appellant for life, thereafter, to the use of his 
son in tail male with remainders over. The deed of resettlement had 
the effect of disentailing the settled property. The resettlement 
comprised the surrender of the Appellant's life interest and the 
constitution of an accumulation trust, the trustees of which were
to stand possessed of the trust property upon such trusts as the
Appellant and his son should appoint ; in default of appointment, 
the income of the trustees was to be accumulated until the happening 
of a specified event after which the accumulated income was to be 
paid to the son, and the trust capital was to be held for the son 
and his descendants.
The Appellant conceded that, for the purposes of s. 447, the 
resettlement constituted a "settlement" of which he was the settlor.
The Crown successfully argued before the Kings Bench Division that 
the settlor was deemed to have an interest under the settlement in 
that he had the power to direct the trustees to apply the income of 
the trust for his own benefit. The undistributed income of the trust 
was, therefore, treated as the income of the Appellant under s. 447(1).
1. I.R.C. V. Cookson, /"l977_7 S.T.C. 140, at p. 146. Cf. I.R.C. v. 
Fitte, (1943) 24 T.C. 337, where the. operative words of the deed 
failed to carry out the declared intention of the settlor. The 
effect of the operative words must be assessed in the light of 
the settlor's declared intention and the circumstances surrounding
the execution of the deed; see Goddard, L.J. at p. 351.
2. (1948) 30 T.C. 321.
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In Glyn's case it was matterless that the power to appoint the
income was exercisable by the. Appellant jointly with his son;
however, it was conceded by the Crown that had the power been
vested in the son alone, then the Appellant would not have had
an interest in the trust income, despite the fact that the son
1
might have appointed in favour of his father.
The Commissioners for Special Purposes of the Income Tax Acts 
supported the view that s. 447(2) should not be interpreted strictly;
"We accept the argument that_the words "in any circumstances 
whatsoever" in 7  s . 447(2)_/ cannot be read as including 
the possibility of a mere voluntary application of income 
by a beneficiary to the^settlor, outside the provisions of 
the settlement itself".
There was nothing in the judgement of Singleton, J. to indicate 
any disapproval of the Commissioners' opinion.
In Muir V. I.R.C., Pennycuick, J. thought it necessary to restrict 
the operation of the deeming provision in s. 447(2). The case 
concerned an ill-drawn deed of trust. Doubts as to the validity 
of the trust arose, and on the basis of these doubts a compromise 
was negotiated under which the trustees paid to the settlor the 
sum of £20,000 in consideration that he disclaimed any right which 
might have arisen by reason of a resulting trust. The compromise 
was sanctioned by the Chancery Division
The settlor was assessed to tax on certain income which arose 
under the trust prior to the date on which the compromise was 
negotiated.
1. Ibid., at p. 329.
2. Ibid., para. lO Case stated.
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The Crown argued, inter alia, that where at a future date the 
validity of a trust may be open to doubt, then there is always 
the possibility that the income and property thereof may in the 
future be held on resulting trust in favour of the settlor. It 
was urged that such a possibility was sufficient to invoke the 
operation of s. 447(1)
The Crown's contention was rejected. The mere doubt that at some 
time in the future the trust might be declared invalid is not 
sufficient to create in the settlor an interest in either the 
income or property of the trust for the purpose of s. 447(1). 
Pennycuick, J. stated:
"Section / 447_/ is in very wide terms, but it must, I
think be confined to cases where the income or property 
"will or may become payable or applicable for the benefit 
of the settlor" either under the trusts of the settlement 
itself or under some collateral arrangement having legal 
force: e.g. the repayment of an interest-free loan, such 
as was considered by the Cour^ of ^ppeal in Jenkins v. 
Commissioners of Inland Revenue ..."
This aspect of Pennycuick, J.'s judgement was upheld in the 
Court of Appeal. If in fact a doubt that at some time the trust 
may become invalid proves to be well founded, the Revenue will 
be entitled to make additional assessments on the settlor in
3
respect of the years prior to the invalidation of the trust.
Thus, if the truster is not to be treated as having an interest in 
the trust property or in the income arising under the trust, he 
must ensure that there is no possibility that as a necessary legal 
consequence of his constituting the trust,income or property will 
revert to him. The following suggestion is made in Simon:
1. (1944) 26 T.C. 265.
2. (1966) 43 T.C. 368, at p. 381.
3. The practicality of this rule is doubted by Tiley, at
19:39.
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"Wide though the words"in any circumstances whatsoever" 
are, it seems clear, as the Crown admitted in Glyn v,
I.R. Comrs. that some limit must be placed on them. If 
this were not so, a settlor could be said to have an 
interest in virtually every settlement, as the remaind­
ermen might bequeath their beneficial interests to him by 
will. It may be that the limit lies at the point where 
the settlor can have no interest in any circumstances that 
are contemplated by the settlement, and has not in fact 
acquired any interest through extraneous circumstances.
For example, it is thought that the possibility of acquiring 
an interest on the intestacy of a beneficiary does not 
give the settlor any interest in the settled property or 
income, at any rate ynless and until the possibility has 
become an actuality.
The meaning of the words "payable to or applicable for the benefit
of" the settlor or his spouse in s. 447(2)
Controversy has arisen in respect of the operation of the words 
"payable to or applicable for the benefit of" the settlor in 
connection with loan arrangements made between trustees and 
trusters.
2
In Lords Vestey's Executors v. I.R.C. , the House of Lords held 
that a commercial loan made out of trust income or property in 
favour of the truster does not represent income or property paid 
to or applied for thé benefit of the truster within the meaning 
of s. 447(2).
3
The facts in the Vestey case are briefly set out above. Land 
was leased by the settlors. The lessees were directed to pay 
their rent to trustees in Paris. The rent was to be held by the 
trustees in trust to accumulate "until the expiry of 2 0  years 
from the death of the last surviving grandchild now living of
1 . E6.238 (at p. 1068)
2 . (1949) 31 T.C. 1.
3. Supra, at p . 95.
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the Settlors". The trust also provided that the trustees were 
to invest the accumulated rent according to the direction of 
authorised persons: the settlors were included within the class 
of authorised persons.
The accumulated fund was to be held in trust for such of the
settlor's children or remoter issue (and their wives and widows)
as the settlors might appoint. The deed also reserved a power in
the settlors to appoint the fund by will or codicil in favour
of their widows. Lord Reid summarized the rights of the 
settlors thus:
"After the execution of the lease ... and deed of 
settlement ..., the only rights relevant to the 
present case which the Vesteys had with regard to 
the moneys which came into the hands of the Paris 
trustees were rights to appoint certain funds to their 
issue, rights to appoint life interests to their 
widows, and a joint right to direct the investment of 
the settled fund."
It was argued by the Crown that s. 447 applied and that the
undistributed income of the trust should be treated as the income
of the settlors. It was suggested that by reason of the settlors'
power to direct the investment of the trust fund they had an
interest in the income arising therefrom; the income might have
become payable to the settlors "in any circumstances whatsoever"
in that they could have directed that the trust fund should be
loaned to themselves upon their personal credit: a direction which
2
the trustees would be bound to follow.
1. (1949) 31 T.C. 1, at p. 116.
2. It was also argued that the settlors' spouses were interested
in the trust income in that the settlors might have appointed
in their favour by will. This argument was rejected: the 
wife or husband of a settlor does not include the widow or 
widower of the settlor. This overruled the decision of the 
Court of Appeal in Gaunt v. Gaunt, (1941) 24 T.C. 69.
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The Crown's argument was rejected by the House of Lords. The 
Settlors, in exercising their power to direct the investment of 
the trust fund would be acting in a fiduciary capacity; they 
would not be entitled to profit by their office.^ If they chose 
to direct a loan to themselves it would be required to be at a 
commercial rate of interest. A loan at a commercial rate of 
interest would not be income paid to or applied for the benefit 
of the settlor within the meaning of s. 447(2). Lord Morton 
of Henryton explained:
"The phrase "payable to or applicable for the benefit of" 
is a well known one, frequently used in settlements where 
money is either paid to a beneficiary who can then use it 
as he pleases, or is to be applied by trustees in some 
manner which will benefit the beneficiary, Reading the 
phrase as a whole I am satisfied that the words "payable 
to" are directed only to an out-and-out payment with no 
obligation on the payee to return the money. As to the 
words "applicable for the benefit of the settlor", I 
think that a loan may well benefit a person even if it 
is made at a commercial rate of interest, as it may tide 
him over a difficult period, but I do not think that if the 
money is so lent it is applied "for the benefit of" the 
debtor within / S. 447(2) /
Lord Vestey' Executors v. I.R.C. was considered by Goff, J. in
3
I.R.C. V. Wachtel . Consonant with the dicta of Lord Morton of 
Henryton in the Vestey case, Goff, J. considered that sums paid 
to the settlor by the trustees pursuant to a commercial agreement 
are not to be considered as being applied for the benefit of 
the settlor merely because he derives some incidental benefit 
from the transaction. Thus, the possibility of a loan to a 
settlor at a commercial rate of interest would not represent an 
interest of the settlor in the trust income or property for the 
purposes of s. 447. Burgess expressed some doubts as to the 
rationale of this proposition; he considered the judgement of 
Lord Morton of Henryton in the Vestey case and suggested:
1. See Lord Simon at p. 83-84.
2. (1949) 31 T.C. 1, at p. 114-115.
3. (1971) 46 T.C. 543. The facts of the case are presented
below at p. 115.
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"It is clear from his judgement that loans, if they 
were to be caught at all, would be caught by the 
words "applicable for the benefit of" the settlor.
As Lord Morton accepted that, as a matter of fact, 
loans could be for the benefit of settlors, even 
at commercial rates of interest, it is suggested 
that the principle is that all loans are prima facie 
covered by the section, but with an exception operating 
in favour of those at commercial rates of interest.
Burgess supported his submission by reference to the judgement 
of Goff, J. in I.R.C. V. Wachtel.
He suggested that the position is unsatisfactory; that there 
is no cogent reason why s. 447 should not embrace all loans 
whether at commercial rates or otherwise. He argued that it 
would be impossible to determine whether or not a benefit is 
merely incidental to a commercial transaction and concluded:
"The present writer would prefer that all loans to settlors 
be within the section since all loans confer benefits.
Slightly different considerations arise in relation to loans 
by the settlor to trustees; this was the position in Wachtel's 
case. In I.R.C. v. Wachtel, the Respondent executed a trust 
deed on 4th April, 1960. The beneficiaries of the trust were 
the Respondent's children.
The day following the execution of the trust the trustees agreed 
to purchase shares in E. I. Ltd.; the purchase price was greatly 
in excess of the funds available to the trustees. In order to. 
finance the deal the trustees borrowed from D. Bank Ltd. The 
Bank would grant the trustees overdraft facilities on condition 
that the Respondent would guarantee the overdraft and would 
deposit at the bank an amount which would cover the debt. The 
guarantee agreement was made on 22nd March, 1960, (bpfore the 
execution of the trust).
1. "The Settlor and Section 447" : j_ 197l_/ B.T.R. 278, at p. 281
2. Ibid., at p. 282.
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It was agreed that the bank would charge interest on the trustees' 
overdraft at a rate of 1 %, but it would pay no interest on the sum 
deposited as security by the Respondent. It was further agreed 
that the trustees would pay the trust income to reduce their 
overdraft and that the Respondent could reduce his deposit 
accordingly.
The trust and the guarantee agreement constituted an "arrangement"
and, therefore, a settlement of which the Respondent was the
settlor. The income arising under the settlement comprised
the dividends paid to the trustees on their shares in E. I Ltd.
The Respondent had an interest in that income to the extent that it
was applied in discharging the trustees overdraft; such income
was applicable for the benefit of the settlor since it "entitled
him to withdraw an equivalent amount of his frozen capital."^
Goff, J. relied on the judgement of Lord Greene, M. R. in Jenkins 
2
V. I.R.C. in which the Master of the Rolls accepted the 
proposition that income used in paying off an interest-free loan 
made by a settlor was income applied for the benefit of the settlor,
It would appear from the dicta in Wachtel's case that if a settlor 
loans a sum to trustees at a commercial rate of interest, the 
repayment of that loan will not amount to the application of 
trust income for the benefit of the settlor. The loan arrangement 
in such case is a commerical transaction. However, presumably the 
benefit derived by the lender from the repayment of an interest- 
free loan would be considerably greater than the repayment of a 
loan at a commercial rate of interest which, while in the hands of 
the borrower is, in effect, producing income on behalf of the 
lender. According to Burgess:
1. (1971) 46 T.C. 543, at p. 556.
2. (1944) 26 T.C. 265.
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' ... in the Jenkins/Wachtel situation, where there was 
no interest or it was negligible, one could argue that 
during the continuance of the loan the asset was sterile 
and that, as repayment would permit the settlor to employ 
his money more profitably, such repayment was obviously 
for his benefit. This argument has much less force whgre 
the loan is put out at a commercial rate of interest."
The problem common to both loans to a settlor and to the repayment 
of loans made by a settlor would appear to be associated with 
determining at what point the benefit derived by him is merely 
incidental to a commercial transaction. A workable solution 
is suggested by Burgess:
"Perhaps the true position is that the existence of a 
commercial rate gives rise to a presumption that any 
benefit by way of repayment is only incidental, but as 
with all other presumptions, one that can be rebutted. 
This would be done by adducing evidence to show that 
looking at the transaction as a whol^ the benefit in 
question was more than "incidental."
In conclusion it can be stated that a truster is deemed to have 
an interest in the income or property of a trust if it is, will 
or may become payable to or applicable for the benefit of him­
self or his spouse under the terms of the trust or under some 
collateral arrangement having legal force. If the collateral 
arrangement is of a commercial nature, for instance a commercial 
loan agreement, on the basis of the dicta in the Vestey and 
Wachtel cases, any income payable thereunder to the truster is 
not payable to or applicable for his benefit within the meaning 
of s . 447(2).
In addition to the previously discussed judicial interpretations 
of s. 447(2) which effectively limit the scope of the deeming 
provision, where the proviso to s. 447(2) applies a truster is 
not deemed to have an interest in either the income or property 
of the trust.
1. / 1971_/ B.T.R. 278, at p. 285.
2. Ibid., at p. 285.
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The proviso to s. 447(2)
The proviso to s. 447(2) is essentially an undeeming provision 
and reads as follows:
" ... the settlor shall not be deemed to have an interest 
in any income arising under or property comprised in a 
settlement -
(a) if and so long as that income or property cannot 
become payable or applicable as aforesaid / i.e. to or 
for the benefit of the settlor or his spouse / except 
in the event of -
(i) the bankruptcy of some person who is or may become 
beneficially entitled to that income or property; or
(ii) any assignment of or charge on that income or 
property being made or given by some such person; or
(iii) in the case of a marriage settlement, the death
of both the parties to the marriage and all or any of the 
children of the marriage; or
(iv) the death under the age of twenty-five or some
lower age of some person who would be beneficially 
entitled to that income or property on attaining that 
age ; or
(b) if and so long as some person is alive and under 
the age of twenty-five during whose life that income or 
property cannot become payable or applicable as aforesaid 
except in the event of that person becoming bankrupt or 
assigning or charging his interest in that income or 
property."
The difference between paragraphs (a) and (b) is of particular 
relevance in circumstances where either the income or property 
of an accumulation trust may revert to the truster on the death
of a beneficiary. If the income or property is due to vest in
the beneficiary on his attaining the age of 30, then so long as 
he is under the age of 25 years, paragraph (b) protects the truster 
from the operation of s. 447 but paragraph (a) does not.^
1. See Simon, E6.239.
118
iv) Income arising under a trust which is treated as the income 
of the truster for the purpose of computing his liability to 
higher rates of tax
S 457 of chapter IV is perhaps the most extensive of the 
provisions of Part XVI. It operates to treat the income 
arising under the trust as income of the truster for the 
purposes of computing his liability to tax at the higher 
rates. It does not operate in respect of tax at the basic 
rate. S. 457(1) provides:
"Where, during the life of the settlor, income arising under 
a settlement made on or after 7th April, 1965 is, under the 
settlement and in the events that occur, payable to or 
applicable for the benefit of any person other than the 
settlor, then, unless, under the settlement and in the 
said events, the income either ~
(a) consists of annual payments made under a partnership 
agreement to or for the benefit of a former member, or 
the widow or dependants of a deceased former member, of 
the partnership, being payments made under a liability 
incurred for full consideration, or
(b) is excluded by subsection (lA) or (2) below, or
(c) is income arising under a settlement made by one party 
to a marriage by way of provision for the other after the 
dissolution of the marriage, or while they are separated 
under an order of a court or under a separation agreement 
or in such circumstances that the separation is likely to 
be permanent, being income payable to or applicable for the 
benefit of that other party, or
(d) is income from property of which the settlor has 
divested himself absolutely by the settlement, or
(e) is income which, by virtue of some provision of the 
Income Tax Acts not contained in this Chapter, is to be 
treated for all the purposes of those Acts as the income 
of the settlor,
the income shall, for the purposes of excess liability, be 
treated as the income of the settlor and not as the income 
of any other person.
In this subsection "excess liability" means the excess 
liability to income tax over what it would be if all income 
tax were charged at the basic rate to the exclusion of 
any higher or additional rate."
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Subsection (lA) provides that subsection (1) does not operate
in respect of covenanted payments to charity except to the
1
extent that the payments exceed £3,000 in any year.
Subsection (2) of s. 457 exempts from the operation of subsection
(1 ) annual payments made under a liability incurred for full
consideration in connection with the acquisition of a business.
If such payments are to be exempt, they must be made to the
vendor of the business, or, if he is dead, to his widow or 
2
dependants.
Thus, assuming the truster has avoided the operation of the 
various alternative provisions of Part XVI, s. 457 will usually 
prevent him absolving his liability to tax at the higher rates 
on income which he has attempted to alienate.
An important exception to s. 457 is contained in s. 457(1)(d).
Under s. 457(1)(d) income arising from the capital of a trust 
will not be treated as the income of the truster provided he 
has divested himself absolutely of the trust property. However, 
according to s. 457(6), the truster shall not be deemed to have 
divested himself absolutely where the trust property or income 
therefrom is, will or may become payable to or applicable for 
the benefit of the truster or his spouse in any circumstances 
whatsoever. Thus, a truster is not deemed to have divested 
himself absolutely of trust property in circumstances where he 
would be deemed to have an interest in the income arising under 
a settlement of capital by virtue of s. 447(2), or would be so deemed 
but for the proviso to s. 447(2). Many of the cases which are 
discussed above in connection with the interpretation of s. 447(2) 
are equally applicable to s. '4 5 7 (6 ).
1. "Covenanted payment to charity" is described above, at p. 102.
2. Special rules apply where the vendor was a partnership: 
see s. 457(2) (b), (3), (4A) and (5).
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As in s. 447(2), the operation of the doctrine of resulting trusts 
may have unfortunate consequences for the truster who has not 
completely disposed of the trust property. In Vandervell v.
I.R.C.^  the Appellant transferred part of his shareholding in 
a limited company to a charity. The charity granted to V.T. Ltd. 
(a trust company) an option to purchase the shares for £5,000; 
on the facts of the case it was thought that the Appellant,
2
acting by his agent, had procured the granting of the option.
The Appellant failed to specify for what purpose V. T. Ltd. was 
to hold the option, though it was admitted by a director of that 
company that the shares acquired on the exercise of the option 
would be held on trust, but he could not say for whom.
The Crown successfully argued that the trust company held the 
option on resulting trust for the Appellant. He had not, there­
fore, absolutely divested himself of the shares in question. 
Accordingly, the income arising from those shares was treated 
under s. 457(1) as the income of the Appellant for the purpose 
of computing his excess liability to tax. A truster is not deemed 
not to have divested himself of the trust property under s. 457(6) 
if either that property or income therefrom can revert to him in 
the event of -
"(a) the bankruptcy of some person who is or may become 
beneficially entitled to any such property or income; or
(b) an assignment of or charge on any such property or 
income being made or given by some such person; or
(c) in the case of a marriage settlement, the death of 
both parties to the marriage and of all or any of the 
children of the marriage; or
(d) the death under the age of twenty-five or some 
lower age of some person who would be beneficially 
entitled to that property or income on attaining that age.
1. (1966) 43 T.C. 519.
2. Per Lord Upjohn, Ibid., at p. 558.
121
It will be noticed that the proviso to s. 457(6) and paragraph 
(a) of the proviso to s. 447(2) are similar. However, s. 457(6) 
contains no provision as in paragraph (b) of the proviso to s.
447(2).1
S 457 and the additional rate complication
Income arising under a settlement is not earned income within 
the meaning of s. 530(1), I.C.T.A. Thus, where s, 457(1) operates 
to treat the income arising under a trust as the income of the
2
truster, he 'receives' that income in the form of investment income 
and may be liable to tax at the additional rate thereon by virtue 
of s. 32(1), Finance Act 1971. Hence, where s. 457(1) applies, 
original payments made to trustees out of earned income* will be 
redirected to the truster in the form of investment income which 
is susceptible to a charge to tax at the additional rate. This 
may have the effect of increasing the amount of tax chargeable on 
the income over what would have been charged had the trust never 
been constituted. This rather anomalous position is a consequence
3
of the decision of Walton, J. in Ang v. Parrish.
The facts in Ang v. Parrish were as follows. By deeds, the tax­
payer and his wife covenanted to pay to the taxpayer's parents 
certain annual sums. The payments were made largely out of earned 
income and were paid after deduction of tax at the basic rate 
under s. 52, I.C.T.A. It was successfully argued by the Crown 
that the income paid under the covenants was "income arising under 
a settlement" which was to be treated as the income of the settlor 
under s. 457(1). The income arising under the settlement was 
investment income chargeable to tax at the additional rate by 
virtue of s. 32(1), Finance Act 1971.^
1. Supra, at p. 118.
2. In general, any income which is not earned income is 
investment income s. 32(3), Finance Act 1971.
3. / 1980_/ S.T.C. 341.
4. For a review of the decision and of the unsuccessful attempts 
of the taxpayer to resist the assessment to tax at the 
additional rate, see Jones: Journal of the Law Society of 
Scotland, January, 1981.
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s, 457(1) was does not, therefore, operate to prevent the truster
from deducting from his total income payments made to trustees.
The payments are deductible, but are added back for the purposes
of computing the truster’s liability to tax at the higher and
additional rates. In effect, the truster is treated as the
beneficiary of the trust who, according to the principle in
1
Fry V. Shiels' Trustees, is never entitled to claim that the 
income which he receives from the trust is in any sense earned.
In this respect, the actual source of the trust's income is 
immaterial.
D) INCOME FLOWING FROM THE TRUSTEES TO THE BENEFICIARY - FLOW 3)
"In regard to this proposal of the Government, it is known 
to everyone that for years wealthy men with young families 
have been setting aside so much for each child, thereby 
getting the full allowance for the child, and reducing the 
rate of tax. That has been done deliberately for the 
purpose of avoiding Income Tax and Super Tax. These people 
have not only been depriving the Exchequer of money, but 
they have been causing other people to pay more Income Tax 
and Super Tax as a result of their action ... If a certain 
number of people can, by means of these trusts, avoid paying 
their fair share of Income Tax and Super-Tax, it means that 
other people have to pay a higher rate."
Where the beneficiary of a trust is an infant unmarried child of 
the truster, income flowing to that beneficiary from the- trustees 
is treated as the income of the truster. It is in these 
circumstances only that it is necessary to look to the flow of 
income from the trustees to the beneficiary for the purposes of 
Part XVI. S. 437(1) provides:
1. (1914) 6  T.C. 583.
2. Official Report, 20th June, 1922; Vol. 155 c. 1211: 
(per Holmes).
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"Where, by virtue or in consequence of any settlement 
to which this Chapter applies and during the life of 
the settlog, any income is paid to or for the benefit 
of a child of the settlor in any year of assessment, 
the income shall, if at the time of the payment the 
child was unmarried and below the age of eighteen be 
treated for all the purposes of the Income Tax Acts 
as the income of the settlor for thgb year and not 
as the income of any other person."
The subsection does not apply where the total income paid to 
the child does not exceed £5 in any year of assessment.^
Income which is deemed to be paid to an infant unmarried child 
of the truster
According to s. 438(1), where, by virtue or in consequence of the
trust, income is dealt with such that it will or may become
payable to an infant unmarried child of the truster in the future
(on the happening of a contingency or on the exercise of a
discretion or otherwise), that income is deemed to be paid
to the child beneficiary. Thus, where income is accumulated
in the hands of the trustees it may be deemed to be paid to
the child of the truster under s. 438(1), and so treated as
the income of the truster under s. 437(1). If there are several
discretionary objects of an accumulation trust, the accumulated
income is deemed to be paid in equal shares to those objects who
5
are infant unmarried children of the truster.
1. "Income" except in the phrase "be treated for all the purpose
of the Income Tax Acts as the income of the settlor for that 
year and not as the income of any other person "includes any 
taxable income charged by deduction or otherwise, or would 
have been taxable if it had been received in the U.K. by a
person resident or ordinarily resident in the U.K. - s. 444(2)
2. "Child" includes stepchild, adopted child and illegitimate
child, - 8 . 444(1).
3. For the application of s. 437(1) see Copeman v. Coleman,
(1939) 22 T.C. 594; Hood Barrs v. I.R.C., (1946) 27 T.C.
385; Thomas v. Marshall, (1953) 34 T.C, 178 I.R.C. v.
Buchanan, (1957) 37 T.C. 365; Crossland v. Hawkins, (1961)
39 T.C. 493 and I.R.C. v. Leiner, (1964) 41 T.C. 589
4. S. 437(3).
5. S. 438(1)(b).
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However, s. 438(1) does not apply to irrevocable settlements
unless and only to the extent that the income accumulating in
the hands of the trustees is derived from payments of income
made by the truster which are allowable as deductions in
1
computing his total income.
Thus, the income arising from the capital of an irrevocable trust 
which is accumulated in the hands of the trustees is not deemed 
to be paid to the child beneficiary under s. 438(1). This income 
may be harmlessly accumulated and capitalized by the trustees 
although it will suffer tax at the additional rate as well as 
the basic rate by virtue of s. 16, Finance Act 1973.
Any subsequent payment of capital to an infant unmarried child
of the settlor will be treated as a payment of income. The
extent to which the payment may be treated as income is, however,
limited. If the sum paid, together with other sums so paid
(whether to that child or any other infant unmarried child) exceeds
the aggregate of the trust income which has been paid to the child
of the truster and the income accumulated by the trustees since
the date that the trust was executed or became irrevocable (which
ever is the later), then the excess is not to be treated as 
2
income. The purpose is to tax as income, payments of capital 
which represent the trust income which has been accumulated and 
capitalized in the hands of the trustees. The original capital 
of the trust (the capital transferred on its creation) if paid 
to the beneficiary will not be treated as income under s. 438(2).
The concept of the "irrevocable settlement"
The deemed payment under s. 438(1) of income arising from the trust 
property which is accumulated in the hands of the trustees is 
avoided only if the trust is irrevocable. The term "irrevocable" 
has an accepted meaning at common law, though this meaning is 
extended in s. 439.
1. S. 438(2)(a).
2. S. 438(2)(b).
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The common law notion of irrevocability was discussed in I.R.C.
V, Warden . In Warden's case, a trust was determinable at the 
instance of the trustees; there was no power of revocation in 
the truster. The power of the trustees was sufficient to render 
the trust revocable. The Lord President (Normand), Lords Moncrieff 
and Carmont were all of the opinion that the trust was revocable 
according to the common law of Scotland, and that, therefore., 
it was unnecessary to consider the effect of s. 439. The Lord 
President (Normand) stated:
"It was said that a deed, according to the common law of 
Scotland, was irrevocable unless it was revocable by 
the act of the truster alone. In my opinion, a deed 
is revocable if it is terminable either by the truster 
or by persogs appointed by the truster with a power to 
terminate."
A settlement is not revocable at common law merely because the 
truster has some extrinsic power to recover the trust property. 
In Jenkins v. I.R.C. the trust fund comprised shares in a 
company over which the settlor had control. The settlor had the 
power to wind up the company, but this was held not to be a 
power to revoke the settlement. Lord Greene, M. R. was of the 
opinion that to consider otherwise would be 'placing too wide 
a construction on the word "irrevocable" ... taking it in its 
ordinary sense.' He continued:
"The distinction between a revocable and an irrevocable 
settlement is the veriest A.B.C. in legal language; 
and nobody familiar with the language of lawyers, and 
in particular those concerned with settlements, could 
have the slightest doubt, I should have thought, when 
finding the word "irrevocable" used in relation to a 
settlement, what that word was intended to mean. It 
seems to me quite illegitimate to take a word which has 
a technical meaning in conveyancing and then to argue 
that it has some extended meaning.
1 . (1938) 2 2 T.C. 416.
2 . Ibid., at p. 421.
3. (1944) 26 T.C. 265, at
(1939) 2 2 T.C. 525.
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The effect of s. 439 is to treat certain settlements which are 
irrevocable at common law as revocable for the purpose of chapter 
II of Part XVI: as Macnaghten, J. explained:
... s. 439(1)_/ appears to relate to cases where a 
settlement appears on the face of it to be irrevocable 
and it provides that nevertheless it is to be deemed 
revocable in the circumstances set out in sub-paragraphs
(a), (b ) and (c ).
S. 439(1) provides:
' .,. a settlement shall not be deemed to be irrevocable 
if the terms thereof provide -
(a) for the payment to the settlor or, during the life of
the settlor, to the wife or husband of the settlor for his
or her benefit, or for the application for the benefit of
the settlor or, during the life of the settlor, or the wife
or husband or the settlor, of any income or assets in any 
circumstances whatsoever during the life of any child of 
the settlor to or for the benefit of whom any income, or 
assets representing it, is or are or may be payable or 
applicable by virtue or in consequence of the settlement; or
(b) for the determination of the settlement by the act or on 
the default of any person; or
(c) for the payment of any penalty by the settlor in the 
event of his failing to comply with the provisions of the 
settlement;
Provided that a settlement shall not be deemed to be 
revocable by reason only -
(i) that it contains a provision under which any income 
or assets will or may become payable to or applicable for 
the benefit of the settlor, or the wife or husband of the 
settlor, on the bankruptcy of any such child as is mentioned 
in paragraph (a) of this subsection or in the event of an 
assignment of or charge in that income or those assets being 
executed by such child; or
(ii) that it provides for the determination of the settle­
ment as aforesaid in such a manner that the determination will 
not, during the lifetime of any such child as aforesaid, 
benefit the settlor or the wife of husband of the settlor; or
(iii) in the case of a settlement to which section 33 of 
the Trustee Act 1925 applies, that it directs the income to 
be held for the benefit of such a child as aforesaid on 
protective trusts, unless the trust period is a period less 
than the life of the child or the settlement specifies some 
event on the happening of which the child would, if the 
income were payable during the trust period to him absolutely 
during that period, be deprived of the right to receive the 
income or part thereof."
1. I.R.C. V. Lord Glenconner, (1941) 24 T.C. 82, at p. 85
127
clearly, s. 439 adds considerably to the scope of settlements 
which may be described as revocable for the purposes of chapter II. 
For example, in Jamieson v. I.R.C.^  trustees held £10,000 in trust. 
By clause 3 of the trust deed, the trust fund (representing the 
£ 1 0 , 0 0 0  and the income therefrom) was to be held in trust for, 
inter alia, the children of the settlor and their wives and 
issue absolutely or for such successive interests as the trustees 
in their discretion should appoint.
2
Applying the principle in I.R.C. v. Kenmare, the Lords held that 
the terms of the settlement were such that the trustees could 
determine the trust by appointing the trust fund absolutely to 
any particular beneficiary. The settlement was, therefore,
3
revocable by reason of s. 439(1)(b).
However, if a settlement which is irrevocable at common law is 
to be treated as revocable by reason of it containing any provision 
mentioned in either paragraph (a), (b) or (c) of s. 439(1), then 
that provision must be found in the terms of the settlement.
This is as a result of the decision of the Court of Appeal in 
Jenkins v. I . R . C If, for example, the settlement may be 
determined by the act or default of any person, s. 439(1)(b) 
applies only if, according to the terms of the settlement it 
may be so determined.
1. (1963) 41 T.C. 43.
2. (1937) 37 T.C. 383.
3. It was unsuccessfully argued that by appointing the trust
fund absolutely, the trustees would not be determining the 
settlement, but would be merely fulfilling the purpose of 
the trust.
4. (1944) 26 T.C. 265.
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Although the operation of s. 439(1) is restricted by the decision 
in Jenkins v. I.R.C., the same caution applies to any attempt to 
exploit the loop hole created by the case that was mentioned earlier 
in respect of s. 445(1) and the exploitation of the decision in 
Wolfson V. I.R.C
Interest paid by the trustees which is deemed to be paid to the 
infant unmarried child of the settlor
By virtue of s. 440(1), interest paid by trustees of a settlement 
to which chapter II applies may be deemed to be paid to the 
beneficiary of the trust where that beneficiary is an infant 
unmarried child of the truster; such interest is treated as the 
income of the truster under s. 437(1).
The amount of the interest which is deemed to be paid to the child 
is the fraction ^ of the interest, where A is the income arising 
under the trust less expenses properly chargeable to income (but 
not the sums distributed to the beneficiaries of the trust), and 
B is such part of A that is paid to any infant unmarried child 
of the truster.
S, 440 does not apply where the interest is paid to the truster or 
his spouse (if living with the truster), nor does it apply to 
interest in respect of which tax relief is available.
PAYMENTS OF CAPITAL SUMS BY THE TRUSTEES TO THE TRUSTER
"The need for this clause, ... is that certain people have 
set up machinery under which the income goes in at one 
slot and the same amount of money comes out below, but 
when it comes out below, they say it is a capital payment.
1. (1949) 31 T.C. 141, supra, at p. 8 8 .
2. S. 440(2).
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whereas they deduct from their total returns what they 
have put into the slot aboye. Therefore, that machinery 
... has to be dealt with."
S. 451 has the effect of treating certain payments of capital 
made by the trustees to the truster as payments of income.
The object of the section is evident from the statement above.
It is to prevent an individual from supplying a trust with income 
on which he would otherwise have been assessable to tax; the 
income being capitalized in the hands of the trustees to be 
repaid to him in the form of a non-taxable capital sum. S. 451 
certainly achieves this objective, though as a provision of the
Income Tax Acts it will be demonstrated that it is little
2
short of disgraceful.
The problems associated with the section are twofold; it must 
be determined (1) what a capital sum is and when it is paid 
directly or indirectly to the truster, and (2) to what extent 
the sum is to be treated as income.
S. 451(1) provides:
"Any gapital sum paid directly or indirectly in any relevant 
year of assessment by the trustees of a settlement to which 
this section applies to the settlor shall —
(a) to the extent to which the amount of that sum falls within 
the amount of income available up to the end of that year, be 
treated for all the purposes of the Income Tax Acts as the 
income of the settlor for that year;
(b) to the extent to which the amount of that sum exceeds the 
amount of income available up to the end of that year but falls 
within the amount of income available up to the end of the next 
following year, be treated for the purposes aforesaid as the 
income of the settlor for the next following year,
and so on."
1. Official Report, 27th June, 1938; Vol. 337 c. 1643: (per Attorney-Gen).
2. See generally the Inland Revenue consultative paper: "The 
Taxation of Certain Sums paid to Settlors: Section 451, Taxes 
Act 1970".
3. "Relevant year" means any year of assessment after the year 
1937-38: - s. 451(8).
4. The section applies to any settlement wherever made: - s. 451(8).
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1. a) The capital sum
"Capital sum" is defined in s. 451(8) as follows:
"(i) any sum paid by way of loan or repayment of a loan; 
and
(ii) any other sum paid otherwise than as income, being 
a sum which is not paid for full consideration in money 
or money's worth,but does not include any sum which could 
not have become payable to the settlor except in one of 
the events specified in the proviso to section 447(2) above, 
and ...
references to sums paid to the settlor include references 
to sums paid to the wife or husband of the settlor."
It is regrettable that, in consequence of the drafting of subsection 
(8) in such wide terms, s. 451 catches innocent transactions which 
are not entered into for the purposes of tax avoidance. The severity 
of a strict application of the section was revealed in I.R.C. v.
De Vigier.^
In January, 1952, the Appellant in De Vigier's case executed a 
settlement of which the Appellant's wife was a trustee. He 
transferred to the trustees shares that he held in A. Ltd. The 
settlement was in favour of his infant unmarried children; the 
income arising under the settlement was to be accumulated until 
the children attained the age of twenty-five, though there were 
limited powers of advancement.
In tax year 1957-58 the Appellant's wife paid into the account of 
the trustees an amount of £7,000. This was done in order that the 
trustees had funds available to them to take advantage of a rights 
issue by A. Ltd. In tax year 1958-59 the sum of £7,000 was paid 
back to the Appellant's wife.
1. (1964) 42 T.C. 24.
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The Crown contended that the sum totalling £7,000 was paid to the 
Appellant's wife as the repayment of a loan and was, therefore, the 
payment of a capital sum; accordingly the Appellant was assessed 
to tax under s. 451. Against this the Appellant urged that the 
payment from the trust account to his wife was nothing more than 
a mere indemnity payment to cover the expense of £7,000 advanced 
on behalf of the trust by his wife as a trustee.
The House of Lords with the utmost regret could not view the payment 
otherwise than as the repayment of a loan. There was, therefore, 
the payment of a capital sum to the wife of the Appellant, hence 
the Appellant was assessed to tax under s. 451. Lord Pearce 
explained :
"The words "repayment of a loan" must, in my opinion, be 
given their ordinary meaning. It does not follow that 
an indemnity to which a trustee is entitled from the 
trust is the repayment of a loan by him. In such cases 
it is a question of fact whether the circumstances under 
which the trustee is entitled to his indemnity constitute a 
loan. There may be borderline cases where a Court is 
entitled to hold that a temporary payment by a trustee into 
a trust account does not come within the word "loan". In 
the case before us, however, I do not think it is possible 
so to hold. The difficulty of excluding Mrs. De Vigier's 
transaction from the category of a loan is shown by the 
periphrases necessary in argument to describe it in neutral 
terms, such as "putting up the money", "making an advance" 
and "putting the trust account in funds". The simplest and 
most natural way of describing it is that she "lent the 
money" or "made a temporary loan" to the trust. Either o^ 
these descriptions is fatal to the Appellant's argument."
A loan made to the truster by the trustees is the payment of a capital
sum whether or not it is secured or is at a commercial rate of interest;
it is of no consequence that the trustees regard the transaction as
2
an investment. In McCrone v. I.R.C. , the truster (the Appellant in 
the case) executed a settlement of capital in December, 1946. The 
trustees were to accumulate the income; the trust property and 
accumulations were to be paid over in equal shares to the truster's 
daughters on their attaining the age of twenty-five.
1. Ibid., at p. 37-38.
2. (1967) 44 T.C. 142.
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In July, 1958, the truster suggested that the trustees should make 
a loan to him of £45,000. The trustees responded to the truster's 
request by transferring to him £45,000 worth of securities; the 
loan was secured over the truster's farm, and he was obliged to 
pay interest at the rate of 6%.
The Revenue argued that the loan was a payment of a capital sum to
a settlor by the trustees of a settlement which must be treated as 
the income of the settlor under s. 451.
Resisting the assessment the truster argued that the securities 
were transferred for full consideration in money or money's worth, 
and that a "loan" for the purpose of s. 451(8) in effect means an
unsecured loan; it was further argued that the section applies where
the trustees deliberately make a loan to the settlor but not where 
their sole motive is to invest the trust fund.
The First Division of the Court of Session dismissed the truster's 
arguments. The fact that the loan was secured was of no assistance 
to the Appellant's case. Lord Migdale remarked:
"Counsel for the Appellant contended that there was a 
difference between a loan which was secured and one which 
was not. I cannot see why a loan which is secured should 
be in a different position to one which is not secured. All 
it does is tg better the prospects of the lender getting his 
money back."
Moreover, the fact that the trustees regarded the transaction as an 
investment did not alter its nature as a loan arrangement:
'The ... submission for the Appellant, that because the trustees 
regarded the transaction as an investment it could not be a 
loan, is even more unstateable. The trustees thought that an 
application of trust funds to obtain a return of 6 per cent 
per annum on the money, repayment being secured by a 
disposition of a farm, was a wise policy. That circumstance 
in no way affects the conclusion that, in order to obtain a 
return of 6 per cegt., they lent a portion of the trust funds 
to the Appellant."
1. Ibid., at p. 151.
2. Ibid., at p. 149: per Lord Guthrie.
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It should be noted that the payment to the truster in McCrone's 
case consisted of the transfer of stocks, though the truster was 
obliged to repay £45,000. The Court of Session did not regard it 
of any significance that the first stage of the transaction was 
completed by the transfer of securities. The Lord President (Clyde) 
stated:
"It is true that the form in which the transaction was 
carried through involved a transfer of stocks, the 
amount of which depended upon their realisable value 
at the time in the market. But I am unable to hold 
that the way in which the loan was carried out can in  ^
any way detract from its nature as a loan of £45,000."
However, this is not to say that a payment of trust property will
necessarily amount to a payment of a capital sum for the purposes
of s. 451. It was pertinent to the decision in McCrone's case
that the truster was obliged to repay to the trustees the sum
of £45,000. It would appear, particularly from the judgement 
2
of Lord Guthrie, that had the securities been transferred to the 
truster subject to an agreement to retransfer those same securities, 
then there would have been no payment of a capital sum, and hence 
no assessment under s. 451.
Particular difficulty has arisen in respect of the truster who 
operates a current account with a body corporate connected with 
the settlement.
A body corporate is connected with a settlement if it is a close
company the participators of which include the trustees or a
3
beneficiary under the settlement. For the purpose of s. 451, the 
payment to the settlor of a capital sum by a body corporate 
connected with the settlement is treated as if it had been paid 
by the trustees.^ Thus, if the truster overdraws his account with
1. Ibid., at p. 147.
2. Ibid., at p. 149.
3. S. 454(4).
4. S. 451(4)
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the company and the overdraft represents a "loan", he will be 
deemed to have been paid a capital sura by the trustees of the 
settlement equal to the amount by which he is overdrawn.
The problem arose in Potts' Executors v. I . R . C where the 
settlor sold to the trustees of the settlement all but one 
of his shares in a company of which he was a director. The 
company was a body corporate connected with the settlement.
The settlor had a current account with the company. The account 
was credited with the settlor's fees and expenses as director 
of the company. It was debited in respect of sums paid by the 
company on behalf of the settlor at his request. During the tax 
years 1939-40 and 1940-41 the account showed a debit balance; the 
settlor had directed that substantial sums should be paid to the 
Inland Revenue to discharge his liability to tax. On 23rd 
December, 1940, the settlor paid into the account an amount to 
clear the debit.
There was no intention on the part of the settlor to avoid the 
payment of tax; the arrangement with the company was purely a 
matter of convenience, Neverthless, the settlor was assessed to 
tax under s. 451, the Crown alleging that the amounts by which 
the account showed a debit balance represented sums paid by way 
of loan to the settlor. The Crown argued that the loan was a 
payment of a capital sum; as the company was a body corporate 
connected with the settlement, then the capital sums paid were 
to be treated as having been paid by the trustees of the settlement 
under s. 451(4). Hence, the debit balance was to be treated as the 
income of the settlor under s. 451.
After some considerable discussion in the House of Lords as to the 
nature of the arrangement between the company and the settlor, the 
Crown's contention was dismissed. Had there been a banking arrangement, 
then according to the dictum of Lord Blackburn in Cunliffe Brooks S Co. 
V. Blackburn Benefit Society, there could have been little doubt that 
the overdraft represented a loan. According to Lord Blackburn in the 
Cunliffe case:
1. (1950) 32 T.C. 211.
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"/ Bankers / ... are under no obligation to honour cheques which 
exceed the amount of the balance, or in other words, to allow 
the customer to overdraw. Bankers generally do accommodate their 
customers by allowing such overdrafts to some extent; when they 
do so the leggl effect is that they lend the surplus to the 
customer ..."
However, the majority in the House of Lords in Potts' case
(Lord Morton dissenting) concluded that there was no banking arrangement,
Lord Simmons considered that it would be 'an abuse of language or at
least the merest colloquialism to speak of the transaction between
the company and the settlor as a banking transaction.' He continued:
' ... according to the ordinary fair meaning of the words the 
company did not pay any suras to the settlor by way of loan. 
It would in fact be as inapt to say that the company paid 
him sums by way of loan when he was in debit on the account 
as to say that he gaid the company sums by way of loan when 
he was in credit."
Whether or not it is strictly necessary to consider the distinction 
between a loan and an overdraft is open to doubt. The vital question 
is to whom a capital sura is paid.
1. b) Payment of a capital sum directly or indirectly to the truster
Although the majority in the House of Lords considered that the 
overdraft in Potts' case did not represent a loan for the purposes 
of s. 451(8), it was further considered that the actual suras paid 
by the company were not paid directly or indirectly to the settlor. 
They were paid pursuant to the directions of the settlor to third 
parties in discharge of the settlor's liability thereto.
Of the words "capital sum paid ... indirectly ... to the settlor".
Lord Normand opined:
1. (1884) 9 A. C. 857, at p. 864.
2. (1950) 32 T.C. 211, at p. 228.
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"In my view they are apt to cover payments made as loans 
to third parties through whom the payment reaches the 
settlor himself, but they are not apt to cover payments 
made to third parties who are not accountable to the 
settlor and are entitled to retain the sums as their own 
moneys. This is a taxing Act and its terms are not to 
be enlarged by reasoning that the same final result is 
achieved as by a loan made to the settlor followed by 
a payment made by him to the third party."
In Potts' case, none of the sums paid by the company were paid 
to persons who were accountable to the settlor. The sums were not, 
therefore, paid indirectly to the settlor and hence no assessment
could be made on him under s. 451(1).
The decision in Potts' Executors v. I.R.C. was considered by the
2
House of Lords in the similar case of I.R.C. v. Bates. The
Respondent in I.R.C. v. Bates had settled shares of a company of
which he was a director. He had a current account with the company 
which was often overdrawn; however, the Appellant paid in enough 
to meet the balance at the end of each financial year. In order 
to do so, the Appellant would overdraw sums from his bank, and 
at the beginning of the next financial year the company would 
pay out sufficient to cover the Appellant's bank overdraft. On 
three occasions the company paid the sums direct to the bank, but 
twice the sums were paid to the Appellant himself.
The company was a body corporate connected with the settlement.
The Crown urged that the sums paid out by the company to cover the 
Appellant's overdraft were paid by way of loan; they were, therefore, 
to be treated as capital sums paid to the settlor by the trustees 
which should be taxed accordingly under s. 451(1).
The House of Lords decided that the only sums paid by the company 
which were assessable under s. 451(1) were those paid to the 
Appellant himself:
1. (1950) 32 T.C. 211, at p. 229.
2. (1966) 44 T.C. 225.
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"In the present case it appears that in five different 
years payments were made by the company for the purpose 
of discharging the Appellant’s debt to his bank. In 
three cases these payments were made direct to the 
b ^ k  and Potts' case shows that they were not caught by 
/ s. 45l_/. But it so happened that in the other two years 
the payments were made by cheques drawn in favour of the 
Appellant and not in favour of the bank. It is this 
fortuitous circumstance alone that has brought the 
Appellant within the scope of ^ s. 451_/ and imposes on 
him liability for several thousands of pounds."
The Appellant argued that the sums that he actually received were 
not paid by way of loan but were payments passing in the course 
of a running account. This argument was received with little 
sympathy: Lord Guest stated;
' ... it was suggested that these sums were not loans, 
but were payments passing in the course of a running 
account between the company and the Appellant. Even 
if they were, the sums were, in my opinion, none the 
less loans. I pose the rhetorical question - "if those 
sums were not loans, what were they?"
Both the Potts and Bates cases demonstrate the s. 451(1) is 
concerned with capital sums paid to a truster or to a person 
accountable to him. Sums paid by trustees to third parties in 
discharge of the truster's liabilities are not sums paid by way 
of loan to the truster himself despite the fact that he is 
obliged to make good the trustees' deficit. There can be little 
doubt that in such case the trustees would be entitled to maintain 
an action in debt against the truster. However the creation of an 
action in debt against the truster is not the equivalent of granting 
a loan to him of the amount of the outstanding debt.
1. Ibid., at p. 262-263: per Lord Reid,
2, Ibid., at P. 266.
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There is clearly a real distinction between a debt and a loan, 
though it is unfortunate that it should be of such fundamental 
importance to the operation of s. 451. The distinction drawn 
in Bates' case between the sums paid to the bank, which were 
not taxable, and the sums paid to the bank through the hands of 
the Appellant, which were taxable, may have been real, but it 
provided for an irrational application of a taxing provision.
It should be noted that if, pursuant to some arrangement with 
the truster, the trustees discharge his liabilities by payments 
of capital sums to his creditors, then, although those sums 
would not be paid to the truster for the purpose of s, 451, they 
would be applied for his benefit for the purpose of s. 447(2): in 
which case, the undistributed income of the trust would be treated 
as the income of the truster. Goff J. in I.R.C. v. Wachtel 
explained:
"Paying the settlor's bills could well be a payment to 
a person not accountable, yet it would be directly or 
indirectly for the benefit of the settlor,^though it 
would not be a payment indirectly to him."
2. The extent to which a capital sum is treated as income
According to s. 451(1), a capital sum paid to the truster by the 
trustees is to be treated as a payment of income to the extent 
that it falls within the income available at the end of the year 
of assessment in which the sum is paid. If the sum exceeds the 
income available, then the carry forward provision operates as 
provided by s. 451(1)(b). ^
The means of calculating the amount of income available at the 
end of any year is provided by s, 451(2) as follows:
1. (1971) 46 T.C. 543, at p. 559.
2, Supra, at p. 130.
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"For the purposes of subsection (1) of this section, the 
amount of income available up to the end of any year shall, 
in relation to any capital sum paid as aforesaid, be taken 
to be the aggregate amount of income arising under the settle­
ment in that year and any previous relevant year which has 
not been distributed, less -
(a) the amount of any other capital sums paid to the settlor 
in any relevant year before that sum was paid, and
(b) so much of any income arising under the settlement in that 
year and any previous relevant year which has not been 
distributed as is shown to consist of income which has been 
treated as income of the settlor by virtue of section 445,
446, or 448 above, and
(c) any income arising under the settlement in that year and 
any previous relevant year which has been treated as the income 
of the settlor by virtue of section 447 above, and
(d) any sums paid by virtue or in consequence of the settle­
ment, to the extent that they are not allowable, by virtue
of section 450 above, as deductions in computing the settlor's 
total income for that year, and
(e) an amount equal to the sum of tax at the basic rate and 
tax at the additional rate on -
(i) the aggregate amount of income arising under the settle­
ment in that year and any previous relevant year which has not 
been distributed, less
(ii) the aggregate amount of the income and sums referred to 
in paragraphs (b), (c) and (d) of this subsection."
The wording in s. 451(2) is unfortunate and has been extensively 
criticised both in the courts and by academic writers.
1 2 
Silberrad reviewed what he described as the "absurd results"
of a strict literal interpretation of the subsection. He noted
that 'all accumulations of income made on or after April 6th, 1938,
and prior to a year in which a capital sum is paid to the settlor are
"income available", in addition to the undistributed income of the
year in which the payment is made.' The difficulty is that the income
which is available at the end of the year in which the payment of
1. "The Misdrafting of_Section 451 of the Income and Corporation
Taxes Act 1970": / 1970_7 B.T.R. 380.
2. Ibid., at p. 384-387.
3. Ibid,, at p. 385.
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capital is made does not cease to be "income available" at the 
end of that year merely because there has been a capital sum paid to 
the settlor. Likewise, in subsequent years the fact that sums are 
treated as the income of the settlor by reason of the carry forward 
provision of s. 451(1)(b) has no bearing on the amount of "income 
available" at the end of those years. There is no difficulty where 
the capital sum paid is less than the amount of the income available 
at the end of the year in which the payment is made; the difficulty 
arises where the payment exceeds that amount. Lord Reid illustrated 
the problem:
"Suppose loans of £20,000 are made by the connected company 
in year 1, which is the first in which the trustees receive 
income. That, after making the calculations in subs. (2)
(b) and (e), is £3,000. That £3,000 is added to the settlor's 
income for year 1. It is the calculation directed for year 
2 which gives rise to the absurdity. Suppose the trust income 
in year 2 to be £2,000 then the "income available" up to the 
end of year 2 is the sum of the incomes of the years 1 and 2,
i.e. £5,000 because there was a direction to accumulate. And 
if in year 3 there is trust income of £3,000 the 'income 
available' at the end of that year is the sum of the incomes 
for year 1, 2, and 3, i,e. £8,000. In year 2 £5,000 will 
be treated as the income of the settlor and in year 3 £8,000 
will be treated as his income, so, although the trust income 
for three years was only £8,000 in all, the settlor's income 
for those years will be regarded as increased by £3,000 plus 
£5,000 glus £8,000, i.e. £16,000, or double the whole trust 
income.
2
In practice, the Inland Revenue do not strictly enforce s, 451(2).
It would appear that they set against the actual amount of income 
available at the end of any relevant year the amount of the capital 
sum which has been treated as the income of the settlor in any 
previous relevant years.^
The formula provided by s. 451(2) for the calculation of the 'income 
available' at the end of any year leads to further problems in 
respect of both s. 457 and s. 438(2)(b).
1. I.R.C. V. Bates, (1966) 44 T.C. 225, at p. 261.
2. The concession was made in Bates' case.
3. An example of the computation in accordance with the Revenue
concession is provided in Simon, E6.245.
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From the undistributed income of the settlement there is deducted, 
inter alia, any income which has been treated as the income of 
the settlor under sections 445, 446, 447 and 448, together with 
any income which, by virtue of s. 450, the settlor has not been 
allowed to deduct in computing his total income. The remainder 
represents income available at the end of the year for the purpose 
of s. 451. However, s. 451(2) does not provide for the deduction 
of any income which has been treated as the income of the settlor 
by virtue of s. 457 or s. 438(2)(b).
S. 457 does not apply to income arising under a settlement which is
treated as the income of the settlor under any other provision of
1
the Income Tax Acts. The section does not, therefore, normally
apply to the undistributed income arising from the property of a
settlement of which the settlor has not absolutely divested himself.
This income will usually be treated as the income of the settlor
by virtue of s. 447. However, s. 457 would apply to that income
if, for instance, it was not treated as the income of the settlor
under s. 447 by reason of the operation of paragraph (b) of the
2
proviso to s. 447(2).
It is not therefore unrealistic to suggest that there are circumstances 
in which the 'income available' at the end of any year might include 
income which has been treated under s. 457 as the income of the 
settlor.
Thus, income arising under the settlement may be treated as the 
income of the settlor under s. 457; if the income is accumulated 
in the hands of the trustees, and out of the accumulations there 
is paid to the settlor a capital sum, that capital sum is treated 
as his income under s. 451. The settlor will be taxed on the 
capital he receives and this, in effect, amounts to a double taxation.
1. S. 457(1)(d).
2. It is also argued below that s. 457 can apply in circumstances
in which s. 450 operates to prevent the settlor from deducting 
certain payments in computing his total income.
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where the capital sum exceeds the 'income available' in the year in 
which it is paid, then the amount of the settlement income (or part 
thereof) available in the next following year may be treated as the 
income of the settlor under s. 451(1)(b). This does not prevent 
the possibility that the actual income available in that next following 
year might be treated as that of the settlor under s. 457. This 
would not amount to a double taxation for in circumstances where 
s. 451(1)(b) applies it is not the actual income available in the 
next following year that is treated as the income of the settlor; 
that income is merely used as a measure to determine what portion 
of the capital sum is to be treated as the income of the settlor 
in that year. However, it is clearly grossly inequitable.
The disharmony between s. 438(2)(b) and s. 451 is, perhaps, more 
apparent.
Income of a settlement may be capitalized in the hands of the trustees. 
If it is paid to an infant unmarried child of the settlor in the 
form of a capital sum, by virtue of s, 438(2)(b), it may be treated 
as a payment of income. This in turn will be treated as the income 
of the settlor under s. 437(1).
The income available at the end of any year for the purposes of 
s, 451 includes the aggregate amount of income arising in that
1
year and any previous relevant year which has not been distributed.
In effect, it includes any income accumulated by the trustees which
has been paid to an infant unmarried child of the settlor as a
capital sura which in consequence, has been treated as the income 
2
of the settlor. Thus, income of the settlement which has already 
been treated as that of the settlor is used to determine what amount 
of a capital sum paid to him by the trustees is to be treated as his 
income under s, 451. This cannot in any sense be regarded as fair or 
reasonable and must be considered as an oversight of the legislature 
in drafting s. 451(2). Neither do the absurdities end here.
1. S. 451(2).
2. A payment of capital from income accumulated in past years 
does not affect the nature of the income while it accumulated 
as being undistributed for the purpose of chapter III - s. 455, 
discussed below at p. 146.
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In accordance with s. 451(5), where any capital sum is treated 
as the income of the truster, it is treated as 'income of such 
an amount as, after deduction of both tax at the basic rate and 
tax at the additional rate for that year would be equal to that 
sum or part thereof.' Thus an actual capital payment of £55 represents 
income of £lOO in the hands of the settlor. The settlor must there­
fore pay income tax on £100 which, if he were taxed at the basic rate 
would amount to £30; out of a payment of £55, a settlor who is 
assessed to tax at the basic rate receives a net amount of £25. In
practice the Inland Revenue gross up a payment only for the purpose
2.
of charging it at the higher rates of the settlor. There is, 
however, no rebate of tax for a settlor who would not have paid 
tax at the additional rate on the gross amount of the payment.
The full rigours of s, 451 are to a considerable extent mitigated 
by the extra-statutory concessions of the Inland Revenue as
2
indicated above, and by the decisions in Potts' Executors v. I.R.C.
3
and I.R.C. v. Bates.
A possible means of defeating the operation of s. 451 is to ensure 
that the income of the trust is distributed, leaving no "income 
available" at the end of any relevant year. A clause in the trust 
deed preventing the payment of capital sums by the trustees to the 
truster might operate to deter the trustees from making such payments, 
though 8. 451 does not discriminate in favour of payments made in 
breach of trust.
The section obviously represents a trap for the unwary, and, if 
applied according to its literal interpretation, would operate with 
improper severity. However, it should be borne in mind that the 
absurdity attributed to the section relates only to its severity 
and not to its workability. The 1981 Finance Bill proposes certain 
amendments to s. 451; because these proposals are liable to change 
they are discussed in very general terms by way of appendix^
1. See I.R.C. v. Bates, (1966) 44 T.C. 225.
2. (1950) 32 T.C. 211.
3. (1966) 44 T.C. 225.
4. Appendix 4.
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PAYMENTS OF INCOME BY THE TRUSTER WHICH ARE NOT ALLOWED AS DEDUCTIONS 
FOR THE PURPOSE OF COMPUTING HIS TOTAL INCOME
S. 450 operates to prevent a truster from deducting from his 
total income annual payments made to the trustees to the extent 
that the payments are accumulated in the hands of the trustees 
and are not treated as the income of the truster by virtue of 
either s. 445, s. 446, s, 447 and s. 448. The section reads as 
follows:
"Where, by virtue or in consequence of agy settlement to 
which this section applies, the settlor pays directly or 
indirectly in any year of assessment to the trustees 
of the settlement any sums which would, but for this 
subsection, be allowable as deductions in computing his 
total income for that year, those sums shall not be so 
allowable to the extent to which the aggregate amount 
thereof falls within the amount of income arising under 
the settlement in that year which has not been distributed, 
less -
(a) so much of any income arising under the settlement in 
that year which has not been distributed as is shown to 
consist of income which has been treated as the income of the 
settlor by virtue of section 445, 446 or 448 above, and
(b) the amount of income so arising in that year which is 
treated as the income of the settlor by virtue of section 
447 above.
The section does not prevent the truster from deducting basic
rate tax under s. 52 or 53 on the annual payments made to the
trustees; it merely disallows the deduction of such sums in
3computing his liability to tax at higher rates.
An example of the application of s. 450 is provided by the case of
I.R.C. V. P a y In this case the settlor settled £60,000 upon 
accumulation trust the ultimate beneficiary of which was her 
grandson. The trustees had wide powers of investment and in effect 
granted a mortgage to the settlor repayable with interest at 6%.
The constitution of the trust and the granting of the mortgage 
occurred simultaneously: no money actually changed hands.
1. References to sums paid by the settlor include references 
to sums paid by the settlor's spouse: s. 450(5)
2. Sums paid to a body corporate connected with the settlement
are treated as having been paid to the trustees: s. 450(2).
3. Tiley, at 19:76.
4. (1955) 36 T.C. 109.
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The deed of settlement and the granting of the mortgage were 
held to constitute an arrangement and therefore a settlement for 
the purpose of chapter III of Part XVI.
The settlor, as mortgagor, attempted to deduct from her total 
income an amount equal to the annual payments of mortgage interest.
The deduction was not allowed. It was held by Dankwerts, J. that 
the payments of interest were payable by virtue or in consequence 
of a settlement to which s. 450 applied: as most of the income 
of the settlement was undistributed, the payments of mortgage 
interest could not be deducted in computing the settlor's total 
income for tax purposes.
The meaning of income arising under a settlement which has not 
been distributed for the purposes of sections 447, 450 and 451
S. 455 provides that income arising under a settlement in any 
year of assessment shall be deemed not to have been distributed 
to the extent that it exceeds a certain amount. That amount 
is the aggregate of (a) the sums paid, other than payments of 
interest, which fall to be treated as the income of the persons 
to whom they are paid (except by virtue of s. 451), or would have 
been so treated had those persons received the sums in the United 
Kingdom and were themselves domiciled and resident or ordinarily 
resident in the United Kingdom; (b) the expenses of the trustees 
properly chargeable to income, other than those described in (a); 
and (c) in the case of a charity, any income arising to the 
trustees which is not dealt with as described in (a) or (b) above, 
but which would be granted an exemption from tax under s. 360,I.C.T.A,
Payments of interest by the trustees are expenses properly
chargeable to income^ unless the interest is paid to the settle]
or his spouse, or is interest in respect of which tax relief is 
2
allowable. However, a payment of interest is not an expense 
properly chargeable to income where there are no sums paid as
1. 3.456(1).
2. S. 456(4).
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described in (a) above to any persons other than the settlor or
his spouse. If such sums are paid to others as well as to the
settlor or his spouse then a fraction of the interest paid by the
trustees is an expense properly chargeable to income. That fraction 
A — B
is — -—  of the interest, where A is the whole income arising
under the settlement less the expenses of the trustees other than
payments of interest, and B is the amount of sums paid as
described in (a) above to persons other than the settlor or his 
2
spouse.
Example
Income arising under the settlement .... £500
Sums paid to settlor ....................  £lOO
Sums paid to persons other than
settlor or his spouse ................. £150
Payments of interest in respect of 
which no tax allowance is available 
and which is not paid to the settlor
or his spouse .........................  £100
Expenses of trustees properly
chargeable to tax .....................  £50
Amount of interest which is properly chargeable to income:
(500 - 50) - 150 X 100 = £66.66 
(500 - 50)
Undistributed income:
500 - (100 + 150 + 50 + 66.66) = £153.34.
Part XVI as an indirect means of taxing the trust
Although most of the provisions of Part XVI discussed above operate
to treat the income of a trust as income of the truster, many in
fact represent the machinery by which the trust itself is indirectly 
taxed at the personal rate of tax of the truster. This is achieved by 
providing the truster who pays the tax with a right of action against 
the person who actually receives the income. S. 441 provides:
1. S. 456(2).
2. S. 456(3).
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*'{1) Where, by virtue of this Chapter, any income tax 
becomes chargeable on and is paid by the person by whom 
a settlement was made or entered into, that person shall 
be entitled -
(a) to recover from any trustee or other person to whom 
the income is payable by virtue or in consequence of the
settlement the amount of tax so paid; and
(b) for that purpose to require an inspector to furnish 
to him a certificate specifying the amount of income in
respect of which he has so paid taxand the amount of the
tax so paid,
and any certificate so furnished shall be conclusive 
evidence of the facts appearing thereby."
A similar provision applies to income which is treated as that
2
of the truster by virtue of sections 445, 446, 447 and 448 and
3
by virtue of s. 434 .
Thus, although a truster bears the liability for tax on the income 
which is treated as his by virtue of those provisions of Part XVI, 
the actual financial burden rests on the trust itself. The trust, 
therefore, represents no loss of revenue to the Crown, and the 
payment of the tax is, in effect, ultimately borne by those who 
enjoy the income.
However, the truster cannot demand from the trustees reimbursement 
for tax paid on the amount of income which is treated as his 
pursuant to s, 451 or s. 457; nor can he recover his losses from 
the trustees which arise by reason of his inability to deduct pay­
ments from his total income in the circumstances described in s. 450.
THE INTEGRATION OF THE SECTIONS
It was noted above that Part XVI does not represent a scheme of 
taxation planned from the outset, or 'a code' in any shape or 
form,'^ In general the provisions have been introduced at random 
to counteract specific forms of tax avoidance.
1. Chapter II - settlements in favour of infant unmarried children 
of the settlor.
2. See s. 449(3) .
3. See s. 435(1)
4. Supra, at p. 51.
148
There is some discrimination in Part XVI between settlements of 
income and of capital. Settlements of capital of which the settlor 
has absolutely divested himself are treated with particular favour.
The integration of the sections of Part XVI in relation to these 
two types of settlement will now be considered.
Settlements of income
In the final analysis it must be concluded that the income tax 
advantages associated with settlements of income are small.
In order that a truster can transfer to the trustees the burden of 
tax at the basic rate on income payments made by him under the terms 
of the trust he must ensure that -
(1) the payments are payable for a period which is capable of 
exceeding six years - s. 434;
(2) there is no power to revoke or determine the trust or any 
provision thereof on the exercise of which he will cease to 
be liable to make payments - s. 445 (subject to the six 
year proviso);
(3) the income cannot be paid to or applied for the benefit of 
himself or his spouse on the exercise of a power in any person 
- s. 448 (subject to the six year proviso);
(4) he has no interest in the income within the meaning of s. 447(2) 
thereby preventing an assessment on the undistributed income
of the trust under s. 447;
(5) the beneficiaries of the trust are not his infant unmarried 
children - s. 437.
Should the truster comply with the five conditions outlined above, 
then any beneficiary who has unused personal allowances, in effect, 
may reclaim from the Revenue the tax deducted by the truster on 
making the payments.
Assuming that the truster is entitled to deduct from the payments 
of income an amount representing tax at the basic rate thereon, he 
cannot avoid liability to tax at his higher personal rates. To the 
extent that the income is accumulated, s. 450 prevents the deduction
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of the payments in computing the truster's total income. Apart 
from s, 450, unless either of the paragraphs of s, 457(1) apply, 
s. 457 operates to treat as the income of the truster any income 
arising under the trust for the purposes of computing his excess 
liability to tax. The relationship between s. 450 and s. 457 
is somewhat confused, Tiley noted:
"In view of the wide scope of s. 457 it may be wondered 
whether s. 450 is still needed. Both provisions are 
concerned only with excess liability and whereas s. 457 
disallows the deduction completely no matter who is the 
payer, s. 450 is limited to income accumulated under the 
settlement ,.. The reason is to be found in the fact that 
s. 450 dates back to 1938 whereas s. 457 concerns only 
liabilities commenced since 1965 covenants entered into ^
before that date being governed by the more generous s. 458."
2
In the light of Ang v. Parrish it is clear that s. 457 does not 
disallow a deduction of income payments made by the truster: it 
treats the income arising under the trust as the income of the truster 
which is an entirely different matter.
By virtue of s. 457(1)(e), the section does not operate in respect 
of income arising under a trust which is treated as the income of 
the truster under any provision of the Income Tax Acts other than 
those of chapter IV. However, s. 450 does not treat the income 
arising under the trust as the income of the truster; it has the 
effect of preventing the truster from deducting from his total 
income the payments that he makes under the terms of the trust, 
to the extent that the income is not distributed.
S. 450 operates oh the same principle as s, 48 of the Finance Act 
3
1977. It will be recalled that according to s. 48, an annuity 
payment made under a liability incurred for money or money's worth 
is not allowed as a deduction from the total income of the person
1. 19:77, ^written before the decision in Ang v. Parrish).
2. / 1980_/ S.T.C. 341.
3. Supra, at p. 70.
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by whom it is made. However, it cannot be doubted that the annuitant 
would be liable to tax on the amount that he received; the fact that 
the person by whom the annuity payment was made could not deduct the 
amount from his total income does not make that amount any less the 
income of the annuitant.
Likewise, payments made by the truster to the trustees which are 
caught by s. 450 are none the less income of the trustees. The 
payments therefore, represent income arising under a settlement 
for the purposes of s. 457. That income must be treated as the 
income of the truster for the purposes of calculating his excess 
liability to tax.
In accordance with the decision of Walton, J. in Ang. v. Parrish, 
and consistently with dicta in the House of Lords in Coathew 
Investments, Ltd. v. I.R.C. the effect of s. 457 is to add to the 
total income of the truster the income arising under the trust.
Thus, in cases where s. 450 applies, the payments of income are not 
deductible in computing the truster's total income, but those same 
payments represent income arising under the settlement which is 
added to the truster's income under s. 457 for the purpose of 
computing his excess liability to tax; this, in effect, amounts 
to a double taxation.
There is clearly some discord between the two sections, though 
no doubt by concession the Revenue would not seek to apply both 
sections in the same instance.
Income arising under a settlement which is treated as that of the
2
settlor under s. 457 is taxed as investment income. It must, 
therefore, be borne in mind that the constitution of a settlement 
of income may have the undesirable side-effect of rendering the 
settlor liable to the investment income surcharge.
1. (1966) 43 T.C. 30ly
2. Ang V. Parrish, / 1980 / S.T.C. 341.
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The payments of income by the truster to the trustees are treated 
by Part XVI as described above; however, the accumulations of income 
in the hands of the trustees become trust property or capital. Any 
income arising from the accumulations is treated as if it arose 
from a settlement of capital.
Settlements of capital
The income tax advantages associated with settlements of capital 
can be substantial. The operation of Part XVI can be avoided 
completely in respect of income arising from the property of a 
trust. However, as with settlements of income, before any advantage 
may be secured, the truster must first rid himself of liability to 
tax at the basic rate. He must ensure that -
(1) the income is payable to the trustees or any other person for 
a period which is capable of exceeding six years - s. 434;^
(2) there is no power to revoke or determine the trust or any 
provision thereof on the exercise of which he or his spouse 
might become beneficially entitled to the trust property - 
s. 446 (subject to the six year proviso);
(3) there is no power in any person to pay or apply the trust 
property to or for the benefit of himself or his spouse -
s. 448 (subject to the six year proviso);
(4) he has no interest in the income or property of the trust within 
the meaning of s, 447(2) thereby preventing an assessment on 
the undistributed income of the trust under s. 447;
(5) if the beneficiary of the trust is his infant unmarried child, 
the trust is irrevocable and that neither the income arising 
or the accumulations of income are paid to the child during 
its infancy - s. 438.
The truster may avoid his liability to tax at higher rates by bringing 
the income arising under the trust within one of the exceptions to 
s. 457 provided by paragraphs (a) to (e) of subsection (1) thereof.
1. See I.R.C. v. Prince-Smith, (1943) 25 T.C. 84.
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Particularly useful is s. 457(1)(d) by virtue of which the income 
arising from the property of the trust will not be treated as the 
income of the truster for the purpose of computing his excess 
liability to tax if he has divested himself absolutely of that 
property.
Thus, a settlement of capital of which the settlor has absolutely 
divested himself can represent a considerable saving of tax where 
the income is paid to a beneficiary (other than an infant unmarried 
child of the truster) who has a low personal rate of tax and where 
that income would have been charged at a high rate had it accrued to 
the truster.
Any income which is accumulated in the hands of the trustees will 
be assessed to tax at both the basic and additional rate by virtue 
of s. 16, Finance Act 1973. The process of accumulation is advantageous 
where both the truster and the beneficiary have personal rates of tax 
in excess of 45%. The accumulated income must, however, be paid to 
the beneficiary in the form of a non-taxable capital sum if the 
fiscal benefits of the accumulation are to be realized.
Although settlements of capital may represent an effective method of 
saving income tax, not unnaturally they attract charges to both 
capital gains and transfer tax. For the sake of completeness the 
structures of these two capital taxes are described in Part 3 below.
153
PART 3; THE CAPITAL TAXATION OF TRUSTS
CAPITAL GAINS TAX
Introduction
Unlike Part XVI, I.C.T.A., the Capital Gains Taxes Act 1979 provides 
a comprehensive structure or scheme of trust taxation the weaknesses 
of which are only now beginning to tell. The Finance Bill 1981 
proposes certain amendments to the capital gains taxation of trusts; 
these proposals will be noted in the main text.
The scheme operates in respect of 'settled property' as defined 
by the Act, which throughout the life of the trust is the subject 
of disposals actual and deemed. Whiteman and Wheatcroft noted:
"So far as settled property is concerned, chargeable gains or 
allowable losses may accrue (1) to the settlor on his disposal 
of assets on the creation of a settlement, (2) to the trustees 
on their disposal of trust assets during the administration of 
the trust, (3) to the trustees on a number of occasions when 
there is a deemed disposal of assets comprised in the settled 
property, and (4) to the beneficiaries on the disposal of 
their interests under the trust."
Thus, in general the liability to capital gains tax tends to follow
2
the legal ownership of the corpus of the trust fund.
The disposal of the property by the settlor on the creation of the 
trust sets the base value of the settled property for future dealings 
by the trustees. Likewise, there is a deemed disposal by the trustees 
on the occasion that the property ceases to be settled property; the 
base value is thereby set for future dealings with the property by 
the person who becomes absolutely entitled thereto as against the 
trustee.
1. 9—Ol.
2. See Buckley, L. J. (dissenting) in Berry v. Warnett, / 1980 /
S.T.C. 631, at p. 645.
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The entire scheme hinges on the definition of 'settled property'. 
It is necessary, therefore, to begin by considering what is meant 
by settled property for the purposes of the Capital Gains Tax Act 
1979.^
Settled property
The definition of settled property is provided by s. 51 and is 
essentially framed in the negative: any property which is held 
in trust other than property to which s. 46 applies is settled
property for the purposes of the Act. S, 46 generally applies to
property held by trustees who are required to act in accordance with
the direction of the beneficiary: it reads as follows:
"(1) In relation to assets held by a person as nominee for
another person, or as trustee for another person absolutely 
entitled as against the trustee, or for any person who would 
be so entitled but for being an infant or other person under
disability (or for two or more persons who are or would be
jointly so entitled), this Act shall apply as if the property 
were vested in, and the acts of the nominee or trustee in 
relation to the assets were the acts of, the person or persons 
for whom he is the nominee or trustee (acquisitions from or 
disposals to him by that person or persons being disregarded 
accordingly).
"(2) It is hereby declared that references in this Act to any
assets held by a person as trustee for another person absolutely 
entitled as against the trustee are references to a case 
where that other person has the exclusive right, subject only to 
satisfying any outstanding charge, lien or other right of the 
trustees to resort to the assets for payment of duty, taxes, costs 
or other outgoings, to direct how that asset shall be dealt with."
Thus, in relation to any settlement, property held in trust to which
a person is absolutely entitled as against the trustee is not 'settled
property'. The concept of 'absolute entitlement as against the trustee'
must not be confused with the concept of 'beneficial entitlement'. A
person may be absolutely entitled as against the trustee although he
2
himself acts in the capacity of a trustee. Such a person is clearly 
not beneficially entitled to the property; however, the property may 
be settled property in relation to the settlement of which he is trustee
1, Unless otherwise stated, references are to the Capital Gains Tax 
Act 1979.
2. See Hoare Trustees v. Gardner, (1977) 52 T.C. 53, below at p. 171.
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The notion of two or more persons who are jointly absolutely entitled 
as against the trustee requires some explanation.
In Kidson v. Macdonald, tenants in common of land were held to be
jointly absolutely entitled to the land as against the trustees.
Fox, J. appreciated that s. 46(1) applies in Scotland and Northern
Ireland as well as in England and Wales, and so rejected an argument
based on a technical aspect of English property law that the word
"jointly" in s. 46(1) applies only in respect of property held in
trust for two or more persons as joint tenants, but not to property
2
held in trust for persons as tenants in common. He explained:
"In my judgement, the words used in / s. 46(1)_/ are not 
words which have a technical meaning; the word "jointly" is 
not a term of art in English real property law; and the word 
"jointly" should be given i^s ordinary meaning, namely, 
concurrently or in common,"
Fox, J. further noted that where successive interests are created 
in settled property, then although the beneficiaries are collectively 
entitled to direct the trustee as to his dealings with the property, 
they are not absolutely entitled as against the trustee for the 
purpose of s. 46(1):
'If ... one has a trust for A for life with remainder to B 
absolutely, A and B together are able to direct the trustees 
how to deal with the settled property, but such a limitation 
is clearly settled property and is not excluded by / s 46(1) /-T 4
5
In Stephenson v. Barclays Bank Trust Co., property was held by the 
trustees of a will trust for such of the testator's grandchildren 
living at his death who should attain the age of twenty-one years.
1. (1973) 49 T.C. 503.
2. For the distinction between a joint tenancy and a tenancy in 
common, see Megarry and Wade, The Law of Real Property, 3th ed., 
chapter 7.
3. (1973) 49 T.C. 503, at p. 512-513: followed in Harthan v. Mason, 
/ 1980_/ S.T.C. 94.
4. Ibid., at p. 512.
5. (1974) 50 T.C. 374.
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However, the interests of the grandchildren were subject to the 
prior rights of three annuitants entitled during their widowhood 
to annuity payments out of trust income.
It was urged on the basis of s. 46(2) that the grandchildren were 
absolutely entitled to the trust fund in that they had the 
exclusive right to direct how the trust property was to be dealt 
with, subject only to an outstanding charge, viz, the annuity 
payments which were, it was submitted, "outgoings" of the trustees 
This argument was rejected by Walton, J.:
"It does not appear to me to be in any way apt language 
for use in the case of another beneficial interest arising 
under the same instrument as the beneficial interest of the 
person said to be absolutely entitled as against the trustees. 
Such a person is not "absolutely entitled as against the 
trustee", what ever that phrase means, for the obvious 
reason that he does not, subject only to the excepted rights 
of the trustees, hold the entirety of the beneficial interest 
in the fund."
It was also considered by Walton, J. that if beneficiaries are to be 
considered as jointly absolutely entitled as against the trustee 
then their interests must be qualitatively the same:
"The definition says "jointly"; it does not say "together", 
I think this is because it is intended to comprise persons 
who are, as it were, in the same interest."
The propositions in the Kidson and Barclays Bank Trust Co. cases 
were summarized by Sumption thus :
"There are ... two requirements for the application of the 
provisions as to nominees and bare trustees where there is 
more than one beneficial owner. These are:
(1) the interests of the beneficial owners must be concurrent 
and not successive. An example of the latter is the interest 
of a life tenant and remainderman; and ^
(2) the interests of the co-owners should be the same. The
1. Ibid., at p. 386.
2. Ibid., at p. 388.
3. As to the problems of ascertaining the qualitative similarity
of the interests, see Whiteman and Wheatcroft, at 9:15.
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section says "jointly" and not together and so tenants 
in common are capable of being together absolutely 
entitled."
2
Both cases were considered in Booth v. Ellard, a case which 
concerned a shareholders' voting agreement. The taxpayer and 
11 other shareholders transferred their shares to trustees. The 
trustees were instructed to hold the shares in trust for the benefit 
of the 12 transferors. The trust was terminable at the instance of 
the majority. The income was to be distributed to the transferors 
in proportion to the number of shares which each individual transferred, 
There were special arrangements as to rights issues and voting rights.
The Crown argued that the transfer was a disposal of the shares on 
which a chargeable gain accrued to the taxpayer by virtue of s. 19(3).
Against this the taxpayer urged that he and the other transferors 
were jointly absolutely entitled to the shares as against the 
trustees. By virtue of s. 46(1), the property vested in the 
trustees was, for capital gains tax purposes, to be considered as 
being vested in the transferors: there was not, therefore, a disposal 
to which s. 19(3) could have applied.
The court held that, although the transferors' interests were in an 
undivided pool of shares, they were jointly absolutely entitled to 
the shares as against the trustees. The interests of the beneficial 
owners were concurrent and not successive and they were qualitatively 
the same; hence, the Crown's contention was dismissed.
It should be noted that, although s. 46(1) is expressed to apply to 
a person who would be absolutely entitled as against the trustee 
but for his being an infant or by reason of some other disability, 
the section applies only where the infancy or disability is the only 
bar preventing absolute entitlement as against the trustee. Thus, 
the section will not operate to treat as vested an interest which
1. "Absolutely entitled as against the trustee": / 1980_/ B.T.R. 
341, at_p. 344.
2. 1980_/ S.T.C. 555. (Court of Appeal).
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is contingent upon the beneficiary attaining his majority,^
In the majority of cases it will be obvious whether a trust
comprises settled property or property to which s. 46 applies.
Moreover, the draftsman of a settlement of capital created for
the purpose of exploiting the income tax advantages of accumulation
must ensure that no person is absolutely entitled to the trust
property as against the trustee. By reason of the operation of the
2
rule in Hamilton-RusseH*s Executors v. I.R.C. the existence of such 
a person would nullify the beneficial fiscal effects of the 
accumulation.
Although the Act provides a definition of "settled property" for 
the purposes of trusts resident and domiciled in the United Kingdom,
the terms "settlement" and "Settlor" are undefined. However, if the
settlor is domiciled and resident or ordinarily resident in the United 
Kingdom but the trustees of the settlement are not resident or 
ordinarily resident in the United Kingdom, then the terms "settlement"
3
and "settlor" have the meaning ascribed to them in s. 454(3),I.T.C.A. 
The trustees of a settlement
The trustees of a settlement are treated as a single and continuous
body of persons, distinct from the persons who may from time to time 
be trustees.^ The quasi-corporate nature of the body of trustees 
ensures that there are no capital gains tax consequences on the 
death or retirement of a trustee.
There is a presumption that the body of trustees is resident and
5
ordinarily resident in the United Kingdom. The presumption may 
be rebutted if it is shown that the general administration of the 
trust is carried on outwith the United Kingdom by trustees, the 
majority of whom are not resident or ordinarily resident in the 
United Kingdom. It is suggested in Whiteman and Wheatcroft that
1. Tomlinson v. Glyns Executor and Trustee Co., (1969) 45 T.C. 600
2. (1943) 25 T.C. 200.
3. S. 17(7).
4. S 52(1)
5. S. 52(1).
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the general administration of the trust will be carried on outwith 
the United Kingdom 'if the trustee meetings are held, trustee 
resolutions discussed and passed, and trustee correspondence written 
outside the United Kingdom.'^
THE CHARGEABLE GAIN ACCRUING TO THE SETTLOR ON THE CREATION 
OF A SETTLEMENT
In accordance with s. 53, the creation of a settlement constitutes 
a disposal of the entire property thereby becoming settled property. 
This rule applies to revocable and irrevocable settlements alike, 
and it is matterless that the settlor retains some interest under 
the settlement or that he is a trustee thereof.
S. 53 relates to a 'gift in settlement'; however, it is proposed in
the Finance Bill 1981 that from lOth March, 1981 the section shall
2
apply to a 'transfer into settlement'. The purpose of the amendment 
is to ensure that there is a complete disposal of assets on their 
becoming comprised in a settlement whether the settlement is made 
voluntarily or for full consideration in money or money’s worth.
In Berry v. Warnett the settlor constituted a settlement of shares 
of which he was the beneficial owner. The trustee, a Guernsey 
company, was directed to pay the income from the trust property 
to the settlor during his life with remainder to a Jersey company.
The Jersey company paid full consideration for its interest in 
remainder.
The Court of Appeal held that as the transfer of shares to the 
trustee was for valuable consideration, there was no gift in 
settlement. The fact that no consideration moved from the disponee 
(the trustee) was of no consequence. The settlor was assessed to 
tax on the basis that he had made a part disposal of the property, 
viz, the legal interest in the shares.
1. 9:27.
2. Clause 82.
3. / 1980 / S.T.C. 631.
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Thus it was possible to avoid the operation of s. 53 by the 
relatively simple expedient of substituting a sale in place of 
a gift in settlement. Clause 82, Finance Bill is designed to 
effectively prevent this abuse.
In the case of a voluntary settlement, under s. 19(3)(a) the 
disposal by the settlor and acquisition by the trustee is deemed 
to be for a consideration equal to the market value of the property 
(the disposal being effected by bargain made otherwise than at 
arms length). However, the Finance Bill proposes the repeal of 
s, 19(3). Clause 86 expressly applies to transfers into settlement 
and provides that, subject to certain exceptions, the disposal
and acquisition of the assets if made otherwise than by way of
bargain at arms length shall be deemed to be for a consideration 
equal to the market value of the assets transferred.
The Bill further proposes that from 5th April, 1981, the roll-over 
general relief for gifts shall be available as between settlors 
and trustees. S. 79, Finance Act 1980 provides the relief but in
its unamended form applies to gifts as between individuals only:
it cannot, therefore, apply to a gift as between a settlor and 
trustees, the trustees not being 'individuals'.
DISPOSALS BY THE TRUSTEE DURING THE COURSE OF ADMINISTRATION 
OF THE TRUST
Subject to certain exceptions, a body of trustees is treated for 
capital gains tax purposes as a person who is chargeable to tax in 
the usual way in respect of chargeable gains accruing on the disposal 
of assets. It was mentioned earlier that disposals by a body of
3
trustees may be actual or deemed; however, the nature of the disposal 
does not affect the means of calculating any chargeable gain or 
allowable loss.
1. See McCutcheon: "Turtle Soup and Sales into Settlements":
/ 1978_/ B.T.R. 381.
2. See Clause 74, Finance Bill 1981.
3. Supra, at p. 154.
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Trustees are entitled to an exemption from tax in respect of the 
first £1,500 of their chargeable gains but are not entitled to 
the roll-over general relief for gifts under s. 79, Finance Act 
1980 which is available to individuals who deal otherwise than 
at arms length.
On two occasions the trustees may be deemed to have disposed of 
the settled property. There is a deemed disposal on the termination 
of a life interest in possession in the settled property, and on 
the occasion that a person becomes absolutely entitled to any 
settled property as against the trustee.
a) S. 55 - the deemed disposal on the termination of a life interest 
in possession in settled property
S. 55 applies on the termination of a life interest in possession.
A life interest in possession includes an interest pur autre vie
but does not include a right which is contingent upon the exercise
2
of a discretion in any person. An annuitant under a settlement 
has a life interest for the purposes of the section only if settled 
property has been appropriated by the trustees as a fund out of 
which the annuity is payable and there is no right of recourse to 
the settled property itself or to any income arising from settled 
property which has not been appropriated. The settled property 
appropriated for the payment of the annuity is treated as property
3
under a separate settlement.
It is perhaps regrettable that the phrase 'life interest in possession' 
is not further defined. The interpretation of the phrase 'interest 
in possession' has caused some considerable difficulty in relation 
to capital transfer tax. For the present purpose it will suffice to 
say that an interest in possession in settled property is a present 
right of present enjoyment of the property, unlike an interest which
1. Schedule 1 para 6.
2. S. 55(4).
3. S. 55(5).
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1
is in remainder, in reversion or in expectancy. A more elaborate
analysis of the phrase is provided in the discussion of the capital
2
transfer taxation of settlements.
In the case of a life interest in, or in the income arising from,
part of the settled property, that part is treated as the property
3
of a separate settlement.
In Pexton v. Bell^ it was held that an interest in an undivided 
share is an interest in part of the settled property. The trustees 
held a single fund for four beneficiaries; the fund was neither divided 
into shares nor appropriated to the various beneficiaries. One of 
the beneficiaries died thereby causing a deemed disposal by the 
trustees under s. 55(1),
The Crown argued that the trustees were deemed to dispose of the 
entire settled property; the fund was undivided and, therefore, 
the deceased beneficiary had during his life an interest in each 
and every part of the settled fund.
Sir John Pennycuick explained the difficulty surrounding the nature 
of an undivided share:
"The difficulty, I suppose, arises from the curious nature 
of an undivided share. Where property is held in undivided 
shares, each tenant in common has an interest in the whole 
of the property concerned but his interest is confined to 
a proportionate share of that property. He has an interest 
in every asset of the fund, but his co-tenants have equally 
a concurrent interest in every asset of the fund, and the 
true result is that each tenant in common is only the 
beneficial owner of a rateable share of the fund. In the 
present context it seems to me altogether more natural to 
look at the true position rather^than at refinements of the law 
of property in this connection."
1. See Whiteman and Wheatcroft, at 9:97,- 9:102.
2. Infra, at p. 199.
3. S. 55(6).
4. (1976) 51 T.C. 457, heard in tandem with Crowe v. Appleby.•
5. Ibid., at p. 482-483.
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The Crown's contention was rejected: the interest of the beneficiary 
was in part of the settled property, as Lawton, L.J. laconically 
demonstrated :
"I have asked myself a_series of questions ... Did / the 
deceased beneficiary_/ have a life interest in possession 
of the settled property? The answer clearly is: she had.
Did she have that interest in all the settled property?
By the standards of anyone other than a conveyancer the 
answer I am sure would be "No". If she had not got an 
interest in all the settled property, what had she got 
an interest in? - and the answer is: a part."
In the event of the termination of a life interest in possession in
all or part of the settled property, there is a deemed disposal by
the trustee and an immediate reacquisition by him of the property which
2
does not cease to be settled property. Thus, there may be an 
adjustment in the base value of the settled property with the 
possibility of a chargeable gain or allowable loss accruing to 
the trustee. However, if the interest terminates by reason of 
the death of the tenant for life, any capital gain accruing to
the trustee as a result of the deemed disposal is not a chargeable
. 3gain.
In the circumstances described in s. 55(2) there is no deemed disposal 
under s. 55(1). S. 55(2) provides:
"Subsection (1) above shall not apply on the occasion of the 
termination of the trusts of the settlement as respects any 
part of the settled property by the exercise of a power for 
that purpose contained in the settlement or of a statutory 
power of advancement or by the surrender of a life interest 
in such a part for the purpose of advancement, if all the 
property as respects which the life interest terminates 
thereby ceases to be settled property under the settlement."
1. Ibid., at p. 488,
2. Ibid., at p. 488.
3. S. 56(2), On the death of an annuitant who has no life interest,
s. 55(1) applies as it does on the death of a tenant for life
— s , 57 .
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The subsection was introduced by the Finance Act 1966 largely 
as a result of the efforts of Sir Hugh Lucas-Tooth. Sir Hugh 
was particularly concerned that an advancement made in the course 
of the administration of a settlement should not be an event 
occasioning a charge to capital gains tax.^
Subsection (2) applies where on the termination of the trusts 
of a settlement by reason of the exercise of a power of advancement 
or the surrender of a life interest, the settled property does 
not cease to be settled property but does cease to be settled 
property under the settlement. Thus it would appear that s. 55(2) 
is intended to prevent a deemed disposal by the trustee on the 
occasion that a life interest in the settled property terminates 
by reason of a surrender or advancement and the property as respects 
which the life interest terminates remains settled property but 
passes into a separate settlement.
It is doubtful if s. 55(2) has given effect to the intention of 
Parliament. The subsection may in the events prescribed prevent 
a deemed disposal under s. 55(1), but the trustee of the separate 
settlement will become absolutely entitled as against the trustee 
of the original settlement thereby causing a deemed disposal under 
s. 54(1).2
A less fundamental criticism of s. 55(2) is that it provides no 
means of ascertaining the base value of the advanced property for 
the purpose of a future disposal thereof by the trustee of the separate 
settlement into which it is transferred.
b ) S. 54 - the deemed disposal on the occasion that a person becomes 
absolutely entitled to any settled property as against the trustee.
The trustee is deemed to dispose of and immediately reacquire any 
settled property on the occasion that a person becomes absolutely
1. Official Report, I3th July, 1966; Vol. 731 c. 1667. See also
The Times (letters to the Editor) Friday 29th October, 1965 -
'Tax on Trust.'
2, This point is taken up below at p. 167.
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1
entitled to that property as against the trustee. The consideration
for the disposal and reacquisition is equal to the market value of
the disposed settled property. The trustee reacquires the property
2
in the capacity of a trustee within s. 46(1).
The deemed disposal marks the exit of the property from the scheme 
of trust taxation. Because the trustee reacquires in the capacity 
of a s. 46(1) trustee, the property is no longer settled property 
within the meaning of s. 51. The base value of the property is 
fixed for a future disposal by the person who becomes absolutely 
entitled as against the trustee.
No chargeable gain accrues to the trustee if the deemed disposal
under s. 54(1) arises by reason of a person becoming absolutely
3
entitled on the death of the tenant for life.
Any allowable loss which accrued to the trustee in respect of the 
settled property and which cannot be deducted from any chargeable 
gain is treated as an allowable loss of the person who becomes 
absolutely entitled to the property as against the trustee. An 
allowable loss in respect of the settled property includes any loss 
carried forward under s. 4(1)(a) to the year of assessment in which 
the person became so entitled.^
A person may become absolutely entitled to property as against the 
trustee by virtue of the operation of the rule in Saunders v. Vautier. 
As Monroe demonstrated, the combined effect of the rule in Saunders v. 
Vautier and s. 54(1) may be curious.^
1. S. 54(1). In clause 83,.Finance Bill 1981 it is proposed
that there should be a deemed disposal under s. 54 on the 
occasion that a person would become absolutely entitled as 
against the trustee but for that persons infancy or other 
disability.
2. S. 54(1).
3. S. 56(1). S. 54(1) applies on the death of an annuitant who has
no life interest as it does on the death of a tenant for life - 
s , 57.
4. s. 54(2).
5. (1841) 49 Eng. Rep 282, supra, at p. 39.
6. "Associated Operation": / 1968 / B.T.R. 57.
5
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If a fund is held in trust for such of the children of X who should
attain the age of twenty-one years, although X may be seventy years
old, her children in whom the fund has not absolutely and
indefeasibly vested are not entitled to invoke the rule in Saunders
V. Vautier for there is always the possibility that another child may
be born: it being an established principle that a woman is never
1
presumed to be beyond the age of child bearing. But what if X 
were to undergo an hysterectomy? She would be physically incapable 
of conceiving another child: logically at the moment the surgeon 
completed the operation and X became irreversibly sterile there 
should be a deemed disposal of the trust fund under s. 54, the children 
becoming absolutely and indefeasibly entitled to the funds by virtue 
of the operation and of the operation of the rule in Saunder v.
Vautier. However, as Monroe observed, the law does not always follow 
logic :
"The law seems to consider that strictly speaking the age of 
miracles is still^with us and ever mindful of the case of 
Abraham and Sagah to proceed on the basis that all things 
are possible."
S. 54 and resettlements
Extreme caution is required if a charge to capital gains tax is to be 
avoided on the advancement of property from one settlement into another, 
McCutcheon explained:
1. In Scotland there is a rebuttable presumption that a woman 
over fifty-three years old is incapable of child bearing.
The presumption will not arise if the rights of parties 
other than the possible issue might be affected: G's
Trustees v. 1939 S.C. 837. In Monro's Trustees v. Monson,
1965 S.C. 84, it was considered so improbable that males of 
eighty-one and seventy-six years could produce off-spring 
that the trustees were entitled to denude in favour of
beneficiaries who were prepared to indemnify them against
the claims of any prospective issue: see generally Walker, at p.2009
2. Genesis__xvii, 17.
3. / 1968 / B.T.R. 57, at p. 58.
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"The most obvious way that the effect of a resettlement is 
important for capital gains tax purposes is that, if there 
is a new settlement, there may be a deemed disposal under 
section 54,Capital Gains Tax Act 1979, the trustees of the 
new settlement having become absolutely entitled against 
the trustees of the original settlement: see Hoare Trustees 
V. Gardner. If, on the other hand, the original settlement 
remains in tact, the trustees of the sub-settlement and the 
trustees of the head settlement will be treated as a single 
and continuing body under section 52 of the Capital Gains Tax 
Act 1979, and consequently there will not be a deemed disposal 
under section 54."
The difficulties which have arisen have been in the main associated 
with the exercise of powers of appointment and advancement. The 
root of the problem lies in determining whether the property advanced 
or appointed remains the property under the original settlement or 
whether it becomes the subject matter of an entirely new and distinct 
settlement.
The traditional approach developed principally in relation to the 
law of perpetuities is that a trust declared by the exercise of a 
special power takes effect from, and must be read back into the 
original settlement. However, a trust declared pursuant to a 
general power takes effect from the moment of its constitution; 
it is a separate entity the trustees of which are distinct from 
the body of trustees of the original settlement. Lord Romer in 
Muir V. Muir propounded the rule thus:
" ... if a person be given a general power of appointment 
over certain property he is virtually the owner of that 
property. If and when he exercises the power the interests 
of his appointees come to them by virtue of and are created 
by the deed of appointment. In the case of a special power 
it is very different. If, for example, property be settled 
on trust for A for life and after his death on trust for such 
of A's children or remoter issue and in such proportions as 
B shall by deed appoint, B has no interest in the property 
whatsoever. He has merely been given the power of saying on 
behalf of the settlor which of the issue of A shall take the 
property under the settlement and in what proportions. It 
is as though the settlor had left a blank in the settlement 
which B fills up for him if and when the power of appointment 
is exercised. The appointees' interests come to thera^under 
the settlement alone and by virtue of that document."
1. "Resettlements: A Muddle": / 1980_/ B.T.R. 174, at p. 179.
2. / 1943 / A. C. 468, at p. 483. See also In Re Pilkington's 
Will Trusts, / 1964 / A. C. 612.
168
The approach adopted in Muir v, Muir has not been strictly 
implemented by the courts in relation to capital gains tax cases. 
In Hart v. Briscoe Brightman, J. noted:
"In my judgement, the question whether a disposition which 
exercises a fiduciary power is to be viewed as a separate 
settlement, or as part of a single fiduciary arrangement 
headed by the disposition which created the power, must be 
answered in the context of the circumstances of the 
particular case."
Brightman, J. considered it possible that a new settlement could 
be created on the exercise of a special power. He suggested that 
if the exercise of such a power did nothing more than to vary the 
age of vesting or alter the shares of contingent beneficiaries, 
then no new settlement would have been created; but he continued:
"If, however, a special power of appointment, drawn in an 
appropriately wide form, is so exercised that the appointed 
assets become vested in distinct trustees, and all the trusts, 
powers and provisions of the original settlement are irrevocably 
gone, completely new trusts, powers and provisions being 
created to take their place, so that no one will ever again 
need to refer to the original settlement except to confirm 
that it has ceased to exist, the trustees of the original 
settlement being functus officio and having nothing whatever 
to do, I would find it difficult to believe that the original 
settlement continues in being, whether one uses the word 
"settlement" in the sense of.g trust instrument or in the 
sense of a series of trusts."
The problem was recently considered by the House of Lords in Roome v. 
Edwards, where Lord Wilberforce noted:
"There are a number of obvious indicia which may help to show 
whether a settlement, or a settlement separate from another 
settlement, exists. One might expect to find separate and 
defined property; separate trusts; and separate trustees. One 
might also expect to find a separate disposition bringing the 
separate settlement into existence. These indicia may be
1. (1977) 52 T.C. 53, at p. 73.
2. At p. 73.
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helpful, but they are not decisive. For example, a single 
disposition, e.g. a will with a single set of trustees, may 
create what are clearly separate settlements, relating to 
different properties, in favour of different beneficiaries, 
and conversely separate trusts may arise in what is clearly 
a single settlement, e.g. when the settled property is 
divided into shares. There are so many possible combinations 
of fact that even where these indicia or some of them are 
present, the answer may be doubtful, and may depend on an 
appreciation of them as a whole.
"Since 'settlement' and 'trust' are legal terms, which are 
also used by business men or laymen in a business or 
practical sense, I think that the question whether a 
particular set of facts amounts to a settlement should be 
approached by asking what a person, with knowledge of the 
legal context of the word under established doctrine and 
applying this knowledge in a practical and commonsense  ^
manner to the facts under examination, would conclude."
The deliberation of the House of Lords on the matter is far from
satisfactory. To determine whether or not a separate settlement
has been created it would appear to be no longer necessary to
consider the traditional approach as expounded in Muir v. Muir;
2
the issue must be determined as a question of fact.
The real dilemma will be faced by trustees who wish to advance sums 
on trust but who do not wish to expose themselves to the risk of a 
charge to capital gains tax under s. 54(1). According to Walker;
"To have the best chance of avoiding a charge ... an advance 
by way of resettlement should, it seems,
(i) be expressed as an application of capital by appropriation 
on new trusts, rather than involving a transfer to a separate 
ad hoc settlement;
(ii) define the trustees (in relation to the new trusts) as
the trustees or trustee for the time being of the head settlement;
(iii) avoid conferring new investment powers and other 
administrative powers, and instead expressly incorporate those 
of the head settlement (so far as consistent with the beneficial 
trusts); and
(iv) if acceptable for income tax and capital transfer tax, 
deliberately fail to exhaust the beneficial interest completely; 
so as to make it necessary to refer back to the head settlement
1. /”1981_7 s .T.C. 96, at p. 100.
2. See generally Pettit, "An Alarm Bell'Sounds for Trustees": (1981) 
131 N.L.J. 352.
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1
to discover the effective ultimate trust."
A charge to capital gains tax will arise by reason of a resettlement
only if the new trustees become absolutely entitled to the settled
property as against the original trustees. It is in this context
2
that the distinction noted earlier between the concepts of ’beneficial 
entitlement' and 'absolute entitlement as against the trustee' is 
of significance.
3
In Hoare Trustees v. Gardner, the trustees, pursuant to a power 
contained in the main settlement, declared that they would hold 
certain assets on trusts other than those of the main settlement.
The trusts declared exhausted the entire beneficial interest in the 
assets: there was no possibility that the assets could result back to 
be held according to the terms of the main settlement. Brightman, J. 
held that on the exercise of the power there was created a new 
settlement the trustees of which were absolutely entitled to the assets 
as against the trustees of the main settlement. There was, therefore, 
a deemed disposal under s. 54(1):
"Section 46(1)_/ shows beyond doubt that ... 'absolutely 
entitled' is not identically the same as 'beneficially 
entitled', for the subsection is drawn on the footing that an 
infant who is an absolute beneficial owner of property held 
in trust does not, apart from specific provision in the subsection, 
qualify as a person absolutely entitled as against the trustee. 
Furthermore, if "absolutely entitled" is confined to absolutely 
entitled in a beneficial sense, then the words "as against 
the trustee" are meaningless because they add nothing. An 
absolute beneficial owner of property held in trust is absolutely 
entitled as against the whole world, not merely as against his 
trustee: he cannot have absolute beneficial ownership as against 
some persons and not others."
1. "Capital Gains Tax on Advances": / 1978_/ B.T.R. 118, at 
p. 121-122. Walker's opinion is apparently unaffected by 
the House of Lords decision in Roome v. Edwards.
2. Supra, at p. 155.
3. (1977) 52 T.C. 53.
4. Ibid., at p. 76.
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The decision of Brightman, J. in the Hoare Trustee case has attracted 
considerable criticism. Walker noted:
"It may be urged that the judge attached too much weight to 
the words "absolutely entitled as against the trustee"
(words which were, he said, meaningless if only absolute 
beneficial entitlement was intended): perhaps these words 
can be adequately explained either (i) as an attempt to 
convey the meaning of "indefeasibly" in non-technical 
language;_or (ii^ as emphasising the contrast made in 
section / 54(1)_/ between the termination of the fiduciary 
owner's capacity as an ordinary trustee and the commencement _ 
of his capacity as a nominee (or bare trustee) with [_ s.46(l)_/ 
It may also be urged that the judge attached too little 
importance to the natural meaning of "absolutely ... ^
2
Support for Walker's argument is found in Whiteman and Wheatcroft, 
though, unfortunately, this support is based partly on a now 
overruled aspect of the Court of Appeal's decision in Roome v. 
Edwards. Furthermore, in the House of Lords decision in Roome v. 
Edwards Lord Wilberforce endorsed in principle the decision in 
Hoare Trustees v. Gardner. He suggested that on the creation of 
a separate settlement of part of the settled property it would 
seem inescapable that 'there would be a deemed disposal under 
/ s. 54(1) of that part in favour of the trustees of that part 
(even though they might be the same persons as the trustees of the 
original settlement, their personality being irrelevant, under 
/“ s. 52(1) 7.'3
In the criticism of the Hoare Trustees case in Whiteman and Wheatcroft 
attention is focused on s. 55(2).^ It was demonstrated above that 
the intention of Parliament on introducing s. 55(2) was to prevent 
a charge to capital gains tax on the advancement of settled into a
5
separate settlement. The subsection serves no purpose whatever if 
there is a charge under s. 54(1) by reason of the new trustees becoming 
absolutely entitled to the advanced property as against the original 
trustees. In view of the dicta of Lord Wilberforce in Roome v. Edwards, 
it has become increasingly difficult to question the validity of the
1. "Capital Gains Tax on Advances" 1978 B.T.R, 118, at p. 119.
2 . 9274-75^^
3. / 1981_/ S.T.C. 96, at p. lOl.
4. 9:75 (footnote 64).
5. Supra, at p. 165.
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decision in the Hoare Trustees case: thus, it would appear that 
s. 56(2) is now redundant. S. 55(2) is effective only if the 
Hoare Trustees case is considered to be wrongly decided.
THE DISPOSAL OF AN INTEREST IN SETTLED PROPERTY
Consonant with the theory that the liability to tax tends to follow 
the legal ownership of the trust fund, s. 58(1) provides that no 
chargeable gain accrues to a beneficiary on the disposal of an 
interest created or arising under a settlement.^
An interest which is acquired for consideration in money or money's
worth (other than consideration consisting of another interest under
the settlement) or is derived from a person who so acquired the
interest, is treated as an asset on the disposal of which a chargeable 
2
gain may accrue. On the occasion that a person who holds such an 
interest becomes absolutely entitled to the property as against the 
trustee, that person is treated as having disposed of his interest in 
consideration of his obtaining the property. However, this does not 
affect the operation of s. 54(1) in respect of the deemed disposal 
by the trustee.
Clause 84 of the Finance Bill 1981 proposes certain amendments in 
respect of disposals of interests in non-resident settlements. The 
clause is directed at a particular form of tax avoidance involving 
a combination of the exemption under s . 58 and the immunity to 
capital gains tax of non-residents.
1. In this respect it is necessary to distinguish the interests
under a settlement from the settled property itself. In 
Harthan v. Mason, /_ 1980_/ S.T.C. 94, tenants in common held 
land for themselves on statutory trusts. The land was sold
and the tenants in common claimed that the gain thereby accruing 
to them was not chargeable to tax; they argued that they had disposed 
of their interests under the statutory trust and the gain, therefore, 
was exempt under s. 58(1). Fox, J. held that the gain accrued by 
reason of a disposal of the land and not of the beneficial interests 
therein; he held that the beneficial interests both before and 
after the disposal were in the proceeds of sale (at p. 97).
2. S 58(1).
3. S. 58(2).
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s. 2(1) provides that a person is chargeable to capital gains tax 
in respect of chargeable gains accruing to him in a year of 
assessment during any part of which he is resident or ordinarily 
resident in the United Kingdom. Thus a trustee who is resident 
outwith the United Kingdom cannot be assessed to tax in respect of 
capital gains accruing to him. However, under s. 17 the gain may 
be attributed to a United Kingdom resident beneficiary.
S. 17 applies to any settlement created by a settlor who is 
domiciled and resident or ordinarily resident in the United Kingdom, 
the administration of which is carried on by trustees who are not 
resident or ordinarily resident in the United Kingdom. Should the 
trustees realize a gain which would have been chargeable had they 
been domiciled and resident or ordinarily resident in the United 
Kingdom, then the gain may be apportioned to any United Kingdom 
domiciled and resident beneficiary; the beneficiary will be assessed to 
tax accordingly. The apportionment must be made in a manner which 
is just and reasonable, having regard to the extent of the beneficiary’s 
interest.^
Thus, non-resident trustees and non-resident beneficiaries are 
immune to capital gains tax.
3
It was demonstrated in Berry v. Warnett that these immunities 
coupled with the exemption under s. 58(1) could be manipulated to 
the advantage of the taxpayer. It will be recalled that in Berry 
V. Warnett the taxpayer constituted a settlement for full consideration. 
He transferred shares to a non-resident trustee and, having reserved 
for himself a life interest, sold the remainder to a non-resident 
company so effecting a part disposal.^ The scheme was completed when
1. Resident trustees of a settlement may be assessed to tax in 
respect of gains accruing to non-resident trustees of the_ _ 
same settlement - s. 52 as applied in Roome v. Edwards, / 1981 /
S.T.C. 96.
2. Clauses 76-79, Finance Bill 1981 propose substantial amendments
to the means of attributing the gains of non-resident trustees
to resident beneficiaries.
3. / 1980_/ S.T.C. 631.
4. Supra, at p. 160.
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the taxpayer assigned his life interest to another non-resident 
company thereby realizing a gain which, in accordance with s. 58(1), 
was not chargeable. The taxpayer successfully disposed of his entire 
interest in the shares and in doing so attracted a charge to tax on 
the basis that he had made a part disposal only.
In Chinn v. C o l l i n United Kingdom resident trustees held shares 
in L Ltd. on discretionary trust. In order to avoid a charge to 
capital gains tax on the occasion that A, a discretionary object, 
became absolutely entitled to the shares in L Ltd., the following 
steps were taken: (1) the administration of the trust was transferred 
to non-resident trustees; (2) on 28th October, 1969, the trustees 
declared that they held 184,500 of the shares for A absolutely 
contingently upon his surviving three days; (3) also on 28th October, 
1969, A sold his contingent interest to a non-resident company, R Ltd., 
for £352,704; and (4) on the same day A agreed to purchase from R Ltd. 
184,500 shares in L Ltd. for £355,162, the sale to be completed on 
1st November, 1969.
The theory was that by selling his contingent interest, by virtue of 
s. 58(1) the gain thereby realized would not be chargeable. R. Ltd. 
would become the beneficiary under the settlement and on the 1st 
November, 1969, would become absolutely entitled to the shares as 
against the trustee. There would be no charge on that occasion as 
both the trustee and beneficiary would be resident outwith the United 
Kingdom. A would then receive the shares from R Ltd. pursuant to 
the sale agreement.
The scheme failed. Although it was not stipulated in the contract
that A should receive the same shares to which R Ltd. would become
absolutely entitled on 1st November, 1969, this much could be implied.
As Lord Wilberforce indicated, 'If an agreement can only be carried out
in one way it is superfluous to mention that one way specifically in
2
the agreement: the parties are presumed to intend it.' According to 
Lord Wilberforce:
1. / 1981_/ S.T.C. 1.
2. Ibid., at p. 7.
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"As soon as there was an agreement for their sale accompanied 
or followed by payment of the price, the equitable title 
passed at once to the purchaser, viz / A__/, and all that 
was needed to perfect his title was notice to the trustees 
... which / they_/ had at all material times. Consequently 
the trustees were bound to transfer the shares to /_ A_/ 
immediately the interests vested on 1st. November, 1969, 
and l_ A_/ wag the beneficiary, under the settlement as regards 
the shares."
The Crown also urged that the whole arrangement was a "settlement"
within the meaning of s. 17(7), under which A was a beneficiary.
The arrangement involved an element of bounty in that the trustee
2
exercised its power of appointment gratuitously and in doing so 
conferred completely part of the bounty which had been incompletely
provided by the settlor on constituting the discretionary trust in 
3
the first place. On this ground alone it would have been possible 
to attribute a chargeable gain to A under s. 17(2).
There can be little doubt that had A merely assigned his interest 
to R. Ltd, without entering into the share sale agreement, A would 
have secured a sum approximately equal to the value of the shares 
and would have avoided a charge to tax.^
Clause 84, Finance Bill proposes that, from lOth March, 1981, s. 58(1) 
shall not apply to the disposal of an interest in settled property 
if at the time of the disposal the trustees are neither resident 
nor ordinarily resident in the United Kingdom. The clause further 
provides that if at any time after a beneficiary disposes of his 
interest the trustees cease to be resident or ordinarily resident 
in the United Kingdom, a chargeable gain shall be deemed to accrue 
to the trustees immediately before the administration of the settle­
ment is transferred to non-residents. The amount of the gain deemed to 
accrue to the trustees is to be equal to the gain accruing to the 
beneficiary on the disposal of his interest.
1. Ibid., at p. 7.
2. Per Lord Roskill at p. 200.
3. Per Lord Wilberforce at p. 196.
4. The immunity to capital gains tax of non-residents and the exemption
under s. 58 also formed the basis of the unsuccessful scheme in 
Eilbeck v. Rawlings, / 198l_/S.T.C.174,The schemes were reviewed by 
Foreman, "Capital Gains Tax and Settled Property": (1981) 106 
Taxation 666, at p. 669-671.
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Assuming that the proposal in clause 84 is incorporated in the Finance 
Act 1981, the avoidance mechanism at the heart of the schemes in 
Berry v. Warnett and Chinn v. Collins will be effectively destroyed.
CONCLUSION
The person who may be liable to capital gains tax in respect of
settled property will usually be the trustee as legal owner of the
1
fund; it is immaterial to whom the income of the trust is paid.
Unless the settled property is at all times composed of cash, the 
imposition of capital gains tax certainly renders less attractive the 
income tax advantages associated with a settlement of capital.
The disposal on the creation of the settlement and, in particular, the 
deemed disposals by the trustees diminish to a considerable extent 
the real fiscal benefits of an income tax effective settlement.
Perhaps one of the greatest attributes of the trust as a means of 
saving tax namely, its flexibility, has been limited in consequence of 
the uncertainty surrounding advancements, appointments and resettle­
ments in general. This does not affect the income tax saving efficiency 
of the trust, though as a result the trust becomes a less desirable option 
available to the tax planner.
1. Tiley, 24:01. It may be of importance to ascertain to whom the 
income is paid for the purpose of determining whether a life 
interest 'in possession' exists in the settled property.
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CAPITAL TRANSFER TAX ^
Introduction
It was the intention of Parliament on devising the scheme of 
taxation of capital transfers that there should be no discrimination 
as between settled property and property held absolutely. The White 
Paper on capital transfer tax provided;
"The broad principle to be applied to settled property is 
that in general the charge to tax should be neither greater 
nor smaller than the charge on property held absolutely."
The objective of Parliament has been met by the Finance Act 1975 and 
its various amendments with a limited degree of success. The Inland 
Revenue have commented that the principle recited in the White Paper 
is easier to state than to carry out in practice and demonstrate 
generally that the implementation of the principle has been far from
3
satisfactory.
It is noted in Hayton and Tiley that a separate capital transfer
tax charging code for settlements is necessary to restrict the
scope for postponing and minimising a charge to capital transfer tax by
means of a settlement.^ The code is substantially embodied in
5
Schedule 5 to the Finance Act 197 5: the Schedule is in the nature
of anti-avoidance legislation and this to a certain extent explains 
why the actual implementation of the principle recited in the White 
Paper has in practice tended to discriminate against settled property,^
1. Unless otherwise stated, references are to the Finance Act 1975, 
and references to paragraphs are to the paragraphs of Schedule 5 
to the Finance Act 1975.
2. Cmnd. 5705, para, 17.
3. "Capital Transfer Tax and Settled Property (a consultative
document)", para 2.3.1.
4. P. 76.
5. Schedule 5 is given effect by s. 21.
6. An abundance of evidence of this discrimination is provided
in the Inland Revenue's consultative document.
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Schedule 5 provides the actual mechanism for the charging of 
settlements to capital transfer tax. The raachanisra consists 
of two essentially independent components, one dealing with 
settled property in which there subsists an interest in possession, 
the other relating to settled property in which no interest in 
possession subsists. Before detailing the scheme of settlement 
taxation it will be useful first to consider the meaning of the 
terms "settlement", "settlor", "trustee" and "excluded property" 
for the purposes of Sch. 5.
A settlement for the purposes of capital transfer tax is any 
disposition of property, the property being:
"(a) held in trust for persons in succession or for any 
person subject to a contingency; or
(b) held by trustees on trust to accumulate the whole or 
part of any income of the property or with power to make 
payments out of that income at the discretion of the trustees 
or some other person, with or without power to accumulate 
surplus income ; or
(c) charged or burdened (otherwise than for full consideration 
in money or money's worth paid for his own use or benefit to 
the person making the disposition), with the payment of any 
annuity or other periodical payment payable for a life or any 
other limited or terminable period;
or would be so held or charged or burdened if the disposition 
or dispositions were regulated by the law of any part of the 
United Kingdom; ... "
In Scotland, "settlement" also includes an entail; any deed charging
an annuity on, or on the rents of, any property; and any deed creating or
2
reserving a proper liferent of any property.
The word "settlor" is defined is similar terms as it is in Part XVI,
I.C.T.A. Thus "settlor" includes 'any person by whom the settlement 
was made directly or indirectly', or 'who has provided funds directly
1. Para.1 (2). "Settlement" also includes a lease for lives 
para. 1(3).
2. Para. 1(4).
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or indirectly for the purpose of or in connection with the settle­
ment or has made with any other person a reciprocal arrangement
1
for that other person to make the settlement.'
The judicial decisions discussed earlier in respect of the term 
"Settlor" as used in Part XVI, I.C.T.A. are to a certain extent 
relevant here, though their value is dubious for the reason that 
the word "settlement" in Part XVI is assigned a wider meaning than 
it is in Sch. 5.^
"Trustee" is not defined for the purposes of Sch. 5. However, in 
the case of a settlement in relation to which there is no trustee, 
under para. 1(7) the person in whom the settled property or its 
management is vested is treated as the trustee.
"Excluded property" for the purposes of Sch. 5 is any property 
outside the United Kingdom which is comprised in a settlement unless 
the settlor was domiciled in the United Kingdom when the settlement 
was made.^ A reversionary interest^ in such property is excluded 
property only if the person who is beneficially entitled to the 
reversionary interest is an individual domiciled outside of the
5
United Kingdom.
1. Para. 1(6).
2. Dymond, at p. 552.
3. Para.2(1).
4. "Reversionary interest" means a future interest under a settle­
ment, whether it is vested or contingent (including an interest
expectant on the termination of an interest in possession which
by virtue of Paragraph 3 of Schedule 5 ... is treated as subsisting 
in part of any property) and in relation to Scotland includes an 
interest in the fee of property subject to a proper liferent."
- s. 51(1) .
5. Para. 2(1)(a) and (b).
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A reversionary interest in settled property situated in the United 
Kingdom is excluded property unless (a) it was acquired for a 
consideration in money or money's worth, or was derived from one 
who so acquired it; (b) it is one to which the settlor or his 
spouse is entitled; or (c) it is the interest expectant on the 
determination of a lease treated as a settlement by virtue of 
para. 1(3) of Sch. 5.^
THE CHARGE TO CAPITAL TRANSFER TAX ON THE CREATION OF A SETTLEMENT
The scheme of taxation provided by Sch. 5 operates in respect of 
settlements; however, the creation of a settlement is governed by 
the ordinary capital transfer tax rules. Thus the settlor is charged 
to tax on any diminution in the value of his estate caused by his 
constituting the settlement. The property transferred into the 
settlement enters into the settled property regime of Sch. 5, Its 
treatment from thenceforth depends upon whether or not there subsists 
an interest in possession under the settlement.
It will be convenient first to consider the two schemes of 
taxation of settled property before discussing the nature of an 
interest in possession.
SETTLED PROPERTY IN WHICH THERE SUBSISTS AN INTEREST IN POSSESSION
Trusts comprising settled property in which there subsists an interest
in possession are described in the report of the Meade Committee as
'transparent'; tax is charged 'by reference to the personal circumstances
2
of the beneficiary as if the trust did not exist.' Para. 3(1) forms 
the basis of this submission and provides that 'A person beneficially 
entitled to an interest in possession in settled property shall be 
treated as beneficially entitled to the property in which his interest 
subsists.'
1. S. 24(3).
2. "The Structure and Reform of Direct Taxation", at p. 401.
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Provision is made for the circumstance where the beneficiary is
entitled to part only of the income arising from the settled
property^ or where his entitlement is to a specified amount of 
2
that income. In general the effect of these provisions is to
treat the beneficiary as being beneficially entitled to such a
part of the settled property that will generate sufficient income
to satisfy his entitlement according to the terms of the trust.
An apportionment is also made where the beneficiary is not entitled
to the income from the settled property but is entitled to the use
and enjoyment of the property either jointly or in common with 
3
other persons.
It is apparent that by the fiction of para 3(1) the value of the 
beneficiary's estate is made artificially high; the actual value 
of his interest will in most circumstances be considerably less 
than the value of the property in which his interest subsists.^ 
However, consistently with the fiction, there can be no charge to 
tax on the occasion that the beneficiary's interest is enlarged to 
an absolute entitlement to the property itself. Further, it is 
doubted if the granting of an interest-free loan of capital to the 
beneficiary can constitute a chargeable event, unless it can be 
considered as a transaction reducing the value of the settled
5
property which is an event chargeable under para. 4(9) of Sch. 5 .
1. Para. 3(2)
2. Para. 3(3).
3. Para. 3(5).
4. Consultative document, para. 3.2.5.
5. Foster, C2.04(c). para. 4(9) provides that where, as a
consequence of a transaction made between the trustee and, 
inter alia, the beneficiary under the trust, the value of the 
settled property is diminished, a corresponding part of the 
beneficiary's interest is treated as coming to an end; an 
event which is chargeable under para. 4(2) as described 
below. However, as McCutcheon indicated a loan which is 
repayable on demand_will not depreciate the value of the 
trust fund: / 1979 / B.T.R. 246, at p. 246.
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On the death of the beneficiary the settled property is treated 
under s. 22(1) as if it were a part of the beneficiary’s free 
estate, although the trustees will usually be liable for the tax in 
respect of it.
Sch. 5 provides an elaborate scheme to deal with the event of the 
termination of the beneficiary's interest during his life. Para 4(2) 
provides :
"Where at any time during the life of a person beneficially 
entitled to an interest in possession in any property 
comprised in a settlement his interest comes to an end, 
tax shall be charged, subject to the following provisions 
of this paragraph, as if at that time he had made a transfer 
of value and the value transferred had been equal to the value 
of the property in which his interest subsisted."
It is immediately noticeable that para 4(2) represents a departure 
from the 'consequential loss formula' of s. 20 which is applicable 
to life time transfers of property held absolutely. As a corollary, 
there is no requirement to gross up the value of the settled property 
in order to calculate the amount on which tax is chargeable.
The trustees will usually be responsible for the tax chargeable in 
the event of the termination of the beneficiary's interest; however, 
the 'transfer' will adversely affect the beneficiary's cumulative total 
This fact must be borne in mind by trustees on making advances to 
persons other than the beneficiary entitled to the interest in 
possession. It would appear that such an advancement will constitute 
the coming to an end of the beneficiary's interest in the property 
advanced. This inevitably will increase the beneficiary's cumulative 
total.^
1. An advancement made by virtue of the statutory power contained 
in 8 32, Trustee Act 1925 will invariably require the written 
consent of the beneficiary who is entitled to the interest in 
possession: - s. 32(1)(c).
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Para. 4(1) provides that on the disposal of the beneficiary's
interest, tax is to be charged not as if he had made a transfer
of value, but as if his interest in the property had terminated;
an event chargeable under para 4(2) as described above. It is
suggested in Foster that this 'apparently circular treatment is
to convert an actual transfer of value into a deemed one with
the result that the exemptions for gifts of £2,000 per annum,
£250_/ per donee, normal expenditure out of income and in
consideration of marriage, do not apply.' However, should the
beneficiary dispose of his interest for a consideration in money
or money's worth, the value of the property in which the interest
subsists is treated as having been reduced by an amount equal to
2
the consideration received.
There is an exemption to tax where during the life of the beneficiary 
his interest terminates and the property reverts to the settlor if 
living, or to the settlor's spouse if domiciled in the United Kingdom. 
This exemption is subject to the proviso that neither the settlor 
nor his spouse must have acquired the reversionary interest for a
3
consideration in money or money's worth. The exemption is of 
little practical value to those who hope to avoid payments of income 
tax by means of a settlement of capital; a possible reversion of the 
settled property to the settlor or his spouse might nullify the 
attempt of the settlor to divest himself absolutely of the capital 
for the purpose of s. 457(1)(d), I.C.T.A.
There is a limited relief in the circumstances that the value 
transferred by a chargeable transfer is calculated by reference 
to the value of settled property in which there subsists an interest 
in possession.^ Clause 95, Finance Bill proposes certain amendments 
in this respect. It proposes that the relief should be available 
where there has been a previous chargeable transfer of the settled
1. C2.03, at C134.
2. Para. 4(4).
3. Para 4(5) and (6): see also clause 98, Finance Bill 1981.
4. Para. 5.
184
property (the first transfer) which increased the value of a 
persons estate and which was made either on or after the constitution 
of the settlement.
If the period between the two transfers is less than five years, 
then the amount of tax chargeable on the value transferred by 
the later transfer may be reduced. The reduction is expressed as 
a percentage of the tax paid on the first transfer as is attributable 
to the increase in value of the first beneficiary's estate.
The percentage is 100% if there is a period of less than one year 
between the first and later transfer; 80% if the period is more 
than one year but less than two; 60% if more than two years but 
less than three; 40% if more than three years but less than four; 
and 20% if more than four years but less than five.
Clause 95(4) proposes a limited carry-forward of the relief to 
subsequent transfers. The Clause is intended to take effect from 
loth March 1981.
It should be noted that no tax is chargeable under para. 4 if the
2
settled property is excluded property.
SETTLED PROPERTY IN WHICH NO INTEREST IN POSSESSION SUBSISTS
"The main statutory provisions which charge tax under the 
discretionary trust regime, in particular those in paras 
6 to 11 of Sched 5, may be regarded either as a masterpiece 
of subtle, intricate and esoteric logic, or as a monstrosity 
of repellant and well-nigh unfathomable convolution, according 
to taste; and^probably most readers will prefer the latter 
description."
A settlement in which there subsists no interest in possession 
(usually referred to as a discretionary or accumulation settlement)
1. The relief currently provided by para 5 is available in respect
of a subsequent transfer made not later than four years after
the first transfer. The relief pperates by reducing the value 
of the property which is the subject of the subsequent transfer, 
The amount of relief available decreases as the number of years 
between the transfers increases.
2. Para. 11(4).
3. Dymond, at p. 651.
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is, in essence, treated as an entity for the purposes of capital
transfer tax. This is not strictly true of settlements constituted
after 1974 as the rate at which these settlements are charged to
tax may be determined by reference to the personal rate of tax of
1
the settlor when he made the settlement.
Fundamental to the scheme of taxation are the concepts of 'capital
distribution' and 'distribution payment'. The expression 'capital
distribution' according to Foster 'is used to denote that the
transaction is liable to CTT, rather than to denote a type of
transaction*, whereas 'a distribution payment is something which
2
enters into the settlement's cumulative total.'
Distribution Payment
Para. 11(7) provides that a 'distribution payment' means:
" ...any payment which -
(a) is not income of any person for any of the purposes 
of income tax and would not for any of those purposes be 
income of a person not resident in the United Kingdom if he 
were so resident; and
(b) is not a payment in respect of costs or expenses;
and "payment" includes the transfer of assets other than money."
Thus, a payment of capital by the trustees which is treated as the
income of any person, for instance, by virtue of the rule in Brodie's 
Will Trustees v. I.R.C., or by virtue of s. 438 or s. 451, I.C.T.A., 
will not constitute a distribution payment.
A distribution payment may be actual or deemed. There may be a deemed 
distribution payment under para. 11(8) which is discussed below.^
1. ''The Structure and Reform of Direct Taxation", at p. 402.
2. Foster, 03.01 at Cl62.
3. (1933) 17 T.C. 432.
4. Infra, at p. 189.
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Capital Distribution
There is provided no direct definition of a capital distribution.
In para. 6(1) it is stated that a distribution payment made out 
of settled property in which no interest in possession subsists 
is referred to as a capital distribution; however, it is not 
legitimate to define a capital distribution in terms of a 
distribution payment. A capital distribution may be treated 
as having been made in circumstances where there is neither an 
actual nor deemed distribution payment.
It is in respect of capital distributions alone that tax is charged 
under the regime for discretionary settlements. Para. 6(4) provides:
"Tax shall be charged on any capital distribution as on the 
value transferred by a chargeable transfer where -
(a) the value transferred less the tax payable on it is 
equal to the amount of the capital distribution; and
(b) the rate applicable is that specified in paragraphs 7 to 9 
below; ... "
It is noted in Dymond:
"Paragraph 6(4) is in fact the only true charging provision 
under the discretionary trust regime: all other provisions 
which in substance impose a charge do so by treating a 
capital distribution as being made in specific circumstances, 
and so channel it back into para 6(4)."
A thorough understanding of the interaction of the concepts of 
'capital distribution' and 'distribution payment' can be achieved 
only by considering the consequences of the various chargeable 
events.
1. e.g. the periodic charge under para 12(1), at p. 1 9 4 ,
2. P. 651-652.
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THE CHARGEABLE EVENTS UNDER THE DISCRETIONARY SETTLEMENT REGIME
A) Para. 6(1): distribution payments which are capital distributions 
Para. 6(1) provides :
"Where a distribution payment is made out of property 
comprised in a settlement and at the time the payment 
is made no interest in possession subsists in the property 
or in the part of it out of which the payment is made, 
the payment is in this Schedule referred to as a capital 
distribution."
Tax is charged on the capital distribution as described in para.
6(4)(a) at the rate applicable under paras. 7 to 9. If the 
recipient bears the tax, then by virtue of para. 6(5) tax is 
charged under para. 6(4) as on the value transferred by a chargeable 
transfer where the value transferred is equal to the amount of the 
capital distribution. There is no requirement to gross up the 
capital distribution to determine the value of the chargeable transfer.
A distribution payment to the settlor or his spouse does not constitute
• Si 
2
a capital distribution.^ however, the distribution payment will
affect the settlements cumulative total.
Para 11(5) provides that, for the purposes of calculating the 
settlement's cumulative total, the amount of the distribution 
payment is the amount on which tax is paid: unless the recipient 
bears the tax that amount will be the grossed up amount of the 
capital distribution, Para. 11(5) provides:
"The amount of any distribution payment which is a capital 
distribution shall be taken (except for the purpose of 
paragraph 6(4)(a)) to be the amount on which tax is 
chargeable in respect of it,"
Thus, the amount on which tax is paid is the amount that enters 
into the settlement's cumulative total.
1. Para 6(6).
2. Obviously if the capital is treated as the income of the
settlor under s. 451, I.C.T.A. it will not constitute a
distribution payment - para. 11(7)(a).
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An advancement of property into a separate settlement is not a 
capital distribution under para. 6(1); nor is it a distribution 
payment. This is because para. 11(4) provides that where property 
leaves one settlement and becomes comprised in another, it is 
treated as if it remained in the first. Many of the resettlement 
problems associated with capital gains tax are thereby avoided.
B) Para. 6(2): the occasion on which a person becomes entitled to 
an interest in possession
Para. 6(2) provides:
"Where a person becomes entitled to an interest in possession 
in the whole or any part of the property comprised in a 
settlement at a time when no such interest subsists in the 
property or that part, a capital distribution shall be 
treated as being made out of the property or that part of 
the property; and the amount of the distribution shall be 
taken to be equal to the value at that time of the property or 
if the interest is in part only of that property, of that part."
Under para. 6(4)(a) tax is charged on the amount of the capital 
distribution grossed up at the appropriate rate. However, the 
grossing up principle does not apply where the tax is payable out
2
of the property which is the subject of the capital distribution.
By virtue of para, 11(8), the amount of a notional capital distribution 
under para. 6(2) is to be treated as a distribution payment. This 
will affect the cumulative total of the settlement. Para. 11(8) 
provides :
"The amount of any capital distribution treated as made under 
paragraph 6(2), (2A) or (3) above or paragraph 15(3) or 24(2) 
below shall also be deemed to be a distribution payment; but 
where, after an amount has been taken into account by virtue
1. Supra, at p. 167. However, para. 11(4) does not apply
to settlement in which an interest in possession subsists:
see generally McCutcheon, "Resettlements: A Muddle":
/ 1980_/ B.T.R. 174.
2. Para. 6(5).
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of this sub-paragraph or paragraph 6{6A) above as a 
distribution payment made out of the whole or part of 
any property, one or more distribution payments are 
made (otherwise than under this sub-paragraph or 
paragraph 6(6A) above) out of that property or part, 
the amount so taken into account shall be treated 
as reducing the amount of those payments."
It can only be assumed that para. 11(8) and para. 11(5) operate 
in conjunction. Thus the amount of the distribution payment 
deemed to have been made under para. 11(8) is ascertained by reference 
to para. 11(5).. By virtue of para. 11(5), the amount of a distribution 
payment which is a capital distribution is taken to be the amount on 
which tax is charged. This ensures that the amount on which tax is 
charged is the amount that enters into the settlement's cumulative 
total.^
Para. 6(2) operates on the occasion that a person becomes entitled
to an interest in possession; however, it is not clear which
provision operates to treat as a chargeable event the occasion on
which a person becomes absolutely entitled to property comprised
in a settlement. The situation envisaged is the transfer of
property to a beneficiary absolutely, but where before the absolute
vesting of the property the beneficiary was entitled to a mere
contingent interest which could not have constituted an interest in
possession. An example of this would be the capital gains tax scheme
2
in Chinn v. Collins. It will be recalled that the scheme in Chinn 
V. Collins consisted of the appointment of property absolutely to 
a beneficiary contingent upon his surviving a specified time; a 
transfer of the trusteeship to non-residents followed by the 
assignation of the beneficiary's contingent interest to a non-resident 
for consideration. On the vesting of the property absolutely in the 
purchaser of the contingent interest there may have been a charge 
to capital transfer tax for which the settlor might have been liable 
under s. 25(3)(d) . Beattie noted:
1. See McCutcheon, at 11-09 to 11-11.
2. / 1981_y S.T.C. 1, supra, at p.. 175.
3. See Ballard: "Chinn v. Collins: Trusts and Tax Avoidance",
CTT News, January, 1981, p. 15, at p. 19.
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"On the termination of a discretionary trust by the vesting of 
the trust assets in a beneficiary taking absolutely, or in a 
purchaser of the beneficiary's interest taking absolutely, 
capital transfer tax would appear to be payable. There is 
some doubt whether it would be payable under subparagraph (2) 
of paragraph 6 of Schedule 5 to the Finance Act 1975, on 
the footing that the beneficiary or the purchaser became 
entitled to an interest in possession in the property 
comprised in a settlement or whether it would be payable 
under subparagraph (1) on the footing that a distribution 
payment was made out of property comprised in a settlement. 
There is a school of thought to the effect that no capital 
transfer tax at all would be payable if the actual payment 
to the beneficiary or the purchaser were to be deferred until 
after actual vesting, on the footing that the property was 
no longer comprised in a settlement when the beneficiary or 
the purchaser became entitled to the absolute interest in 
possession, so that subparagraph (2) of paragraph 6 would not 
apply, and that the distribution payment would not be made 
out of property comprised in a settlement, as the settlement 
would have gome to an end, so that subparagraph (1) would 
not apply."
Beattie favoured a charge under para. 6(1) on the basis that the 
absolute vesting would constitute a 'transfer of assets' which 
would be a distribution payment. His view is supported by dicta 
of Brown-Wilkinson, J. in Von Ernst Et Cie SA v. I.R.C. who stated:
"Counsel for the trustees concedes, I think, that a distribution 
payment out of property held on discretionary trusts to a 
beneficiary for an absolute interest would be an actual capital 
distribution under para. 6(1) which ... would inevitably attract 
tax under para. 6(4). This concession being rightly and, I 
think, inescapably made ..."
However, the Inland Revenue have taken the view that the absolute 
vesting would be brought into charge by para. 6(2)
"The case where a beneficiary becomes entitled to an interest 
in possession in property previously held on discretionary 
trusts includes situations where the beneficiary becomes 
absolutely entitled to the settled property itself."
1. "Foreign Trustees of Discretionary_Trusts, Capital Gains Tax
and Capital Transfer Tax", / 1976_/ B.T.R. 16, at p. 17.
2. /“1980_/ S.T.C. Ill, at 117.
3. The Board of Inland Revenue booklet, CTT 1, para. 91.
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It would appear that the absolute vesting of settled property
will attract a charge to capital transfer tax be it by virtue of para.
6(1) or (2). In this respect it may be argued that the confusion
as to which sub-paragraph is applicable is of mere academic significance
However, it would appear axiomatic to the operation of para, 6(2A) that
the absolute vesting should be treated as a capital distribution under
para. 6(2).
C) Para. 6(2A): the occasion on which a person becomes absolutely
entitled to property comprised in a discretionary settlement
Para. 6(2A) provides:
"Where the whole or any part of the property comprised in a 
settlement ceases to be comprised in that settlement (other­
wise than by virtue of any payment or transfer of assets 
made by the trustees) at a time when no interest in possession 
subsists in the property or that part, then, if -
(a) sub-paragraph (2) does not apply; but
(b) a person at that time becomes entitled to (or immediately
thereafter has) an interest in the property or part which
would be an interest in possession if held beneficially by an 
individual,
a capital distribution shall be treated as being made out of 
the property or that part of the property; and the amount of
the distribution shall be taken to be equal to the value
at that time of the property or that part of it."
The sub-paragraph was introduced by s. 70, Finance Act 1978 and is 
designed to prevent the exploitation of the rule under para. 11(10) 
that certain open companies cannot hold an interest in possession. 
McCutcheon illustrated the avoidance mechanism at which para. 6(2A) 
is aimed;
"Where trustees of a discretionary trust wished to make 
a distribution payment it was possible to exploit this in 
the following way. The trustees would appoint the fund 
absolutely to a beneficiary subject to a contingency and 
the beneficiary would sell his contingent interest to an 
open company. At the end of the contingency period 
the property vested in the company (and therefore ceased to 
be settled property) without - given the fact that for the 
purposes of para. 6(2) the company did not become entitled 
to an interest in possession - any charge to CTT arising. 
Paragraph 6(2A) prevents this by providing that now there 
is a notional capital distribution on the company becoming 
entitled to the property."
1. 9-12.
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A capital distribution treated as having been made under para.
6(2A) is treated in the same manner as a capital distribution 
under para. 6(2). Tax is charged on the distribution by virtue 
of para. 6(4); para. 11(8) and (5) operate to determine the amount 
of the deemed distribution payment that enters into the settle­
ment's cumulative total.
As McCutcheon indicated, there would be no need for para. 6(2A) 
if in the event of a person becoming absolutely entitled to 
property comprised in a discretionary settlement there was a 
distribution payment caught by para. 6(1).
He also noted that para. 6(2A)(b) presupposes that an individual 
who becomes absolutely entitled to settled property becomes 
entitled to an interest in possession therein; para. 6(2A) would 
be meaningless were it otherwise. On the principle that 'legislation 
is presumed to be effective' it must be assumed that on the vesting of 
settled property absolutely in an individual, he becomes entitled 
to an interest in possession' an event chargeable by virtue of para. 
6(2) and not para, 6(1).
In consequence of the introduction of para 6(2A) it is difficult 
to conclude otherwise than that the statement of the Inland Revenue 
as set out above is correct; the case of a beneficiary who becomes 
absolutely entitled to the property of a discretionary trust is to 
be equated with the situation where a beneficiary becomes entitled 
to an interest in possession therein. This causes a notional capital 
distribution under para. 6(2).
D) Para. 6(3): transactions resulting in the diminution in value of 
settled property in which no interest in possession subsists
If the value of settled property in which no interest in possession
subsists is diminished as a result of a transaction between the
trustees and, inter alia, any person for whose benefit the property
may be applied, a capital distribution is treated as having been
made. The amount of the capital distribution is equal to the amount
2
by which the value of the property is diminished.
1. CTT 1, para. 91, supra, at p. 191*
2. Para. 6(3).
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Tax is charged under para. 6(4) as on the value transferred by a 
chargeable transfer where the value transferred is equal to the 
amount of the distribution. The grossing up principle in para.
6(4)(a) does not apply. There is a deemed distribution payment 
under para. 11(8) which, by virtue of para. 11(5), is equal to 
the value of the capital distribution. The amount of the deemed 
distribution payment enters into the settlement's cumulative total.
E) Para. 12: the periodic charge
In the words of McCutcheon, periodic charges 'are essentially penal
charges - the price under the CTT regime of maintaining a
2
discretionary trust.' It would appear that the charge was 
incorporated within the scheme of taxation on the principle that 
'it would not be right to allow property held in discretionary
3
trusts to remain free of tax for up to a century or more.'
A capital distribution is treated as having been made out of settled 
property if at a relevant anniversary no interest in possession 
subsists therein.^ A relevant anniversary in relation to most settle­
ments occurs at the end of the ten years beginning with the date of
making the discretionary settlement and at the end of every
5
subsequent ten years. 
before 1st April, 1982.
rs. However, there can be no relevant anniversary
6
Tax is charged under para. 6(4) on the amount of the capital
7
distribution; the grossing up principle does not apply. The rate 
at which tax is charged is 30% of the rate that would have been 
charged under paras. 6 to 10 on a capital distribution of the same amount 
made at the same time.^ However, the rate chargeable under para. 12
1. Para. 6(5).
2. 12-01.
3. Inland Revenue's consultative document, para. 4.2.5.
4. Para. 12(1).
5. Para. 12(6); see Hayton and Tiley, at p. 182.
6. Para. 12(6). Clause 96, Finance Bill proposes that no periodic
charge should be made before 1st April, 1983.
7. Para. 6(5).
8. Para. 12(1).
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may be reduced if at any time during the ten year period an 
interest in possession subsisted in the settled property. The 
rate chargeable in respect of any settled property is reduced by 
one-tenth for each year throughout which there subsisted an 
interest in possession. Where the settlor adds property to the 
settlement after the first year of the ten year period the rate 
is similarly reduced by one-tenth for each year during which the 
property was not comprised in the settlement.^
A capital distribution treated as having been made under para. 12 
is not a deemed distribution payment under para. 11(8), and there­
fore does not affect the settlement's cumulative total.
In order to prevent a double taxation, para. 13 provides a tax
credit system. Thus, the rate of tax charged under para. 12
on a capital distribution which is deemed to have been made on
the relevant anniversary is taken to reduce the rate of tax that
would be charged on any subsequent capital distribution made up
lii 
3
2to twenty years after the relevant anniversary. The cred t is
not allowed against future periodic charges under para 12.
By virtue of para. 13(2) a tax credit cannot be used twice; it is 
available to reduce the amount of tax charged on a capital distribution, 
but once used, further capital distributions are charged in the 
normal way without any reduction.^
The credit takes effect by reducing the rate of tax chargeable on 
any subsequent capital distribution. It does not therefore affect 
the amount of the deemed distribution payment which enters the 
settlement's cumulative total under para. 11(8) and (5).
1. Para. 12(4).
2. See Foster, C4.03.
3. Para. 13(1) .
4. Dymond, at p. 731.
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In respect of settlements the trustees of which are not resident
in the United Kingdom, a similar periodic charge is made at the
end of each year of the ten year period if no interest in
possession subsists in the settled property at that time.^ The
rate at which tax is charged is 3% of the rate that would have been
charged under paras. 6 to 10 had a capital distribution of the
same amount been made at the same time. A tax credit system
operates similar to that available in the case of settlements
2
the trustees of which are resident in the United Kingdom.
F) Para. 15(3): the occasion on which the conditions of para. 15(1) 
become satisfied
Para. 15 relates to accumulation and maintenance trusts. Where the
conditions specified in para. 15(1) are satisfied the settlement
3is exempt from various charges to tax under paras. 6 to 12.
Where no interest in possession subsists in the settled property, 
a capital distribution is treated as having been made on the occasion 
that the conditions specified in para. 15(1)(a) and (b) become 
satisfied.
The amount of the distribution is taken to be the value of the
5
property in respect of which the conditions become satisfied.
Tax is charged under para. 6(4)(a) on the value transferred by a 
chargeable transfer where the value transferred is equal to an 
amount which net of tax is equal to the value of the capital 
distribution. The grossing up principle does not apply if the 
tax is paid out of the property the value of which is taken as 
the amount of the capital distribution.^
1. Para. 12(2).
2. Para. 12(3).
3. Infra, at p. 205. _ _
4. Para. 15(3). See Inglewood v. I.R.C. , !_ 198l_/ S.T.C. 318.
5. Para. 15(3).
6. Para. 6(5).
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There is a deemed distribution payment under para. 11(8) equal 
to the amount on which tax is charged. This amount enters into 
the settlement's cumulative total.
G) The alteration of shares in a close company
Under s. 118, Finance Act 1976 a capital distribution may be 
treated as having been made on the alteration of, inter alia, the 
shares of a close company of which a trustee of the settlement is 
a participator.
Rates at which tax is chargeable under the discretionary settlement 
regime
Under the discretionary settlement regime the rate at which tax is
chargeable in the event of a capital distribution is determined
2
by reference to the second table set out in s. 37(3), viz, the 
table applicable to lifetime transfers.
The rate at which tax is charged on the capital distributions of 
settlements made inter vivos after 26th March, 1974, or on a
death after I2th March, 1975 is usually determined according to
3
the rules of para. 7: the rate depends to a certain extent upon the
personal rate of tax of the settlor when he constituted the settlement,
For the purpose of computing the rate under para. 7 the life of the 
settlement is in two consecutive phases.^
The settlement is in phase 1 when the amount on which tax is to 
be charged when added to any previous distribution payments does 
not exceed the value of the settled property when it first became 
comprised in the settlement (the initial value). The rate 
applicable in phase 1 is - where -
1. Para. 11(5) .
2. Para. 6(4).
3. Dymond, at p. 685-686,
4. Ibid., at p. 685-691.
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X is the amount of tax which would have been charged had the settlor 
on constituting the settlement made a gross transfer equal to the 
initial value of the settled property; and 
Y is the initial value of the settled property.
While the settlement is in phase 1 the rate at which tax is 
chargeable will be constant.
The settlement is in phase 2 when the amount on which tax is to 
be charged when added to any previous distribution payments exceeds 
the initial value of the settled property. The rate applicable is 
that of a person who had made previous chargeable transfers and the 
value transferred by them was equal to the aggregate of -
a) the values transferred by any chargeable transfers made by the
settlor before he constituted the settlement;
b) the initial value of the settled property; and
c) the amounts of any previous distribution payments which have
been made since the settlement entered into phase 2 of its 
existence.
Once the settlement is in phase 2 the rate will increase as further 
distribution payments are made.
The rates at which tax is charged on capital distributions in 
respect of settlements to which para. 8 applies are computed 
without reference to the personal circumstances of the settlor.
Para. 8 applies to settlements other than those to which para.
7 applies.
The amount on which tax is chargeable under para 8 is charged at 
the rate of a person who had made previous chargeable transfers 
equal to the amount of the distribution payments made out of the 
settled property since 26th March, 1974, but who had otherwise 
made no chargeable transfers. The settlement has its own independent 
cumulative total.
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THE MEANING OF 'INTEREST IN POSSESSION'
From the foregoing discussion it will be apparent that the 
treatment of settled property in which there subsists an interest 
in possession radically differs from the system of taxation of 
settled property in which no such interest subsists.
The capital transfer tax legislation provides little guidance as 
to the meaning of the expression 'interest in possession', although 
in relation to Scotland Para. 1(9) provides:
" ... any reference to an interest in possession in settled 
property is a reference to an interest of any kind under 
a settlement by virtue of which the person in right of that 
interest is entitled to the enjoyment of the property or 
would be so entitled if the property were capable of 
enjoyment including an interest of an assignee under an 
assignation of an interest of any kind (other than a 
reversionary interest) in property subject to a proper 
liferent and the person in right of such an interest at 
any time shall be deemed to be entitled to a corresponding 
interest in the whole or any part of the property comprised 
in the settlement."
Para. 11(10), which relates to both Scotland and England, provides
that 'interest in possession' means an interest in possession to
1
which an individual is beneficially entitled. Thus, trustees of 
a settlement are incapable of holding an 'interest in possession' 
in the settled property of another settlement: trustees are neither 
'individuals' nor would their interest be of a beneficial nature.
Clearly, para. 11(10) is of no assistance in determining what an 
'interest in possession' is; therefore, for the purpose of its 
application in England the phrase is not defined.
Traditionally, an interest is 'in possession when it is not 'in
2
reversion’ or 'in expectancy': but, as Walker queried:
1. A company is entitled to an interest in possession only if it 
satisfies the conditions set out in para. 11(10)(a) and (b), 
and para. ll(lOA).
2. Stroud's Judicial Dictionary, 4th ed., vol 4, at p. 2059.
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' ... does it extend to an interest which is revocable; 
to an interest which is subject to a power of accumulation, 
or a power to divert to another beneficiary or class of 
beneficiaries; or (in any circumstances) to an infant's 
interest?"
2
The decision of the House of Lords in Pearson v. I.R.C. has to a 
certain extent removed some of the doubts surrounding the meaning 
of the phrase. However, prior to the Pearson case there were 
certain established principles. Thus, the discretionary object 
of a discretionary settlement to whom no income or property had 
been appointed was considered not to have had an interest in 
possession: this is the principle in Gartside v. I.R.C.;
"'In possession' must mean that your interest enables you 
to claim now whatever may be the subject of the interest.
For instance, if it is the current income from a certain 
fund your claim may yield nothing if there is no income, 
but your claim is a valid claim, and if there is any income 
you are entitled to get it. But a right to require trustees 
to consider whether they will pay you something does not 
enable you to claim anything. If the trustees do decide to 
pay you something, you do not get it by reason of having the 
right to have your case considered; you get it only because 
the trustees have decided to give it to you."
It was also recognised that a trust to accumulate has the effect of 
negating an interest in possession. On the basis of Attorney-General 
V. Power,^ Wylie noted:
' ... it was always reasonably clear that a trust to accumulate 
income precluded there from being an interest in possession 
in settled property during the accumulation period if there 
was a possibility that the beneficiary might not ultimately 
become entitled to the accumulations. This was so even if 
the trustees had power to pay maintenance during the accumulation 
period,"
1. "The Meaning of 'Interest in Possession' in the Finance Act 197 5" 
_^1976_/ B.T.R. 49, at p. 49.
2. /_1980_/ S.T.C. 318.
3. / 1968 / A.C. 553, at p. 607 per Lord Reid).
4. / 1906/ 2 I.R. 272.
5. "Capital Transfer Tax - Interests in Possession": (1980) 106
Taxation 307, at p. 309.
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The principles in the Gartside and Power cases were not readily 
applicable to the facts in Pearson v. I.R.C. The facts in Pearson's 
case may be stated quite shortly.
The trustees of a trust constituted in 1964 held shares in P.B. Ltd. 
They were empowered to appoint both the capital and income to 
various discretionary objects. However, in default of and until 
such appointment the trustees were given the power to accumulate the 
income as they saw fit for a period of twenty-one years, and subject 
to that power they were to hold both capital and income for such 
of the "Principal Beneficiaries" who should attain twenty-one years.
By 1974 all the Principal Benficiaries had attained the age of 
twenty-one. The trustees had accumulated the income since 1964, 
but in 1976 a life interest in £16,000 was appointed to one of 
the Principal Beneficiaries. This would have been a chargeable 
event by virtue of para. 6(2) if no interest in possession in the 
settled property subsisted prior to the appointment.
Fox, J. and the judges of the Court of Appeal distinguished the
case from Gartside v. I.R.C. and Attorney-General v. Power. The
distinction drawn was that in those cases 'the beneficiaries got
nothing unless the trustees decided to give it to them' whereas in
the present case the / Principal Beneficiaries / were absolutely
entitled unless the trustees decided to accumulate"^ They held
that the right of each beneficiary was an interest in possession;
it was a present right as opposed to a future right in remainder
or in reversion. In consequence, there could be no charge by
virtue of para. 6(2) on the appointment of the life interest in
1976. It was generally thought that the existence of a mere power
2
to accumulate could not negate an interest in possession.
1. This summary of the distinction drawn at first instance and _ _
in the Court of Appeal was presented by Viscount Dilhorne, /_ 1980_/
S.T.C. 318, at p. 325.
2. Cf. the trust to accumulate in Attorney-General v. Power. The 
distinction between a__'trust' and a 'power' was discussed in 
McPhail V. Doulton, / 1970 7 2 All E.R. 228.
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The majority in the House of Lords took the opposite view. They 
held that an interest in possession is 'a present right of present 
enjoyment*, and that prior to the appointment in 1976 none of the 
beneficiaries had such a right.
Viscount Dilhorne was of the opinion that the Principal Beneficiaries
entitlement depended upon whether or not the power to accumulate
the income was exercised. While the trustees exercised the power
the beneficiaries could have no interest in possession; they were
entitled to nothing. However, he conceded that had the beneficiaries
been entitled to the income, then the mere presence of an overriding
power of appointment or revocation would not have affected their
1
interests as being interests in possession.
Lord Keith drew attention to para. 3(2) and (3) which provide
that an entitlement to part of the income of the settlement is
treated as an interest in possession in a proportionate part of 
2
the property. He suggested that those sub-paragraphs operate
only in respect of an absolute entitlement to part of the income
and not to an entitlement qualified by a power of accumulation.
He argued that this principle is equally applicable where the
beneficiary's interest extends to the whole of the income; the
inference being that an entitlement to the entire income qualified
by a power of accumulation cannot be considered as an interest in
3
possession in the entire property.
As to the distinction drawn in the courts below between the position 
of a discretionary object and the position of a beneficiary who will 
take unless the trustees appoint elsewhere. Lord Keith stated;
1. / 1980_/ S.T.C. 318, at p. 325.
2. Supra, at p. 182.
3. Ibid., at p. 334.
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' ... I do not consider it to be a satisfactory state of 
affairs that the question whether a person has an interest 
in possession should turn on the distinction between the 
position where his interest derives from his being the 
object of a discretionary power and that where his interest 
results in a benefit only failing the exercise of such a 
power. The practical results as regards the person having 
the interest are unlikely to be materially different in 
either case, and I can see no good reason why the distinction 
should lead to a difference of treatment for purposes of 
capital transfer tax. The distinction between a trust and a 
power may be of importance for certain other purposes ... 
but none of the consideration^ leading to that result appear 
to me to be applicable here."
Thus it would appear that a beneficiary has an interest in possession 
if he is entitled indefensibly to the intermediate income as it arises 
from the settled property. The existence of a power to prevent the 
beneficiary's receipt of income arising in future does not affect 
his present right of enjoyment as an interest in possession. However, 
a power to divert the intermediate income from the beneficiary after 
it has arisen has the effect of negating an interest in possession.
Somewhat surprisingly the Law Lords did not think it incumbent
on them to consider the interpretation of the expression 'interest
in possession' as it applies in Scotland. Viscount Dilhorne thought
that there was no 'justification for concluding that a provision
inserted for the purpose of applying Sch 5 to Scotland defines the
meaning of those words in the Schedule in their application to
2
England and Wales.'
It would appear that the definition of an interest in possession in 
settled property was provided for Scotland for the reason that 
the nature of the interest under a Scottish trust differs from that 
under an English trust:
1. Ibid., at p. 334-335.
2. / 1980 / S.T.C. 318, at p. 323.
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"The suggestion has been made that the provision of a separate 
definition for Scotland is based on the Scottish principle that 
a life tenant does not have any right of ownership in the 
property concurrent with the trustees' right, but is only entitled 
to the income of the property as it arises. In England a life 
tenant is treated as having a right of ownership of the property 
different from but concurrent with that of the trustees. In 
ordinary language it is difficult to comprehend the argument 
that a person beneficially entitled to the income as it arises 
from property does not have a beneficial interest in the 
property producing the income whatever the technicality of 
ownership. However, if this is not the view of the Revenug, 
presumably some separate meaning for Scotland will remain."
This tends to support the argument raised in Part 1 that if Baker v. 
2
Archer is considered to be a decision based upon pure trust law,
3
then the principle in the case has no application in Scotland.
It was stressed in I.R.C. v, Clark's Trs.^ that the beneficiary 
of a Scottish trust has no interest in the trust property; his 
interest is essentially a jus crediti to enforce the administration 
of the trust.
If the suggestion in Foster is correct,it is strange that an
equivalent definition of 'interest in possession in settled property'
in relation to Scotland was not provided in the capital gains tax
legislation. It will be recalled that there is a deemed disposal
of settled property by the trustees on the occasion of the
5
termination of a life interest in possession therein. It can only 
be assumed that for the purposes of capital gains tax, in accordance 
with the decision in Pearson's case, a life interest is in possession 
when the tenant for life has a present right of present enjoyment of 
the settled property or the income therefrom.
1. Foster, Cl.04, at C114; also Dymond, at p. 571-572,
2. (1927) 11 T.C. 749.
3. Supra, at p. 26 - 29.
4. 1939 S.C. 11.
5. S 55, Capital Gains Tax Act 1979; supra, at p. 162.
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what is not clear in the light of the Pearson decision is the
consequence of the trustees accumulating in one year and not in
1
the next and so on. The consequence is of significance in respect 
of both capital gains tax and transfer tax. Perhaps the problem 
will be resolved by the legislature in the overhaul of the 
capital transfer tax charging code for settlements promised by 
the Chancellor in his 1981 budget speech. However, the issue 
was not raised in the Inland Revenue's consultative document.
THE FAVOURED TRUSTS
Certain types of settlement are granted an exemption from the 
operation of the various charging provisions noted above. Of 
particular interest in relation to this discussion are those exemptions 
in favour of accumulation and maintenance trusts, and protective trusts
Accumulation and Maintenance Trusts
Where the conditions specified in para. 15(1) are satisfied, an
accumulation and maintenance settlement is exempted from several of
2
the charges to capital transfer tax. Thus, the payment of a capital 
sum to a beneficiary of a qualifying accumulation and maintenance
3
trust will not constitute a capital distribution under para. 6(1); 
neither will a capital distribution be treated as having been made 
under para. 6(2) on the occasion of a beneficiary becoming entitled 
to an interest in possession in any of the property. Further, during 
the process of accumulation the settlement cannot be subjected to a 
periodic charge under para. 12.
In order that the settlement qualifies for the exemptions under para. 
15(2) it must comply with the stringent conditions set out in para. 
15(1). Para. 15(1) provides;
1. Thompson, (1981) 97 L.Q.R. 1.
2. Para. 15(2).
3. It will, however, constitute a distribution payment which will
affect the settlement's cumulative total: see Foster,
C5.01, at C233.2.
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"This paragraph applies to any settlement where -
(a) one or more persons (in tWs paragraph referred to as 
beneficiaries) will, on or before attaining a specified 
age not exceeding twenty-five, become entitled to, or to 
an interest in possession in, the settled property or a 
part of it; and
(b) no interest in possession subsists in the settled 
property or part and the income from it is to be 
accumulated so far as not applied for the maintenance, education 
or benefit of a beneficiary; and
(c) either -
(i) not more than twenty-five years have elapsed since the 
day on which the settlement was made or, if it was later, 
since the time (or latest time) when the conditions stated 
in paragraphs (a) and (b) above became satisfied with 
respect to the property or part; or
(ii) all the persons who are or have been beneficiaries are 
or were ejther grandchildren of a common grandparent or 
children, widows or widowers of such grandchildren who were 
themselves beneficiaries but died before the time when, had 
they survived, they would have become entitled as mentioned 
in paragraph (a) above."
The condition in para 15(1)(a) will be satisfied where, although
no age of vesting is specified in the settlement, it may be
ascertained that at the time of vesting the beneficiary will be
below the age of twenty-five. The Inland Revenue take the view that
the condition will be satisfied if 'it is clear that a beneficiary
will in fact become entitled to the settled property (or to an
2
interest in possession in it) by the age of 25.'
It is imperative that one or more persons before attaining the age 
of twenty-five will become entitled to an interest in possession. 
'Will' does not mean 'might'. In Dymond it is noted:
1. A person's children include his illegitimate children, 
adnpted children and step-children - para. 15(6).
2. 7 1977_/ B.T.R. 947. This ignores the proposition of Rowlatt,
J . in White v. Whitcher, that 'attaining a specified age' 
means 'living to a point of time defined by reference to the 
then age of the person - not to a point of time fixed by other 
occurrences, although, of course, when the data is ascertained, 
it will be known how old everyone in the world, including any 
given person, will be'; (1927) 13 T.C. 202, at p. 205.
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"It does not suffice that, as things stand at a particular 
moment, he would become entitled if nothing (apart from 
his own death) should occur to disentitle him (either 
permanently or till after the specified age); the analogy 
is with an heir apparent, who will become entitled if 
he survives, in contrast to an heir presumptive, who^may 
or may not become entitled even though he survives."
It would appear that certain events which might operate to defeat
the vesting are to be ignored. By concession, the Inland Revenue
do not treat a settlement as failing to satisfy condition (a)
2
merely by reason of the existence of a power of advancement.
3
However, in Inglewood v. I.R.C. it was held that the existence of 
a power to revoke an appointment of an interest due to vest on the 
beneficiary attaining a specified age below the age of twenty-five 
years was such that the settlement failed to satisfy condition (a); 
but Vinelott, J. was of the opinion that the condition is satisfied 
despite the fact that the beneficiary may be deprived of his interest 
on the happening of some event not specified in the settlement.
The condition in para. 15(1)(b) is satisfied only where there 
is a 'trust' to accumulate; it is not satisfied where there is 
the mere power of accumulation. Thus where the terms of the trust 
specify an accumulation period, during that period the condition 
is satisfied. If, after the period the trustees are directed to 
appoint the income to A and B, but have an overriding power of 
accumulation exercisable at their discretion, then after the 
prescribed accumulation period condition (b) ceases to be satisfied 
whether or not the trustees in fact continue to accumulate the income.
1. At p. 740.
2. B.T.R. 437.
3. / 1981_/ S.T.C. 318.
4. See Hayton and Tiley, at p. 202-203.
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The condition in para. 15(1)(c) comprises two alternatives 
one of which must be satisfied. The condition was introduced by 
the Finance Act 1976 to counteract 'the possible creation of trusts 
for the benefit of successive generations of beneficiaries who 
would qualify for the relief, which was not intended,"
'Persons' in para. 15 include unborn persons, although conditions
(a) and (b) will not be considered as satisfied unless there is
2
or has been at least one living beneficiary.
Protective Trusts
Para. 18 affords a limited protection from capital transfer tax 
in respect of 'settled property held on trust to the like effect 
as those specified in section 33(1) of the Trustee Act 1925.'
Para. 18(2) provides;
"For the purposes of capital transfer tax -
(a) there shall be disregarded the failure or determination, 
before the end of the trust period, of trusts to the like 
effect as those specified in paragraph (i) of the said 
section 33(1); and
(b) the principal beneficiary shall be treated as 
beneficially entitled to an interest in possession in 
any property which is for the time being held on trusts 
to the like effect as those specified in paragraph (ii) 
of the said section 33(1)."
Thus, there is no charge to tax under para. 4(2) on the occasion 
that the principal beneficiary's interest comes to an end during 
the trust period.
The discretionary trust which in fact arises under s. 33(1)(ii), 
Trustee Act 1925 is to be treated for the purposes of capital 
transfer tax as if an interest in possession subsists in the settled 
property; the principal beneficiary is treated as being entitled 
to that interest. The discretionary trust is, therefore, exempt
1. Dymond, at p. 739.
2. Para. 15(5).
3. "Principal beneficiary" and "trust period" have the same
meaning as in s. 33, Trustee Act 1925.
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from any periodic charge under para. 12. A payment of capital to the 
principal beneficiary will not attract a charge to tax; however, 
a capital payment of trust property to others will be treated as 
the termination of the principal beneficiary's interest in that 
property and will attract a charge to tax under para. 4(2).
Para. 18(2)(b) applies to property which is 'for the time being' 
held on trusts to the like effect as those in s. 33(1)(ii).
Trustee Act 1925. S. 33(1)(ii) applies during the residue of 
the trust period only. It would appear that at the end of the 
trust period tax will be charged as if the principal beneficiary's 
interest had terminated; thereafter, the property enters into 
the discretionary settlement regime.
It is not clear when property will be held on trusts 'to the like 
effect' as those specified in the Trustee Act, s. 33(1). The 
Inland Revenue take the view that such trusts must not be 
materially different to s. 33(1) trusts in respect of their tax 
consequences. They are not to be distinguished by reason of 
minor variations or additional administrative powers; however,
'the extension of the list of potential beneficiaries to brothers 
and sisters of the principal beneficiary could be a means of 
giving relief to a trust primarily intended to benefit them.
Such a trust would be regarded as outside the scope of paragraph 18.'
The concept of the protective trust is useful to a settlor who 
wishes the beneficial interest under a trust to be enjoyed by 
the beneficiary alone and not by that beneficiary's creditors or 
assignees. The beneficiary's interest lapses on his becoming 
bankrupt or on the occasion of an attempted assignation. It is 
impossible in England to protect the beneficial interest for the 
enjoyment of a particular beneficiary: the safeguard afforded by
1. See Thomas v. I.R.C., 1981_/ S.T.C. 382, a case which arose
prior to the Finance Act 1978. The Finance Act 1978 
substantially amended the original para. 18.
2. 1979 Simon's Tax Intelligence, at p. 282.
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a protective trust is for the beneficial interest in the property 
itself and not for the beneficiary; the beneficiary under a protec­
tive trust loses his interest in the event of an attempted
1
assignation or bankruptcy.
The position in Scotland is different. A liferent may be protected
by being declared alimentary. The alimentary liferenter cannot
assign his interest, nor can it be subject to the diligence of 
2
his creditors. The difference between the English protective
trust and the Scottish alimentary liferent is that in the event
of an attempted assignation or bankruptcy the alimentary liferenter’s
3interest does not lapse but remains for his enjoyment.
However, the amount which may be protected by means of an
alimentary liferent must not be excessive in relation to the
position and circumstances of the liferenter. It would appear
that the excess which is not required for the maintenance of the
liferenter is assignable and may be subject to the diligence of
creditors.^ Thus, a truster who wishes to protect a particularly
valuable liferent should consider the creation of a trust to the
like effect as those specified in s. 33(1), Trustee Act 1925; a
trust which will enjoy the exemptions from capital transfer tax provided
by para. 18.
CONCLUSION
The main capital transfer tax chargeable events which affect a 
settlement of capital have been outlined above.
1. Snell's Principles of Equity, 27th ed., at p. 135-136,
2. Dobie, "The Manual of the Law of Liferent and Fee in Scotland",
at p. 231.
3. Ibid. , at p . 235.
4. Ibid., at p. 233-234,
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To establish an income tax effective settlement of capital the 
settlor exposes himself to a charge to capital transfer tax on 
constituting the trust. If there is no interest in possession 
in the settled property, while the income accumulates the capital 
will be subject to the periodic charge. Any payment of capital 
from a discretionary and accumulation trust will attract a charge 
to capital transfer tax. The occasion on which a person becomes 
entitled to an interest in possession in the settled property 
is a chargeable event, so too is the event of a person becoming 
absolutely entitled to the property itself.
The value of the estate of a person who is entitled to an interest 
in possession in settled property is made artificially high.
Capital transfer tax is chargeable on the death of the beneficiary 
and on the termination of the interest during his life or on the 
occasion that the beneficiary disposes of his interest.
The capital transfer tax consequences of an income tax effective 
settlement of capital are formidable. However, a considerable relief 
is provided by para. 15. By virtue of para. 15, it is possible 
to accumulate income for a period of up to twenty-five years 
without suffering unduly the severe effects of capital transfer 
tax. The potential beneficiary of a favoured accumulation and 
maintenance trust must be below the age of twenty-five which is 
regrettable bearing in mind the object of the accumulation. An 
accumulation trust is income tax effective only if the beneficiary 
to whom the capitalized income will be paid has a personal rate 
of tax in excess of 45%. Few persons below the age of twenty-five 
will possess such a high income; para. 15 is not, therefore, quite 
such a generous provision as it might appear.
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S U M M A R Y
Apart from Part XVI, I.C.T.A. (which, in essence, is an assemblage 
of anti-avoidance provisions rather than an organised structure 
of taxation) the income tax legislation provides no separate 
code expressly for the purposes of trust taxation. In consequence, 
any theory as to the liability to tax or otherwise of either the 
trustee or beneficiary must accord with the existing schedular 
system. Thus, in general, trustees and beneficiaries are 
assessable to tax on the basis that they are persons who receive 
or are entitled to receive income from a source designated in 
the Schedules.
The general theory is not applied strictly in so far as the 
taxation of the trustee is concerned. It has been noted that 
a trustee who is resident in the United Kingdom may not be assessed 
to tax on the income which he receives from a foreign source and 
which is payable to known foreign beneficiaries. In such a case 
the trustee is recognised as acting in a representative capacity 
on behalf of the foreign beneficiaries, and on this basis he may 
have a good answer to a particular assessment to tax.
Where both the trustee and beneficiary are resident in the United 
Kingdom the trustee will be chargeable to tax in respect of the 
trust income. It is of no consequence that the beneficiary to 
whom the income eventually will be paid has unused personal 
allowances and so will not be liable to tax on the trust income 
which he receives. It would appear that the trustee will be 
recognised as acting in a representative capacity only where the 
trust income is paid to a beneficiary who is not assessable to 
tax by reason of his residing outwith the United Kingdom.
The problems associated with the taxation of the beneficiary are 
more complex.
It has been explained that, in the light of the decision in Garland 
V. Archer-Shee  ^ it is the technical nature of the beneficiary's
1. (1931) 15 T.C. 693.
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interest under a trust that determines the Schedule by virtue of 
which he may be assessed to tax. It has also been explained 
that, prior to the decision of the House of Lords in 
Baker v. A r c h e r - S h e e the beneficiary's interest under a Scottish 
or English trust was considered to be in the nature of a jus in 
personam, to compel due administration of the trust.
The beneficiary's interest as a jus in personam would entitle 
him to income from the trust but not to the income of the trust.
He would be entitled to whatever income remained after the completion 
of the trust administration. In effect, the trust itself would 
be the source of the beneficiary's income; the actual source of 
the trusts income would not affect the Schedule under which he 
could be assessed to tax.
However, from the decision in Baker v. Archer-Shee it must be 
inferred that a beneficiary who is entitled to have paid to him 
income arising under an English trust must be assessed to tax under 
the Schedule appropriate to the source of the trust's income.
The decision in Baker v. Archer-Shee is inconsistent with the theory
that the nature of a beneficiary's interest is a mere right to
compel administration of the trust. If the decision is considered
to be based upon a finding of trust law, the case has no
2
application in Scotland. In I.R.C. v. Clark's Trs. the Court of 
Session firmly rejected the notion that the nature of a beneficiary's 
interest under a Scottish trust could be anything other than a jus 
crediti, to enforce the administration by the trustees.
Thus, if Baker v. Archer-Shee is not accepted as binding upon the 
Scottish courts, the beneficiary of a Scottish trust must be 
considered as being entitled to income from the trust, whereas the 
beneficiary of an English trust must be assessed to tax on the basis
1. (1927 11 T.C. 749.
2. 1939 S.C. 11.
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that he is entitled to the income of the trust. The two beneficiaries 
in substance might be in the same position and yet may be assessed 
to tax under differing Schedules.
It is suggested that a possible solution to the problem is to 
construe Baker v. Archer-Shee as a decision based upon pure income 
tax law divorced from considerations of the law of trusts. Hence, 
as a principle of tax law, for income tax purposes the beneficiary 
of a trust constituted and domiciled anywhere in the United Kingdom, 
is treated as being entitled to the income of the trust: he is not 
merely entitled to compel administration of the trust. Because of 
the decision in Garland v. Archer-Shee, it is not possible to extend 
the principle to determine the nature of the beneficiary's interest 
under trusts constituted and domiciled outwith the United Kingdom.
As a rule of pure tax law, the principle of the decision in Baker v. 
Archer-Shee would be applicable in Scotland as it is in England.
The beneficiary under a Scottish or English trust would be assessed 
to tax under the Schedule appropriate to the source of income of 
the trust.
Assuming that there is a Schedule appropriate to the source of the 
trust's income, the beneficiary may be assessed to tax only on so 
much of the income to which he is entitled. The amount of income 
to which he is entitled will usually depend upon the construction 
of the trust instrument.
The taxation of discretionary and accumulation trusts is complicated 
by SS.16 and 17, Finance Act 1973.
The trustee of a discretionary or accumulation trust may be assessed 
to tax at the additional rate on the trust income to which s. 16 
applies. S. 16 does not apply to trust income if it is treated 
as the income of the truster for any purpose of the Income Tax Acts, 
or if, while in the hands of the trustees, it forms the income of 
any person other than the trustees.
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Thus, income capitalized in the hands of the trustees is not 
chargeable to tax at the additional rate if it is accumulated 
on behalf of a beneficiary who is sui juris and who has the 
power to terminate the trust. Neither does s. 16 apply to income 
which remains in the hands of the trustees but in which a person 
has a vested interest,
S. 17 provides the machinery for the taxation of payments from a 
discretionary trust. The machinery of s. 17 supplies the means 
by which the tax paid by the trustees at the additional rate under 
s. 16 may be recovered.
In order that the payment qualifies for treatment under s. 17 it 
must be paid in exercise of a discretion and must form the income 
of the person to whom it is paid. Further, the payment must satisfy 
the conditions precedent to changeability under Schedule D Case III*, 
it must be paid under an obligation and must be capable of 
recurrence.
It has been noted that a payment from the capital of a trust pursuant 
to the exercise of an absolute discretion is considered to fulfil 
the conditions of changeability under Schedule D Case III. This begs 
the question: 'when will a payment from capital at the exercise of 
an absolute discretion constitute a capital receipt in the hands of 
a beneficiary?'
If the fiscal benefits of an accumulation trust are to be enjoyed, 
the truster must effectively alienate his income. By virtue of 
the provisions of Part XVI, I.C.T.A., alienation of income is, in 
general, an arduous method of saving tax.
The operation of the provisions of Part XVI in relation to the trust 
concept has been demonstrated. Depending upon the circumstances 
of the case, income arising under a trust may be treated for tax 
purposes as the income of the truster. However, the income arising 
under a trust which is a mere part of a 'settlement' may be 
attributed to a 'settlor' other than the truster. Thus it is possible 
that neither the truster, trustee nor beneficiary may be assessable 
to tax in respect of the trust income.
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The effect and interrelation of the provisions of Part XVI is 
considered in Part 2 of this work: it is noted that a trust 
constituted for the purpose of avoiding tax at the higher rates 
must comprise capital of which the truster has divested himself 
absolutely.
A settlement of capital may be subject to both capital gains and 
transfer tax. An outline of the capital tax treatment of the trust 
is provided in Part 3, The capital tax consequences of a settlement 
of capital are briefly summarized below, although the variations 
on the theme are infinite.
In order to create a settlement of capital the truster exposes 
himself to a charge to capital gains and transfer tax. An 
accumulation trust might provide an effective tax shelter, but 
it attracts the periodic charge to capital transfer tax. However, 
the periodic charge will not apply if the trust is protected under 
para. 15 of Schedule 5 to the Finance Act 1975.
The granting of an interest in possession is an event which may 
occasion a charge to capital transfer tax. A charge may also 
arise on the termination of the interest, and, if the interest 
was a life interest in possession, there may be a charge to capital 
gains tax. However, there can be no charge to capital gains tax 
if the life interest in possession terminates by reason of the 
death of the tenant for life.
Capital gains tax may be charged on the occasion that a person 
becomes absolutely entitled to the property of the trust. There 
will also be a charge to capital transfer tax unless the person who 
becomes absolutely entitled to the property previously held an 
interest in possession therein.
Obviously, when account is taken of the capital taxes, the income 
tax advantages of a settlement of capital appear less attractive; 
the income taxation of trusts, in practice, cannot be considered in 
isolation.
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APPENDICES
APPENDIX 1. AN OUTLINE OF THE CONCEPT OF 'TRUST'
The trust is an elusive character; like other legal concepts, 
it cannot be satisfactorily defined. As Scott suggested:
"All that one can properly attempt to do is to give such 
a description of a legal concept that others^will know 
in a general way what one is talking about."
The concept is characterised by certain established principles.
It is doubted that any English lawyer would suggest that the 
principles recited by Bell are not equally applicable to the 
concept of the trust in England.
"The whole doctrine and practice depends on these principles -
1. That a full legal estate is created in the person of 
the trustee, to be held by him against all adverse parties 
and interests, for the accomplishment of certain ends and 
purposes.
2. That the uses and purposes of the trust operate as 
qualificationsof the estate in the trustee, and as burdens 
on it preferable to all who may claim through him.
3. That those purposes and uses are effectually declared 
by directions in the deed, or by a reservation of power to 
declare in the future, and a declaration made accordingly.
4. And that the reversionary right, so far as the estate is 
not exhausted by the uses and purposes, remains with^the 
truster, available to him, his heirs and creditors."
In Wilson and Duncan it is suggested that the first two of these 
principles are features of a trust but the other two are not
3
applicable to all examples of the trust relationship. Thus the 
third principle will not apply to trusts which arise by operation 
of law, and in relation to charitable trusts the cy-prds doctrine 
operates as an exception to the fourth principle.
1. Trusts, 3rd ed., para. 2.
2. Principles of the Law of Scotland, at s. 1991,
3. At p. 17. .
Underhill defined an English trust as "an equitable obligation, 
binding a person (who is called a trustee) to deal with property 
over which he has control (which is called the trust property), 
for the benefit of persons (who are called beneficiaries or cestuis 
que trust), of whom he may himself be one, and any one of whom may 
enforce the obligation."
A popular Scottish definition reads;
"The contract /_ of trust_/ may perhaps be explained as one 
in which the legal title to property is transferred to a 
person called a trustee, who does not acquire an unlimited 
right to the property, but who holds it subject to an 
obligation to use it in accordance with the directions, 
express or implied, of the person who constituted the 
trust, for the benefit of certain persons of whom he may 
or may not himself be one."
It is immediately noticeable that, conceptually, there is little
difference between the English and Scottish trust. Wilson and
Duncan have indicated that the definitions propounded by English
writers are of little assistance when defining the trust in
Scotland but this is so merely because most English definitions
3
include the word 'equitable'.
It is interesting to note that despite their similarity the Scottish 
and English trust originate from remarkably diverse backgrounds.
It would appear that the Scottish trust has its roots in the contracts 
of mandate and depositum. The Lord President in Croskery v. Gilmour's Trs 
observed:
"A trust is a contract made up of the two nominate contracts 
of deposit and mandate. The trust funds are deposited for safe 
custody, and the^trustees receive a mandate for their 
administration."
1. Underhill's Law of Trusts, l3th ed., at p. 1.
2. The Enclyclopaedia of the Laws of Scotland, Vol. 15, para. 362.
3. At p. 17.
4. (1890) 17 R. 697, at p. 700.
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of mandate, Stair stated:
"The requisites of this contract must be first, a desire, 
warrant, or order, upon the part of the mandant to the 
mandantar, to do some affair, to the behoof of the 
mandant only; ... or to the behoof of a third party only
"The obligation arising from mandates is chiefly upon the 
part of the mandantar, to perform his undertaking, wherein 
he is obliged to follow the tenor of his commission, in 
forma specifica, in so far as it is special and express.
Depositum, according to Stair, 'is most fitly expressed by the
duty and obligation thereof, which is "to keep and preserve that
which is given in custody," and it is here subjoined to mandate,
3
because indeed it is a kind of it.' However:
'... depositum also may be fitly defined, to be "a mandate 
or commission, given and undertaken, to keep and preserve 
something belonging to the mandantar or some third party;" 
and therefore, whatever hath been before said of mandates, 
must be here understood of custody, and needs^not be 
repeated, except what is special in custody."
Stair further provided that:
"Trust is also a kind of depositation, whereby the thing 
intrusted is in the custody of the person intrusted, 
to the behoof of the intruster, and the property of 
the thing intrusted, be it in land or moveables, is 
in the persog of the intrusted, else it is not proper 
trust: ... "
This proposition is supported by Erskine who stated:
"A trust is also of the nature of deposition, by which a 
proprietor transfers to another the property of the subject 
intrusted, not that it should remain with him, but that 
it may be applied to certain uses for the behoof of a 
third party."
1. "Institution of the Law Scotland", at I, 12, 1.
2. Ibid., at I, 12, 9.
3. Ibid., at I, 13, 1.
4. Ibid., at 1 , 13, 1.
5. Ibid., at I, 13, 7.
6. "An Institute of the Law of Scotland", at III, 1, 32.
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Thus, the trust is a kind of depositation, and depositum may be 
fitly defined as a mandate or commission. The position is some­
what confused although Stair also recognised that 'trust is also
among mandates or commissions, though it may be referred to as 
1
deposition,'
The origins of the trust in England differ greatly from those of its 
Scottish counterpart. The English trust is essentially the product 
of the Chancery. No rights of the beneficiary were recognised at 
common law; the position is neatly illustrated by the example 
provided by Hanbury and Maudsley:
"If land is given to A on A's undertaking to hold the land 
to the use and benefit of B, it is unconscionable for A to 
keep it for his own benefit. B however has no legal claim 
or title to the land. The conveyance to A gives him what­
ever legal estate was conveyed, and at common law, A can 
exercise all the rights which that estate gives to him.
"The Chancellor / i.e., equity_/ interfered to compel A 
to hold the land for the exclusive use and benefit of B.
The Chancellor cannot say that B is the owner; A is. But 
all the beneficial interest in the land can be given to 
B by compelling A to keep the legal title only, and to give 
all the benfit of the^land to B . This is what happens when 
the use is enforced."
The existence of a contract between the settlor and the trustee is 
not essential to the creation of a valid trust. However, where there 
is an enforceable contract between the settlor and his trustee there is 
no reason why the settlor could not maintain an action for breach of 
contract should the trustee act in breach of trust, provided that 
the act which constitutes the breach of trust amounts to a breach
3
of contract. By reason of the doctrine of privity of contract such 
a course of action would not be open to the beneficiary of an 
English trust despite the fact that the terms of the contract 
operate in his favour. Viscount Haldane stated the position in 
England thus:
1. "Institution of the Law of Scotland", at I, 12, 17.
2. Modern Equity, lOth ed., at p. 7. “The 'use' is the forerunner 
of the modern trust.
3. Snell's Principles of Equity, 27th ed., at p. 90.
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' ... in the law of England certain principles are fundamental 
One is that only a person who is party to a contract can sue 
on it. Our law knows nothing of a jus quaesitum tertio 
arising by way of contract. Such a right may be conferred 
by way of property, as, for example, under a trust, but it 
cannot be conferred on a stranger to g contract as a right 
to enforce the contract in personam."
In Scotland it is a long established rule that in certain 
circumstances a person may sue on a contract to which he was 
not a party where that person has a jus quaesitum for its 
enforcement. Stair provided:
'... when parties contract, if there be any article in favour 
of a third part, at any time, est jus quaesitum tertio, which 
cannot be recalled by either or both of the contractors, but 
he may compel either of them to exhibit the contrac^, and 
thereupon the obliged may be compelled to perform."
It is essential that the jus quaesitum is irrevocable for it 'is 
obvious that if A and B contract and nothing else follows, and 
no one is informed of the contract, A and B can agree to cancel the
3
contract. Lord Dunedin in Carmichael v. Carmichael's Exrs. listed 
the events which may lead to irrevocability. These were succinctly 
summarised by Walker who stated that irrevocability
' ... is established by the delivery of the contractual document 
to the tertius, by registration for publication in the Books 
of Council and Session, by intimation to the tertius, by the 
tertius coming under onerous undertakings on the faith of 
having a jus quaesitum, or by evidence that^the tertius knew 
of the provision intended for his benefit."
1. Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co. Ltd. v. Selfridge S Co. Ltd., / 1915_/
A.C. 847, at p. 853. Cf. Denning L. J. (as he was then) in 
Smith and Snipes Hall Farm Ltd. v. River Douglas Catchment Board, 
^ 1949_/ 2 K.B. 500, at p. 514. See also Dowrick, "A Jus 
Quaesitum Tertio by way of Contract in English Law": (1956)
19 M.L.R. 374; and Furraston, "Return to Dunlop v. Selfridge": 
(1960) 23 M.L.R. 373.
2. I, 10, 5.
3. Carmichael v. Carmichael's Exrs., 1920 S.C. (H.L.) 195, at
p. 201.
4. Principles of Scottish Private Law, 2nd ed., at 628-629.
Once it is established that the third party has a jus quaesitum, 
then he is entitled to enforce the performance of the contract as 
between the contracting parties.
Thus a beneficiary of a Scottish trust may be entitled to enforce 
performance of the trustees' duties by means of a jus quaesitum. 
This right of the beneficiary is not recognised in England where, 
although it may be established that an enforceable contract exists 
between the trustees and the settlor, the beneficiary has no right 
at common law to enforce that contract.
It was noted above that the roots of the law of trusts in Scotland
lie in the contracts of mandate and depositum. However, it is
doubted by many writers of more recent times whether the modern
concept of trust can be considered in terms of the nominate
contracts. It is argued in the Encyclopaedia of the Laws of
Scotland that 'in neither mandate nor deposit does the property
vest in the mandatary or depositary, whereas in trust the property
1
vests in the trustee. McLaren considered the trust not as mandate
2
but as quasi-contract. Doubts are also expressed in Gloag and 
Henderson;
' ... the obligation involved in a position of trust or in 
certain fiduciary relationships extends so far beyond what 
the party who accepted the position may have intended, and 
are so often owed to parties with whom he clearly had no 
direct contractual relation, that it is more in accordance 
with modern decisions to regard trust, or fiduciary  ^
relationship, as an independent source of obligation."
It is now accepted that in the modern Scottish law of trusts, not 
only may the beneficiary enforce performance of the mandate by 
means of a jus quaesitum, he also has a right to compel the 
trustees to perform a duty which is owed by trustees to their 
beneficiaries. This duty is, in effect, equivalent to the duty
1. Vol. 15, para. 362.
2. Law of Wills and Succession, 3rd ed., II, at p. 825.
3. Introduction to the Law of Scotland, 6th ed., at p. 30.
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imposed on trustees in England; a duty which was established in 
the Court of Chancery.
The English infiltration into the law of Scotland was highlighted
by the Lord President in Allen v. M'Combies's Trs .^  The Lord
President accepted that it may be historically true that the
Scottish law of trusts is derived from the contracts of deposit
and mandate, but he considered that it would be wrong to apply
the law of these two contracts only when dealing with matters 
2
concerning trust. He determined that the law of the Court of 
Chancery is now engrafted onto the original Scottish law of
3
trusts, and that a trustee in Scotland owes a duty to his 
beneficiaries as does a trustee in England; this duty is not 
derived from the law of contract but from the principles of 
equity established in the Court of Chancery. He did not 
in any way suggest that the laws of deposit and mandate are no 
longer applicable to trusts; these are in addition to the 
principles derived from England. Lord Kinnear in the same case 
supported the Lord President:
" ... there can be no doubt that we have derived the law 
of trust as now administered much more directly, through 
the aid of the decisions of the House of Lords, from 
the equitable administration of trusts by the Court of 
Chancery in England, than by any logical deduction from 
the strictly legal conception of the contracts ^ of 
mandate and deposit_/ ... But whatever be the origin of 
the legal conception of trust it has wider consequences in 
the fiduciary relation^which it creates than can be 
referred to contract."
Thus, a fundamental difference between the Scottish and English law 
of trusts lies in the jus quaesitum of the Scottish beneficiary.
The Scottish beneficiary has two possible actions against a trustee, 
He has the equivalent of the English beneficiary to sue for breach 
of trust; he may also have a jus quaesitum to enforce performance 
of the mandate.
1. 1909 S.C. 710.
2. Ibid., at p. 716.
3. Ibid., at p. 717.
4. Ibid., at p. 720.
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APPENDIX 2. TRUST AND AGENCY DISTINGUISHED
There are many differences between the two legal concepts of trust 
and agency; however, both are in the nature of a fiduciary relation­
ship and this to a certain extent confuses the distinction.
Dowrick noted:
"Agency has often been described as a fiduciary relation. 
Historically the doctrine of fiduciary relations is an 
extension of the law of trusts."
The fiduciary relationship itself is a nebulous concept. 
According to Shepherd:
"A fiduciary relationship exists whenever any person receives 
a power of any type on condition that he also receives with 
it a duty to utilise that power in the best interests of  ^
another, and the recipient of the power uses that power."
It is because the laws which govern the acts of those in a fiduciary 
position are applicable to both trustees and agents that the 
distinction between the two concepts is blurred. For example, the
rule that a fiduciary must not allow his interest and duty to
3 4 5
conflict is found to apply to both trustees and agents.
The distinction is further confused by the dual role which may 
be played by an agent who purchases property in his own name but 
on behalf of his principal. The agent holds the property in trust;
1. "Relationship of Principal and Agent": (1954) 17 M.L.R. 24, 
at p. 28.
2. "Towards a Unified Concept of Fiduciary Relationships": (1981) 
97 L.Q.R. 51, at p. 75.
3. Bray v. Ford, / 1896 / A.C^ 44 (esp. Lord Hershell at p. 51).
4. Williams v. Barton, / 1927_/ 2 Ch. 9.
5. Parker v. McKenna, (1874-1875) 10 Ch. App. Cas. 96. M'Phersons * s 
Trustees v. Watt, (1877) 5 R. (H.L.) 9. For other fiduciary 
duties see generally Shepherd, (1981) 97 L.Q.R. 51, at p. 51.
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1
the beneficiary under the trust is the principal. In Longfield
2
Parish Council v. Robson the clerk to Longfield Parish Council 
was nominated by the Council to purchase land on its behalf. The 
land was conveyed to the clerk who refused to convey it to the 
Council. The court decided that the clerk held the land as a 
trustee on behalf of the Council.
The principle was recognised by Lord Dunfermline in Bank of 
Scotland v . Liquidators of Hutchinson Main and Co. Ltd., who 
observed:
"When an agent obtains money for the specific purpose of 
purchasing a property for his client and takes the title in 
his own name, and becomes bankrupt, it is clear that in 
such a case the law will get behind the apparent title to 
the beneficial and the real title, and that - always granted 
that the interests of third parties who have bought upon 
the faith of the records have not arisen - the property 
will, in the event of bankruptcy, be correctly treated as 
never having been in bonis of the debtor, but always of the 
client."
The basic distinction between trust and agency lies in the concept 
of ownership. In Menzies on Trustees it is provided:
"The most distinctive characteristic of the office of trustee 
is ownership. A trust, in^the legal sense, can only exist 
in reference to property."
The proposition is demonstrated by reference to the procedure of 
English law:
"This characteristic of ownership, as the real criterion 
of proper trusteeship, is sharply illustrated by the 
procedure of the English law, where a trustee proper, being 
vested with legal estate, cannot be sued by the beneficiary 
in an action law, but only in a personal suit in equity.
An agent though liable in a fiduciary capacity in equity, 
can also, as he is not vested with the legal estate of thg 
property in his possession, be sued in an action at law."
1. Bank of Scotland v . Liquidators of Hutchinson S Main S Co. Ltd., 
1914 S.C. (H.L.) 1; and Lees v. Nuttall, 39 Eng. Rep. 1157.
2. (1913) 19 T.L.R. 357,
3. 1914 S.C. (H.L.) 1, at p. 15.
4. 2nd ed., section 5.
5. Ibid.
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Thus a trustee acts with reference to property whereas an agent 
has a power to affect the legal relationships of his principal.
An agent is to a greater extent under the control of his principal, 
but a beneficiary generally has no right to dictate the way in 
which his trustee is to deal with the trust property. Snell 
summarised the distinction thus:
"An agent and a trustee resemble each other in that each is 
subject to fiduciary obligations towards his principal or 
beneficiaries, as the case may be. But there are many 
differences. Trusts are governed by equity, agency by 
common law. In most trusts, there is no contractual 
relationship between the trustees and the beneficiaries, 
whereas apart from agents of necessity agency normally 
arises by contract between a principal and agent. Usually 
a trustee has property vested in him, whereas an agent does 
not; and while a trustee usually cannot involve his 
beneficiaries in liability, an agent can make his principal 
liable."
1. Principles of Equity, 27th ed. at p. 89-90,
APPENDIX 3. THE NATURE OF THE INTEREST OF THE BENEFICIARY
1
The decision of the House of Lords in Baker v. Archer-Shee is 
considered in detail in the main text above. It is intended here 
to present a concise discussion on the nature of the beneficiary's 
interest according to the laws of Scotland and England: the 
decision in the Archer-Shee case is, however, ignored.
Scotland
Bell described the beneficial interest under a trust as follows:
"This is in its nature a jus crediti, and has preference over 
the private creditors of the trustee, while it is effectual 
against the truster's creditors by the real right vested in 
the trustee for behoof of those entitled to the trust .,. 
This jus crediti gives a personal right of action against 
the trustee."
Walker noted that the 'interest of a beneficiary under a trust 
deed is a jus crediti, enforceable by action against the trustees 
but not against any debtor to the trust estate.' Judicial 
authority for this proposition is found in the case of I.R.C. v . 
Clark's Trs., in which Lord President Normand stated:
’ ... the beneficiary's right is nothing more than a personal 
right to sue the trustees and compel them to administer the 
trust in accordance with the directions which it contains ..."
Lord Moncrieff concurred with the Lord President:
"In my view, the right of property in the estate of the 
trust is vested in the trustees to the exclusion of any 
competing right of property, and the right of the beneficiary 
... is merely a right in personam against the trustees to 
enforce their performance of the trust. It is true that, in 
the assertion of that right, a beneficiary will in certain 
cases obtain the aid of the Court to enable him to use the
1. (1927) 11 T.C. 749.
2. Principles of the Law of Scotland, at s. 1996.
3. Principles of Scottish Private Law, 2nd ed., at p. 1829
4. 1939 S.C. 11, at p. 22.
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names of the trustees, but it is only as representing 
the trustees in such a case that he can attach or^assert 
any property right over the assets of the trust."
However, it would appear that a beneficiary who is absolutely
entitled to property held by trustees is treated as possessing
a proprietary right in the trust res. The trustees in such a
case act as ’nominees' or 'bare trustees' who are required
to convey the property to the beneficiary at his request. Smith
submitted that 'the beneficiary's right against the trustee is
a personal right - a jus in personam - in some cases a jus ad
rem, when the beneficiary is entitled to have conveyed to him
2
some specific property. Support for Smith's submission is
3
provided by the estate duty case of Parker v. Lord Advocate 
the facts of which were as follows.
During the life of the truster the beneficiaries were entitled 
to enjoy the free income from the settled funds. On the truster's 
death, the funds were to be divided equally between the beneficiaries 
The truster died and the question of estate duty arose. Estate duty 
was chargeable on the value of the property which passed on the 
death of a person. Property passing on the death of a person was 
deemed to include 'any annuity or other interest purchased or 
provided by the deceased ... to the extent of the beneficial 
interest accruing or arising by survivorship or otherwise on the 
death of the deceased'. The trustees argued:
"Certainly some beneficial interests ... accrued or arose, 
but they did not extend to the whole capital of the trust fund 
since previously the children were entitled to beneficial 
interests in possession in the income, and allowance should 
be made for these, because after the death of the deceased 
the children simply continued to bg entitled to the income 
under the provisions of the deed."
1. Ibid. at p. 26.
2. Short Commentary on the Law of Scotland, at p. 573
3. 1960 S.C. (H.L.) 29.
4. Ibid at p. 31.
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They suggested that the interests of the beneficiaries were 
similar both before and after the death of the truster and that 
therefore the value of the beneficial interests accruing on the 
death of the truster was minimal. The House of Lords had little 
sympathy with this contention. The view of the House was 
succinctly stated by Lord Keith of Avonholm:
"But granted they / the beneficiaries^/ enjoy the same income, 
the income before and after the death is derived from quite 
different rights. Before the truster's death there was 
merely a right in the children to call the trustees to 
account for their administration of the trust and to pay 
to them the income arising - Inland Revenue v. Clark's Trustees 
1939 S.C. 11. After the death their income derived from 
ownership of the corpus of the trust estate vested in them 
for the first time on the degth of the truster. These are 
radically different rights."
After the death of the truster the capital was payable to the
beneficiaries: although the trustees held the capital it was
thought by the House that the beneficiaries were the owners of
the trust fund. Their right was described by Lord Mackintosh in
the Court of Session as a 'jus in re, a real right in the trust 
2fund.' Thus during the life of the truster the beneficiaries' 
interests were rights in personam - against the trustee; but 
after his death the beneficiaries became absolutely entitled to the 
trust property and were treated as having acquired a proprietary 
right - a jus in re.
The Scottish bankruptcy cases fit rather awkardly within the 
general theory outlined above. S. 102 of the Bankruptcy (Scotland) 
Act 1856 reads:
"The act and warrant of confirmation in favour of the trustees 
shall ipso jure transfer to and vest in him, or any succeeding 
trustee, for the behoof of the creditors, absolutely and 
irredeemable, as at the date of the sequestration, with all 
right, title, and interest; the whole property of the debtor, 
to the following effect ... "
1. Ibid. at p. 41.
2. 1959 S.L.T. 65, at p. 71.
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where a debtor appeared on the face of public records to be the 
absolute owner of property but had by an unregistered back letter 
declared himself trustee of that property for another, did the 
'whole property' of the debtor which transferred on sequestration 
to the trustee in bankruptcy include the property held by the 
debtor on latent trust? This was the problem presented to the
X
House of Lords in Heritable Reversionary Co. Ltd. v. Millar.
M bought land in his own name ; the disposition was recorded in 
the Register of Sasines. M executed a declaration of trust on 
behalf of the Appellants for whom he had purchased the property: 
the declaration was unrecorded. M was declared bankrupt. The 
House decided that the property held on trust did not pass to 
the trustee in bankruptcy under s. l02. Lord Watson suggested 
that the debtor M merely had an apparent title to the property 
but had no real right:
"An apparent title to land or personal estate, carrying no 
real right of property with it, does not, in the ordinary 
or in any true legal sense, make such land or personal 
estate the property of the person who holds the title.
That which, in legal as well as in conventional language, 
is described as a man's property is estate, whether heritable 
or moveable, in which he has a beneficial interest which 
the law allows him to dispose of."
The decision was approved by the House of Lords in the later case
3
of Bank of Scotland v. Liqrs. of Hutchinson Main & Co., Ltd. 
However, it is submitted that the statement of Lord Watson is a 
little too extensive.
The statement is acceptable in so far as it relates to property 
held by nominees or bare trustees on behalf of a beneficiary who 
has the power to call for a conveyance of the trust property to 
himself. In this respect it is consistent with the decision in
1. (1892) 19 R. (H.L.) 43.
2. Ibid. at p. 47.
3. 1914 S.C. (H.L.) 1.
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Parker v. Lord advocate and with the submission of Smith which is 
2set out above. However, in so far as it relates to property held 
on behalf of a mere liferenter who has no power to call for a 
conveyance, the statement is not consonant with the prevailing 
authority. It must be confined within narrow limits; Wilson 
and Duncan suggested :
"It may be that this problem, like many others in Scots law, 
is one of semantics and that thege dicta referred to 'property' 
as used in the Bankruptcy Acts."
The problem as to the nature of the beneficiary's interest is 
inextricably associated with the notion that the trustees are 
able to transfer property free from the trust to a bona fide 
purchaser for value who takes without notice of the trust. In 
Millar's case it was necessary for the Lords to explain how such 
a purchaser could receive a good title to trust property from 
trustees who, according to the Lords, had no real property to 
transfer. Lord Watson in Millar's case provided:
" ... the validity of a right acquired ... by a bona fide 
disponee for value does not rest upon the recognition of 
any power in the trustee which he can lawfully exercise,
... but upon the well known principle that a true owner 
who chooses to conceal his right from the public, and to 
clothe his trustee with all the indicia of ownership, is 
thereby barred from challenging rights acquired by innocent 
third parties for onerous consideration under contracts 
with his fraudulent trustees."
5
It was the House of Lords in Redfearn v. Sommervails & Co. 
that first established the principle that a purchaser for value 
of trust property who acts in good faith and without notice of 
the trust takes that property free from the trust. The facts in
1. 1960 S.C. (H.L.) 29.
2. Supra., at xii.
3. At p. 15.
4. (1892) 19 R. 43, at p. 47.
5. (1813) 3 Eng. Rep. 618.
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the case were as follows; A held a share on latent trust for B.
A assigned the share to C for onerous cause. The court was
required to determine the competing claims of B and C. The
Court of Session held that the assignee (C) could take no better 
title than the assignor (A) had; he took therefore subject to 
the latent equity. The decision was based on the rule that where
a creditor assigns a debt, the debtor may use any right of set-off
against the assignee that he could have exercised against the 
original creditor.
The House of Lords reversed the Court of Session's decision.
The assignee (C) was not in the position of an assignee of a 
debt who could enquire of the debtor how the debt stood. C did 
not know of the beneficiary; he could not therefore have enquired 
of B as to the interest of B in the shares. Lord Eldon argued:
"If latent equities were suffered to prevail against 
assignations, the effect would be that nothing could 
ever be assigned; for as long as their Scotch neighbours 
retained any part of their characteristic shrewdness, 
they would never take an assignment if they were aware that 
by means of lament equities such assignments might give 
them nothing."
There is no suggestion here that the trustee had no real property 
to transfer or that the beneficiary was personally barred from 
asserting property rights against the bona fide purchaser for value. 
The rationale for the rule is clearly to promote safety in 
commercial transactions. The notion of personal bar may serve to 
alleviate the position of the purchaser from bare trustees who, it 
would appear, have no real title to transfer. However, in respect 
of trustees (other than bare trustees), on the basis of Redfearn v. 
Somervail £ Co. the purchaser receives the property free from the 
trust in order to promote safety in commercial transactions.
It is only safe to conclude that, unless the beneficiary is entitled 
to call for a conveyance of the trust property, he has no right of 
ownership therein: he has a personal right of action against the 
trustees - a jus in personam. As Smith submitted, there is 'no 
suspicion that the law of Scotland recognises anything in the nature 
of different but concurrent rights of ownership in the trustee and 
beneficiary.'
1. Ibid, at p. 626.
Short Commentary on the Law of Scotland, at p. 573.
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Prior to the decision in Baker v. Archer-Shee it was a commonly 
held belief that the interest of a beneficiary under a trust 
was a mere jus in personam - to compel due administration of the 
trust. The topic was not entirely free from confusion though 
what confusion there was stemmed more from a looseness of language 
than from any fundamental conflict of concepts. Maitland noted:
"This is a topic which, as it seems to me, is insufficiently 
explained in some of our elementary text-books. Language 
is there used about one person being the owner at law while 
another is the owner in equity in which there is no harm, 
provided it be properly understood; but it does not explain 
itself and is liable to lead to serious mistake^, not merely 
to unsound theories but to practical blunders."
Maitland maintained that the rights of the beneficiary are essentially
jura in personam; they are rights against certain persons and not
3jura in rem, rights against the world at large. The beneficiary 
has no proprietary rights in the trust res. The confusion that 
Maitland noted, that it is common to speak of the beneficiary as 
the owner in equity of the trust res, arises by reason of the 
uncanny resemblance that the beneficiary's interest bears to a 
property right.
The beneficiary's interest developed the appearance of a proprietary 
right in a series of stages; Maitland catalogued the development.^
(i) In the first place the beneficiary has a remedy against 
the person who has undertaken to hold land or goods for him. The 
right is clearly in personam,
(ii) The rights can be enforced against the heirs and 
successors of the original trustee.
1. (1927) 11 T.C. 749.
2. Equity, 2nd ed., at p. 106.
3. Ibid., at p. 107. See also Coke - ' ... cestui que use had
neither jus in re nor jus ad rem, but only a confidence and 
trust.' (Co.Litt. 272 b)
4. Equity, 2nd ed., at p. 112-114.
XVI1
(iii) The trust can be enforced against the creditors of 
the trustee.
(iv) The beneficiary may enforce his right against anyone 
who receives trust property gratuitously from the trustee. At 
this stage Maitland observed that 'the cestui que trust's right 
/ is_/ beginning to look real.'
(v) The trust can be enforced against one who has received 
trust property for valuable consideration but who had notice of 
the trust. The rationale for this rule according to Maitland, is 
that it 'is unconscientious - 'against conscience' - to buy what 
you know is held on trust for another.'
(vi) The trust is enforceable against one who has received 
trust property for valuable consideration and who did not know
of the trust, but his ignorance was due to his lack of diligence; 
this is the notion of constructive or presumed notice.
The trust may therefore be enforced against a number of persons 
other than the original trustee; the beneficiary’s interest clearly 
has many semblances of a proprietary right.
"But here a limit was reached. Against a person who acquires 
a legal right bona fide, for value, without notice express or 
constructive of the existence of equitable rights those 
rights are of no avail."
"Equity cannot touch him, because, to use the old phrase, his
conscience is unaffected by the trust.
"The result to which we have attained might then, as it would
seem, be stated in one of two alternative ways.
"(1) Cestui que trust has rights enforceable against any 
person who has undertaken the trust, against all who claim 
through or under him as volunteers (heirs, devisees, personal 
representatives, donees) against his creditors, and against 
those who acquire the thing with notice actual or constructive 
of the trust.
Or (2) Cestui que trust has rights enforceable against all 
save a bona fide purchaser ('purchaser' in this context 
always includes mortgagee) who for value has obtained a 
legal right in th^ thing without notice of the trust express 
or constructive."
1. Ibid., at p. 114,
2. Ibid., at p. 115.
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As Hart noted, the right of the beneficiary 'ought to be regarded 
as jus in personam since, although it can be enforced against a 
great many people,it cannot be enforced against everybody.'^
This is not, however, to suggest that a beneficiary has no rights 
in rem. He has, as Langdell has indicated, a right in rem in the 
equitable obligation of the trustee, that is, the equitable chose 
in action. Langdell noted;
"Regarding the equitable obligation itself as the res, there 
can be no doubt that an equitable obligation, like a legal 
obligation always creates a right in rem (i.e., an absolute 
right), as between the obligee and the rest of the world except 
the obligor; for it can create a right in personam (i.e., a 
relative right) only between the obligee and the obligor.
To say, therefore, that an obligation can create a relative right 
only, is to say that it can create no right whatever, except 
as between the obligee and obligor. Moreover, if an obligation 
does not create an absolute right, it is impossible to support 
Lumley v. Guy and Boyjen v. Hall, though the converse does not 
necessarily follow."
Lumley v. Guy  ^ and Bowen v. Hall^ are authorities for the proposition 
that the acts of a stranger which interfere with a contract so 
preventing the obligee from enjoying its performance are actionable 
wrongs. The right of an obligee against the obligor gives rise to a 
negative duty imposed on the world at large not to interfere with 
the obligee's right in personam. Ames explained:
A cestui que trust is frequently spoken of as an equitable 
owner of the land. This, though a convenient form of 
expression, is clearly inaccurate. The trustee is the owner 
of the land, and, of course, two persons with adverse interests 
cannot be owners of the same thing. What the cestui que trust 
really owns is the obligation of the trustee; for an obligation 
is as truly the subject-matter of property as any physical res.
1. "The Place of the Trust in Jurisprudence"; (1912) 28 L.Q.R. 290. 
at p. 297.
2. A Brief Survey of Equity Jurisdiction, 2nd ed., 6, n 1.
3. (1853) 118 Eng. Rep. 749.
4. (1881) 6 Q.B.D. 333.
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The most striking difference between property in a 
thing and property in an obligation is in the mode 
of enjoyment. The owner of a house or a horse enjoys 
the fruits of ownership without the aid of any other 
person. The only way in which the owner of an obligation 
can realize his ownership is by compelling its performance 
by the obligor. Hence, in the one case, the owner is 
said to have a right in rem, and, in the other, a right 
in personam. In other respects the common law rules 
of property apply equally to ownership of things and 
ownership of obligations. For example, what may be 
called the passive rights of ownership are the same 
in both cases. The general duty resting upon all mankind 
not to destroy the property of another, is as cogent 
in favour of an obligee as it is in favour of the owner 
of a horse. And the violation of this ^uty is as pure 
a tort in the one case as in the other.
Very much in the minority is the opinion of Scott who, although
accepting the proposition of Langdell, argued that a beneficiary
also has a proprietary right in the trust res; he suggested that
it is not wrong to speak of a beneficiary as an equitable owner.
Scott maintained that the courts 'speaking of conscience, of
presumed notice, of unjust enrichment' may not always have realized
that they were in fact attributing to the beneficiary property
rights in the trust res, and that the subjection to the trust of
donees of trust property who have taken without notice involves a
2
recognition of a proprietary right in the beneficiary.
Scott further maintained that it is not by reason of some principle 
based on considerations of 'conscience' that the purchaser for 
value of property without notice of the trust takes the property 
free of the trust. The purchaser takes the property because the 
law requires that commercial transactions must be protected. Thus, 
according to Scott, the beneficiary has a real right in the trust 
property, but, as the law requires that commercial transactions 
must be protected, the right cannot prevail against a bona fide
3
purchaser for value without notice of the trust.
1. "Purchaser For Value Without Notice": (1887) 1 Harv. L.R. 1,
at p. 9-10.
2. "The Rights of the Cestui Que Trust": (1917) 17 Col. L.R. 269,
at p. 283.
3. Ibid., at p. 280.
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The present writer does not pretend that justice has here been 
done to the elaborate arguments produced by Scott in support 
of his thesis. However, it is submitted that the proposition 
that a beneficiary has no propietary interest in the trust property 
was convincingly reaffirmed by Stone in his reply to Scott's article
Unlike Scott, Stone was not prepared to dismiss to such an extent 
the notion of conscience as the basis for the subjection of 
certain persons to the trust. Stone argued {mainly on the basis 
of American decisions)^ that liability is imposed on a donee of 
trust property only when that donee becomes aware that the property 
was the subject of a trust:
"He / the donee / must not only interfere with the trust 
property, but his liability is dependent upon his knowledge 
that he is interfering with the right which the cestui has 
against the trustee. That is to say, his liability is 
fixed only when his conscience is affected. Thus, the 
innocent donee is not liable to the cestui until he knows 
that, by his possession and retention of the trust property, 
he is interfering with the right of the cestui. If he 
gave the property away before notice, he would not be 
liable for his interference with the trust property and 
he might reacquire the property from his subsequent bona 
fide purchaser without incurring any liability to the cestui, 
although a strict trustee may not repurchase the trust 
property from the bona fide purchaser and hold it free 
of his personal obligation to the cestui. The duty arises 
when his conscience is affected. These results indicate 
that the test of liability of the third person, in every 
case, whether a purchaser or donee, is conscious interference 
with the right of the cestui. It is his act, accompanied 
with knowledge of the cestui's right, which fixes upon the 
third person the obligation in personam, without which there 
can be no right against the third person."
The significance of Stone's observations is that it is not a 
proprietary right of the beneficiary in the trust res which imposes 
the liability on a donee of trust property, but the right which 
gives rise to a negative duty in the world at large not to deliberately
1. Bonesteel v. Bonesteel (1872) 30 Wise. 516: Gidding v. Eastman 
(N.Y. 1835) 5 Paige Ch. 561.
2. "The Rights of the Cestui Que Trust": (1917) 17 Col. L.R.
467, at p. 484.
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interfere with the obligation of the trustee to the beneficiary.
Where a bona fide purchaser for value of trust property
subsequently becomes aware of the trust he is, by retaining the
property, deliberately interfering with the beneficiary's
equitable chose in action against the trustee. However, Stone, in
agreement with Scott, suggested that no liability attaches to the
purchaser because the law requires that commercial transactions
1
must be protected. Stone summarized his thesis thus;
' ... it is believed that the view of the nature of the 
right of the cestui que trust most consistent with the 
decisions and which gives greatest promise of the 
development of the law upon a moral basis is that the 
right of the cestui is a right in personam against the 
trustee, specifically enforceable with reference to the 
trust res; that the cestui acquires rights in personam 
against third persons, not because he is equitable owner 
of the trust res, but through equity's imposing upon 
third persons, obligations in personam, because of their 
unconscientious interference with the right which the 
cestui has against the trustee; that, therefore, equity 
imposes on all the world the duty of not consciously 
aiding in a breach of trust or preventing the cestui 
from having the benefit of the obligation of the trustee."
Thus, apart from the decision in Baker v. Archer-Shee, it would
appear that the beneficiary of an English trust has no proprietary
right in the trust res. As Hanbury has indicated, the lawyer
adopts lay phraseology and talks loosely of 'equitable ownership*
3
merely to avoid the imputation of 'prigishness'.
It was noted in Appendix 1 that the modern law of trusts in Scotland 
has to a considerable extent been derived from the decisions of 
the English Court of Chancery.^ It is not therefore surprising 
that the nature of the beneficiary's interest according to the legal 
theory of both countries should be similar. In his analysis of 
the nature of the beneficiary's interest in Scotland Smith stated:
1. Ibid., at p. 484.
2. Ibid., at p. 500.
3. "A Periodical Menace to Equitable Principles": (1928) 44 L.Q.R. 
486, at p. 486.
4. Supra, at p. vii..
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"It must be stressed, however, that no good and much harm 
can result from seeking to graft onto Scots law the 
characteristically English dichotomy of 'legal' and 
'equitable' ownership,"
The statement is unfortunate in that Smith assumed that there 
is a dichotomy of 'legal' and 'equitable' ownership in England: 
it has been shown that this is not the case. Conceptually, the 
Scottish trust is barely distinguishable from its English 
counterpart. It is only the Archer-Shee decision that casts 
doubt on this proposition.
1. Short Commentary on the Law of Scotland, at p. 549,
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APPENDIX 4. SECTION 451, I.C.T.A. AND THE FINANCE BILL 1981
The Finance Bill 1981 proposes several amendments and reliefs to
the operation of s. 451, I.C.T.A. These proposals are discussed
1
in general terms below.
A) Payment of a capital sum indirectly to the settlor
Clause 41(7) seeks to rationalize the somewhat arbitrary rules in
respect of capital sums paid indirectly to the settlor by the
trustees of a settlement. It will be recalled that a sum paid
to a third party is caught by s. 451 only if that third party
2
is accountable to the settlor or his spouse, .Thus, capital 
sums paid to the creditors of the settlor in discharge of his 
debts are not taxable as his income. A capital sum so paid, 
in effect, benefits the settlor as much as a sum paid to a 
third party who is accountable to the settlor. However, the sum 
paid to the accountable third party is taxable under s. 451
In clause 41(7) it is proposed that a capital sum which (1) is 
paid by the trustees to a third party at the settlor's direction 
or by virtue of the assignment of the settlor's right to receive 
it, or (2) is otherwise paid or applied by the trustees for the 
benefit of the settlor, shall be treated as if it had been paid
3
to the settlor.
B) The extent to which a capital sum is treated as income
A capital sum paid by the trustees to the settlor may be treated 
as his income to the extent that it falls within the income available 
at the end of the year in which it is paid or in subsequent years.^
1. Unless otherwise stated, reference in this appendix are to
the Finance Bill 1981.
2. Lord Normand in Potts' Executors v. I.B.C., (1950) 32 T.C.
211, at p. 229; supra, at p. 137.
3. The proposal is intended to operate from 6th April, 1981.
4. S. 451(1); supra, at p. 139.
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The amount of income available at the end of any year for the 
purposes of s. 451(1) is the amount of income arising under the 
settlement in that year and any previous relevant year which 
has not been distributed, minus the deductions specified in 
paras (a) to (e) of s, 451(2), Clause 41 proposes that several 
other deductions should be allowed in addition to those currently 
allowed in s. 451(2).
Thus, for the purposes of ascertaining the amount of income 
available at the end of any year it is proposed that there 
should be deducted from the undistributed income of the settle­
ment arising in that and any previous relevant year;
1) the amount of income which has been taken into account in
previous years in determining the amount of a capital sum to be
2
treated as the income of the settlor in those previous years;
2) the amount of income arising under the settlement in that 
and any previous relevant year which has been treated as the
3
income of the settlor under s. 457; and
3) the amount of any sums paid by virtue or in consequence of 
the settlement and which have been treated as the income of the 
settlor under s. 438(2)(b), I.C.T.A.^
Para. (e)(ii) of s, 451 is amended to take account of the proposed
5
deductions at 2) and 3) above.
C) The amount of tax payable by the settlor
Where a capital sum is treated as the income of the settlor under 
s. 451, the amount of income attributed to him is an amount equal 
to the sum received grossed up at the basic and additional rate of 
tax.^
1. Supra at p. 140.
2. The purpose of this proposal is evident from the remarks of Lord
Reid in I.R.C. v. Bates, (1966) 44 T.C. 225, at p. 261-262;
supra, at p. 141.
3. Supra, at p. 142.
4. Supra, at p. 143.
5. The proposal is intended to affect capital sums paid after 
6th April, 1981.
6. S. 451(5) , I.C.T.A., supra, at p. 144.
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Although the settlor will be liable to income tax on the grossed 
up amount of the capital sum it is proposed in clause 41(5) that 
there is to be set against the amount of tax chargeable an amount 
equal to (a) the sum of tax at the basic and additional rate for 
that year on the amount treated as income; or (b) so much of that 
sum as is equal to the tax charged, which ever is the less.
In effect, the capital sum will be grossed up only for the purposes 
of assessing the amount at the higher rates of tax of the settlor.^
D) Capital sums paid by way of loan
Clause 41(4) proposes that where a capital sum is paid to the settlor 
by way of loan and is repaid in full, no part of the sum may be 
treated as income of the settlor under s. 451(1) for any year of 
assessment after that in which the repayment is made.
If one or more previous loans have been made and repaid in full, 
relief may be available in respect of a subsequent loan. The 
amount of the subsequent loan is to be reduced by the amount of 
the previous loans which has been treated as the income of the 
settlor.
It is further proposed that relief should be available in respect
of a capital sum paid by the trustees to the settlor by way of
complete repayment of a loan. The relief is to be available
where subsequent to the complete repayment, the settlor makes a
further loan to the trustees of an amount not less than the amount
repayed. If this condition is satisfied, the capital sum (the
amount of the original loan repayed to the settlor) is not to be
treated as the income of the settlor after the year in which the
2
further loan is made.
1. The proposal is intended to affect capital sums paid after 
6th April, 1981.
2. The proposal is intended to affect capital sums paid after 
6th April, 1981.
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E) Capital sums paid by bodies corporate connected with the settlement
Clause 43(2) proposes to substitute s. 454(4), I.C.T.A. S. 454(4) 
provides the criteria for determining whether or not a body corporate 
is connected with a settlement. It is proposed that the new s. 454(4) 
will provide:
" ... a body corporate shall be deemed to be connected with 
a settlement in any year of assessment if at any time in 
that year -
(a) it is a close company (or only not a close company because 
it is not resident in the United Kingdom) and the participators 
then include the trustees of the settlement; or
(b) it is controlled within the meaning of section 534 below
by a company falling within paragraph (a) above."
S. 454(4) as it now stands provides that a close company is 
connected with a settlement if the participators include either 
the trustees of the settlement or the beneficiary. Para, (b) of 
the proposed s. 454(4) is an addition to the section.
Clause 42(1) proposes that a capital sum paid to the settlor by 
a body corporate connected with the settlement shall be treated 
as if it had been paid by the trustees to the extent that it falls 
within the total amount of 'associated payments' made by the 
trustees to the body corporate.
An 'associated payment' is a capital sum (or other sum paid or asset 
transferred otherwise than for full consideration) paid to the body 
corporate by the trustees within five years of the date on which the 
capital sum was paid to the settlor by the body corporate.
If the capital sum paid by the body corporate to the settlor 
exceeds the amount of associated payments made up to the end 
of the year in which the capital sum is paid, then a carry forward 
provision is to operate. Thus, the excess may be treated as if it
were paid by the trustees in subsequent years to the extent that
it falls within the total amount of associated payments made in 
those subsequent years.
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In general, there is to be no charge to tax on the settlor if the 
capital sum paid by the body corporate is made by way of loan or 
repayment of a loan and the settlor repays to the body corporate 
an amount equal to the capital sum within twelve months of the 
date on which it was paid to him.
1. The proposal is intended to affect capital sums paid after 
6th April, 1981.
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ADDENDUM
Piratin v. I.R.C.^
Piratin v. I.R.C. was a case involving the notorious s. 451,
I.C.T.A. The taxpayer was the settlor of a trust constituted in 
1967. He operated a running account with a close company, S.L.P.,
2
which was connected with the settlement. Applying I.R.C. v. Bates, 
Slade, J. held that each withdrawal from the account represented a 
repayment of a loan; the sums withdrawn were, therefore, capital 
sums paid directly to the settlor and were accordingly taxable 
under s. 451(1). It was immaterial that the sums were paid to 
the settlor in the course of a running account.
In 1972 the settlor deposited various sums with Oceanic, a close 
company also connected with the settlement. In the same year 
Oceanic transferred those sums to B. Ltd. at the settlor's request. 
On receipt of these sums B. Ltd, became contractually bound to pay 
to the settlor on demand an amount equal to the amount transferred 
by Oceanic.
The Crown argued that Oceanic, by transferring the funds to B. Ltd., 
had indirectly paid a capital sum to the settlor with s. 451(1).
The Crown's contention was dismissed. B. Ltd. was not in law
strictly accountable to the settlor for the sums transferred; B.
Ltd. was merely contractually bound to pay to the settlor an
equivalent sum. This did not satisfy the strict accountability test
3
laid down in Potts' Executors v. I.R.C. to determine if a sum is 
paid 'indirectly' to a settlor for the purpose of s. 451.
1. / 1981_/ S.T.C. 441.
2. (1966) 44 T.C. 225.
3. (1950) 32 T.C. 211.
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